Additional analyses
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coefficient | Hazard ratios | Altman measure | ||
| Rm_PROXY | 0.098*** | 0.611*** | 1.842 | 2.153*** |
| (4.682) | (2.462) | (3.579) | ||
| Poison Pill | 0.441*** | 0.375*** | 0.960 | 0.025 |
| (4.026) | (4.274) | (0.164) | ||
| Abs_DA | −0.024 | −0.041 | 1.454 | −1.566** |
| (−0.237) | (−0.476) | (−1.973) | ||
| Rm_proxy* Poison Pill*Abs_da | 1.320** | 1.047** | 2.848 | |
| (1.786) | (1.830) | |||
| Offerprice | −0.003 | −0.004** | 0.996 | −0.003 |
| (−1.243) | (−2.135) | (−1.186) | ||
| Firstday_ret | 0.003 | 0.008*** | 1.008 | 0.007* |
| (1.063) | (3.717) | (1.681) | ||
| BTM | 0.451*** | 0.280** | 1.323 | 0.532** |
| (3.117) | (2.390) | (2.341) | ||
| Leverage | −0.137 | −0.182 | 0.833 | 2.380*** |
| (−1.089) | (−1.576) | (13.201) | ||
| Logage | 0.014 | −0.028 | 0.972 | −0.258*** |
| (0.202) | (−0.527) | (−2.587) | ||
| ROA | −0.683* | −1.751*** | 0.173 | −7.192*** |
| (−1.647) | (−4.500) | (−6.655) | ||
| Overhang | −0.000 | −0.000*** | 1 | 0.000 |
| (−0.658) | (−5.077) | (0.368) | ||
| VC_Dummy | 0.087 | 0.231** | 1.259 | −0.248 |
| (0.749) | (2.416) | (−1.507) | ||
| Big4 | −0.039 | 0.090 | 1.094 | 0.111 |
| (−0.374) | (1.020) | (0.681) | ||
| Gross_Margin | −0.368** | −0.455*** | 0.634 | 0.116 |
| (−2.088) | (−3.029) | (0.385) | ||
| Nidummy | 0.021 | −0.024 | 0.976 | 0.946*** |
| (0.141) | (−0.192) | (4.650) | ||
| Constant | 2.251 | – | −1.945 | |
| (1.401) | (−1.208) | |||
| Firm and year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Wald χ2 | 355.80 | 729.7 | 556.73 | |
| Log pseudolikelihood | −1453.73 | −5044.74 | −738.81 | |
| Observations | 2,997 | 2,994 | 2,883 | |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.136 | – | 0.392 | |
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coefficient | Hazard ratios | Altman measure | ||
| Rm_PROXY | 0.098*** | 0.611*** | 1.842 | 2.153*** |
| (4.682) | (2.462) | (3.579) | ||
| Poison Pill | 0.441*** | 0.375*** | 0.960 | 0.025 |
| (4.026) | (4.274) | (0.164) | ||
| Abs_DA | −0.024 | −0.041 | 1.454 | −1.566** |
| (−0.237) | (−0.476) | (−1.973) | ||
| Rm_proxy* Poison Pill*Abs_da | 1.320** | 1.047** | 2.848 | |
| (1.786) | (1.830) | |||
| Offerprice | −0.003 | −0.004** | 0.996 | −0.003 |
| (−1.243) | (−2.135) | (−1.186) | ||
| Firstday_ret | 0.003 | 0.008*** | 1.008 | 0.007* |
| (1.063) | (3.717) | (1.681) | ||
| BTM | 0.451*** | 0.280** | 1.323 | 0.532** |
| (3.117) | (2.390) | (2.341) | ||
| Leverage | −0.137 | −0.182 | 0.833 | 2.380*** |
| (−1.089) | (−1.576) | (13.201) | ||
| Logage | 0.014 | −0.028 | 0.972 | −0.258*** |
| (0.202) | (−0.527) | (−2.587) | ||
| ROA | −0.683* | −1.751*** | 0.173 | −7.192*** |
| (−1.647) | (−4.500) | (−6.655) | ||
| Overhang | −0.000 | −0.000*** | 1 | 0.000 |
| (−0.658) | (−5.077) | (0.368) | ||
| VC_Dummy | 0.087 | 0.231** | 1.259 | −0.248 |
| (0.749) | (2.416) | (−1.507) | ||
| Big4 | −0.039 | 0.090 | 1.094 | 0.111 |
| (−0.374) | (1.020) | (0.681) | ||
| Gross_Margin | −0.368** | −0.455*** | 0.634 | 0.116 |
| (−2.088) | (−3.029) | (0.385) | ||
| Nidummy | 0.021 | −0.024 | 0.976 | 0.946*** |
| (0.141) | (−0.192) | (4.650) | ||
| Constant | 2.251 | – | −1.945 | |
| (1.401) | (−1.208) | |||
| Firm and year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Wald | 355.80 | 729.7 | 556.73 | |
| Log pseudolikelihood | −1453.73 | −5044.74 | −738.81 | |
| Observations | 2,997 | 2,994 | 2,883 | |
| Pseudo | 0.136 | – | 0.392 | |
Note(s): In this table, model 1, we report the moderating effect of shareholder governance on IPO failure. The interaction term is the product of Rm_proxy, Abs_DA and poison pill. We also illustrate in Model 2 the estimation of the Cox proportional hazards model of the probability of failure. Finally, in Model 3, we report the result of our logistic regression using the Altman Z-Score as a proxy for IPO failure. Appendix outlines definitions and data sources for the regression variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by the firm are reported inside the parentheses
* Statistical significance at the 10% level
** Statistical significance at the 5% level
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level
Source(s): Table by authors
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