Bank risk, linear models, sound/unsound banks
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CE Ratio | Leverage | NPLs | Price Volatility | |||||
| Female Directors (lag) | m_Y = 0, 1 | −0.0863*** (0.0253) | 0.0587** (0.0284) | −0.0369** (0.0144) | 0.0238*** (0.00804) | −0.0275* (0.0148) | 0.0128 (0.0175) | −0.0816*** (0.0296) | 0.00160 (0.0322) |
| Board Size (lag, log) | 0.00849 (0.0122) | −0.000926 (0.00420) | −0.00279 (0.00728) | −0.0204* (0.0118) | ||||
| Independent Directors (lag) | −0.00156 (0.0125) | −0.00396 (0.00266) | −0.00490 (0.00636) | 0.00319 (0.00822) | ||||
| CEO Duality (lag) | 0.000372 (0.00491) | −0.00103 (0.00236) | −0.00248 (0.00288) | −0.00205 (0.00409) | ||||
| Tenure (lag, log) | 0.0168** (0.00799) | −0.00620** (0.00269) | −0.0109 (0.00988) | −0.0172** (0.00785) | ||||
| Meetings (lag, log) | −0.00346 (0.00426) | −0.00491** (0.00192) | 0.00365 (0.00284) | 0.00913* (0.00504) | ||||
| Bank Size (lag, log) | 0.0366*** (0.0104) | 0.00703* (0.00387) | −0.00779 (0.00881) | −0.0473** (0.0210) | ||||
| ROA (lag) | −0.118 (0.148) | 0.143 (0.100) | −0.936*** (0.336) | −0.861*** (0.212) | ||||
| Loans Ratio (lag) | 0.106*** (0.0330) | −0.000855 (0.0139) | 0.0139 (0.0183) | −0.0268 (0.0262) | ||||
| Deposits Ratio (lag) | 0.00000776 (0.0326) | 0.0210 (0.0135) | −0.0581*** (0.0177) | −0.0326 (0.0605) | ||||
| Hard Quotas (lag) | 0.0284** (0.0125) | −0.00579 (0.00423) | −0.00191 (0.00638) | 0.0139 (0.00943) | ||||
| Soft Quotas (lag) | 0.0111** (0.00474) | 0.00497*** (0.00147) | −0.0102*** (0.00313) | −0.00989** (0.00490) | ||||
| GDP (lag, log) | −0.0443 (0.0300) | −0.0252*** (0.00912) | −0.0385** (0.0149) | −0.0879** (0.0341) | ||||
| Year effects, constant | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||
| Observations | 990 | 968 | 995 | 983 | ||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CE Ratio | Leverage | NPLs | Price Volatility | |||||
| Female Directors (lag) | m_Y = 0, 1 | −0.0863 | 0.0587 | −0.0369 | 0.0238 | −0.0275 | 0.0128 (0.0175) | −0.0816 | 0.00160 (0.0322) |
| Board Size (lag, log) | 0.00849 (0.0122) | −0.000926 (0.00420) | −0.00279 (0.00728) | −0.0204 | ||||
| Independent Directors (lag) | −0.00156 (0.0125) | −0.00396 (0.00266) | −0.00490 (0.00636) | 0.00319 (0.00822) | ||||
| CEO Duality (lag) | 0.000372 (0.00491) | −0.00103 (0.00236) | −0.00248 (0.00288) | −0.00205 (0.00409) | ||||
| Tenure (lag, log) | 0.0168 | −0.00620 | −0.0109 (0.00988) | −0.0172 | ||||
| Meetings (lag, log) | −0.00346 (0.00426) | −0.00491 | 0.00365 (0.00284) | 0.00913 | ||||
| Bank Size (lag, log) | 0.0366 | 0.00703 | −0.00779 (0.00881) | −0.0473 | ||||
| ROA (lag) | −0.118 (0.148) | 0.143 (0.100) | −0.936 | −0.861 | ||||
| Loans Ratio (lag) | 0.106 | −0.000855 (0.0139) | 0.0139 (0.0183) | −0.0268 (0.0262) | ||||
| Deposits Ratio (lag) | 0.00000776 (0.0326) | 0.0210 (0.0135) | −0.0581 | −0.0326 (0.0605) | ||||
| Hard Quotas (lag) | 0.0284 | −0.00579 (0.00423) | −0.00191 (0.00638) | 0.0139 (0.00943) | ||||
| Soft Quotas (lag) | 0.0111 | 0.00497 | −0.0102 | −0.00989 | ||||
| GDP (lag, log) | −0.0443 (0.0300) | −0.0252 | −0.0385 | −0.0879 | ||||
| Year effects, constant | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||
| Observations | 990 | 968 | 995 | 983 | ||||
Notes:
Panel fixed effects (within) estimation (significant Hausman test); all the explanatory variables are lagged by 1 year (lag); natural logarithmic transformations of Board Size, Tenure, Meetings, Bank Size and GDP are used (log); Bank-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:
p < 0.10;
p <* 0.05
p < 0.01; m_Y is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the risk (measured in terms of Y = CE Ratio, LEV, NPLs, PV) is above the sample median and 0 when the risk is below the sample median; | m_Y = 0, 1 means the coefficient on the left is conditional to m_Y being equal to 0 and the coefficient on the right is conditional to m_Y being equal to 1
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