Heterogeneous effects: type of firm ownership
| Dep. var. = PDIFF2 | JVs (1) | WFOEs (2) | SOEs (3) | Non-SOEs (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Panel A: results based on our baseline sample | ||||
| TREAT × POST | 0.0007 (0.09) | −0.0149*** (−2.70) | −0.0103 (−0.57) | −0.0083 (−1.40) |
| POST | −0.0039 (−0.62) | 0.0067 (1.44) | 0.0093 (0.51) | 0.0012 (0.22) |
| Firm-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 4,098 | 6,331 | 603 | 6,186 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.695 | 0.732 | 0.682 | 0.644 |
| Panel B: matching all government subsidies regardless of the amount | ||||
| SUBRATIO × POST | −0.2645 (−1.27) | −0.2054* (−1.87) | 0.1015 (0.27) | −0.1399 (−1.00) |
| POST | 0.0070** (2.24) | 0.0006 (0.26) | −0.0052 (−0.47) | −0.0021 (−0.70) |
| Firm-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 10,823 | 17,203 | 1,185 | 13,010 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.706 | 0.730 | 0.678 | 0.647 |
| Dep. var. = | JVs (1) | WFOEs (2) | SOEs (3) | Non-SOEs (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.0007 (0.09) | −0.0149*** (−2.70) | −0.0103 (−0.57) | −0.0083 (−1.40) | |
| −0.0039 (−0.62) | 0.0067 (1.44) | 0.0093 (0.51) | 0.0012 (0.22) | |
| Firm-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 4,098 | 6,331 | 603 | 6,186 | |
| Adjusted | 0.695 | 0.732 | 0.682 | 0.644 |
| −0.2645 (−1.27) | −0.2054* (−1.87) | 0.1015 (0.27) | −0.1399 (−1.00) | |
| 0.0070** (2.24) | 0.0006 (0.26) | −0.0052 (−0.47) | −0.0021 (−0.70) | |
| Firm-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 10,823 | 17,203 | 1,185 | 13,010 |
| Adjusted | 0.706 | 0.730 | 0.678 | 0.647 |
Note(s): This table presents subsample analyses for each type of firm ownership. We divide our matched sample into four subsamples: joint ventures of local firms and foreign companies (JVs), wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs), state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and others (labeled as Non-SOEs). In Panel A, we present the results based on our baseline sample. In Panel B, we match all government subsidies regardless of the amount and replace the treatment dummy (TREAT) with the subsidy ratio (SUBRATIO), calculated as the subsidy amount divided by annual sales. The model includes firm and year fixed effects and firm-level control variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Presented in the parentheses below each coefficient is the t-value based on standard errors clustered by firm. Constant terms are estimated but omitted for presentation. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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