Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
| Mean | Median | Min. | Max. | SD | Skewness | Kurtosis | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abnormal return (dependent variable) | |||||||
| CAR[−1, +1] (%) | 1.98 | 0.68 | – | – | 7.64 | – | – |
| Corporate governance variables | |||||||
| Shareholder protection (acquirer) | 0.69 | 0.77 | 0.43 | 0.87 | 0.12 | −0.20 | −1.65 |
| Shareholder protection (target) | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.17 | 0.80 | 0.20 | −0.15 | −1.52 |
| Shareholder protection (difference) | 0.12 | 0.08 | −0.30 | 0.63 | 0.21 | 0.15 | −0.30 |
| Creditor protection (target) | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.08 | 1.00 | 0.21 | 0.07 | −0.94 |
| Creditor protection (difference) | 0.24 | 0.20 | −0.60 | 0.83 | 0.26 | 0.12 | 0.06 |
| Transparency (target) | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.11 | 0.89 | 0.15 | 10.00 | 0.85 |
| Corruption (target) | 0.38 | 0.41 | 0.10 | 0.61 | 0.11 | −0.33 | −0.87 |
| Rule-of-law (acquirer) | 0.79 | 0.83 | 0.40 | 0.89 | 0.11 | −2.38 | 4.45 |
| Rule-of-law (target) | 0.46 | 0.51 | 0.13 | 0.70 | 0.11 | −0.70 | 0.76 |
| Political and economic variables | |||||||
| Political stability | 0.42 | 0.46 | 0.02 | 0.70 | 0.15 | −0.79 | 0.41 |
| Economic freedom (target) | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.11 | 0.89 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.85 |
| Market value/GDP (target) | 1.117 | 0.742 | 0.037 | 2.766 | 0.912 | 0.51 | −1.25 |
| GDP growth (target) | 0.041 | 0.040 | −0.089 | 0.226 | 0.026 | 0.57 | 8.34 |
| GDP/capita (target) | 3,788.12 | 3,203.24 | 189.59 | 11,219.43 | 2,664.45 | 0.50 | −0.69 |
| Urbanization (target) | 0.025 | 0.020 | −0.003 | 0.062 | 0.012 | 0.750 | 0.230 |
| Cultural variables | |||||||
| Cultural difference | 1.49 | 1.23 | 0.17 | 4.46 | 1.10 | 0.76 | 0.01 |
| Control variables | |||||||
| Acquirer size (million $) | 9,356.57 | 1,699.67 | 8.43 | 340,730.6 | 26,387.08 | 3.75 | 19.30 |
| Market-to-book (acquirer) | 1.90 | 1.41 | 0.23 | 11.64 | 1.63 | 3.48 | 15.12 |
| ROA (acquirer) | 0.15 | 2.82 | −171.07 | 70.72 | 21.13 | −4.53 | 35.57 |
| Free CF (acquirer) (%) | −17.91 | 3.37 | −718.58 | 57.22 | 114.51 | −5.22 | 28.02 |
| Transaction value (million $) | 327.99 | 40.20 | 5.00 | 15,025.00 | 1,161.00 | 8.02 | 81.10 |
| Mean | Median | Min. | Max. | SD | Skewness | Kurtosis | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAR[−1, +1] (%) | 1.98 | 0.68 | – | – | 7.64 | – | – |
| Shareholder protection (acquirer) | 0.69 | 0.77 | 0.43 | 0.87 | 0.12 | −0.20 | −1.65 |
| Shareholder protection (target) | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.17 | 0.80 | 0.20 | −0.15 | −1.52 |
| Shareholder protection (difference) | 0.12 | 0.08 | −0.30 | 0.63 | 0.21 | 0.15 | −0.30 |
| Creditor protection (target) | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.08 | 1.00 | 0.21 | 0.07 | −0.94 |
| Creditor protection (difference) | 0.24 | 0.20 | −0.60 | 0.83 | 0.26 | 0.12 | 0.06 |
| Transparency (target) | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.11 | 0.89 | 0.15 | 10.00 | 0.85 |
| Corruption (target) | 0.38 | 0.41 | 0.10 | 0.61 | 0.11 | −0.33 | −0.87 |
| Rule-of-law (acquirer) | 0.79 | 0.83 | 0.40 | 0.89 | 0.11 | −2.38 | 4.45 |
| Rule-of-law (target) | 0.46 | 0.51 | 0.13 | 0.70 | 0.11 | −0.70 | 0.76 |
| Political stability | 0.42 | 0.46 | 0.02 | 0.70 | 0.15 | −0.79 | 0.41 |
| Economic freedom (target) | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.11 | 0.89 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.85 |
| Market value/GDP (target) | 1.117 | 0.742 | 0.037 | 2.766 | 0.912 | 0.51 | −1.25 |
| GDP growth (target) | 0.041 | 0.040 | −0.089 | 0.226 | 0.026 | 0.57 | 8.34 |
| GDP/capita (target) | 3,788.12 | 3,203.24 | 189.59 | 11,219.43 | 2,664.45 | 0.50 | −0.69 |
| Urbanization (target) | 0.025 | 0.020 | −0.003 | 0.062 | 0.012 | 0.750 | 0.230 |
| Cultural difference | 1.49 | 1.23 | 0.17 | 4.46 | 1.10 | 0.76 | 0.01 |
| Acquirer size (million $) | 9,356.57 | 1,699.67 | 8.43 | 340,730.6 | 26,387.08 | 3.75 | 19.30 |
| Market-to-book (acquirer) | 1.90 | 1.41 | 0.23 | 11.64 | 1.63 | 3.48 | 15.12 |
| ROA (acquirer) | 0.15 | 2.82 | −171.07 | 70.72 | 21.13 | −4.53 | 35.57 |
| Free CF (acquirer) (%) | −17.91 | 3.37 | −718.58 | 57.22 | 114.51 | −5.22 | 28.02 |
| Transaction value (million $) | 327.99 | 40.20 | 5.00 | 15,025.00 | 1,161.00 | 8.02 | 81.10 |
Notes: Rule-of-law is from the World Bank’s “Worldwide Governance Indicators” (WGI project). Shareholder (creditor) protection is the level of shareholder (creditor protection) multiplied by the rule-of-law. Corruption is the level of corruption in the target country by Transparency International. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return. The other variables are defined in Table AI
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