Regression with CAR[−1, +1] and shareholder/creditor protection dispersion
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate governance | ||||||
| Shareholder prot. dispersion × minority acquisition | −0.799 (−1.00) | |||||
| Shareholder prot. dispersion × majority acquisition | 1.973* (1.82) | |||||
| Shareholder prot. dispersion × 100% acquisition | 2.755** (2.07) | |||||
| Creditor prot. dispersion × minority acquisition | −0.523 (−0.63) | |||||
| Creditor prot. dispersion × majority acquisition | 1.265 (1.29) | |||||
| Creditor prot. dispersion × 100% acquisition | 2.14* (1.77) | |||||
| Transparency | 0.37 (1.07) | 4.113 (1.32) | 4.12 (1.35) | 3.538 (1.14) | 4.196 (1.32) | 3.794 (1.23) |
| Controls for politics, economics, culture and firm characteristics (as in Tables VI and VII) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Fixed effects (year, country, industry) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Number of observations | 415 | 415 | 415 | 415 | 415 | 415 |
| F-value | 1.46** | 1.53** | 1.51** | 1.47** | 1.49** | 1.49** |
| R2 | 0.176 | 0.179 | 0.182 | 0.177 | 0.183 | 0.188 |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shareholder prot. dispersion × minority acquisition | −0.799 (−1.00) | |||||
| Shareholder prot. dispersion × majority acquisition | ||||||
| Shareholder prot. dispersion × 100% acquisition | ||||||
| Creditor prot. dispersion × minority acquisition | −0.523 (−0.63) | |||||
| Creditor prot. dispersion × majority acquisition | 1.265 (1.29) | |||||
| Creditor prot. dispersion × 100% acquisition | ||||||
| Transparency | 0.37 (1.07) | 4.113 (1.32) | 4.12 (1.35) | 3.538 (1.14) | 4.196 (1.32) | 3.794 (1.23) |
| Controls for politics, economics, culture and firm characteristics (as in | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Fixed effects (year, country, industry) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Number of observations | 415 | 415 | 415 | 415 | 415 | 415 |
| 1.46** | 1.53** | 1.51** | 1.47** | 1.49** | 1.49** | |
| 0.176 | 0.179 | 0.182 | 0.177 | 0.183 | 0.188 | |
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. The dependent variable is CAR[−1, +1]. Shareholder or creditor protection dispersion equals 1 if the acquirer’s index value for investor protection (shareholder or creditor protection, respectively) is above the global average and the target firm’s index is below it. The control variables, Tobin’s Q, ROA and free cash flow margin, are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. Variables are defined in Table AI. All models contain year, country and industry dummies. *,**,***Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels (italic faced), respectively
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