Table III Results of fixed effects...

Table III

Results of fixed effects regressions on the level of CSR disclosure

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
	Japan	USA	Japan	USA	Japan	USA
CSR disclosure	ESG	ESG	E	E	S	S
L.in_director	0.12*** (3.72)	0.03 (0.93)	0.14*** (3.71)	0.04 (0.54)	0.17** (2.93)	−0.01 (−0.18)
L.CSR disclosure	0.33** (3.23)	0.13** (2.64)	0.32** (3.37)	0.16** (2.88)	0.14* (2.29)	0.15** (3.28)
L.roe	−0.01 (−0.40)	−0.00 (−0.30)	−0.01 (−0.24)	−0.01 (−0.67)	0.03 (0.64)	−0.00 (−0.39)
L.lever	0.01 (1.62)	−0.00 (−0.23)	0.01 (0.70)	−0.00* (−2.39)	0.01 (1.03)	−0.00 (−0.73)
L.sales_growth	0.02 (1.05)	−0.01 (−1.71)	0.00 (0.07)	−0.01 (−1.05)	−0.02 (−0.86)	−0.01 (−1.77)
L.sales	0.00 (0.44)	−0.00 (−0.08)	−0.00 (−0.01)	0.00 (0.69)	0.00 (0.60)	0.00 (0.79)
L.total_asset	0.00 (1.32)	0.00** (2.78)	0.00** (3.18)	0.00*** (4.17)	−0.00 (−1.71)	0.00 (1.05)
L.employee_nu	0.00 (0.13)	−0.00 (−1.77)	−0.00 (−0.24)	−0.00 (−1.97)	0.00 (0.07)	−0.00 (−1.37)
2006bL.year	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
2007L.year	0.38 (0.63)	2.15*** (4.05)	1.07 (1.18)	2.46** (3.29)	1.63 (1.86)	2.55** (3.09)
2008L.year	−0.01 (−0.02)	3.66*** (5.60)	0.37 (0.35)	4.63*** (4.24)	1.36 (1.14)	4.44*** (4.84)
2009L.year	0.63 (0.63)	4.36*** (6.50)	1.63 (1.26)	4.52*** (4.09)	1.37 (0.93)	5.97***(6.01)
2010L.year	−0.21 (−0.19)	3.68*** (4.58)	1.08 (0.86)	3.85** (2.90)	2.15 (1.29)	5.63*** (4.94)
industry dummy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
_cons	23.24*** (4.73)	18.50*** (6.81)	24.56*** (4.35)	15.71* (2.54)	22.88*** (5.08)	15.73*** (4.32)
n	199	1,570	197	933	199	1,566
R²	0.324	0.125	0.301	0.163	0.182	0.133

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
	Japan	USA	Japan	USA	Japan	USA
CSR disclosure	ESG	ESG	E	E	S	S
L.in_director	0.12*** (3.72)	0.03 (0.93)	0.14*** (3.71)	0.04 (0.54)	0.17** (2.93)	−0.01 (−0.18)
L.CSR disclosure	0.33** (3.23)	0.13** (2.64)	0.32** (3.37)	0.16** (2.88)	0.14* (2.29)	0.15** (3.28)
L.roe	−0.01 (−0.40)	−0.00 (−0.30)	−0.01 (−0.24)	−0.01 (−0.67)	0.03 (0.64)	−0.00 (−0.39)
L.lever	0.01 (1.62)	−0.00 (−0.23)	0.01 (0.70)	−0.00* (−2.39)	0.01 (1.03)	−0.00 (−0.73)
L.sales_growth	0.02 (1.05)	−0.01 (−1.71)	0.00 (0.07)	−0.01 (−1.05)	−0.02 (−0.86)	−0.01 (−1.77)
L.sales	0.00 (0.44)	−0.00 (−0.08)	−0.00 (−0.01)	0.00 (0.69)	0.00 (0.60)	0.00 (0.79)
L.total_asset	0.00 (1.32)	0.00** (2.78)	0.00** (3.18)	0.00*** (4.17)	−0.00 (−1.71)	0.00 (1.05)
L.employee_nu	0.00 (0.13)	−0.00 (−1.77)	−0.00 (−0.24)	−0.00 (−1.97)	0.00 (0.07)	−0.00 (−1.37)
2006bL.year	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
2007L.year	0.38 (0.63)	2.15*** (4.05)	1.07 (1.18)	2.46** (3.29)	1.63 (1.86)	2.55** (3.09)
2008L.year	−0.01 (−0.02)	3.66*** (5.60)	0.37 (0.35)	4.63*** (4.24)	1.36 (1.14)	4.44*** (4.84)
2009L.year	0.63 (0.63)	4.36*** (6.50)	1.63 (1.26)	4.52*** (4.09)	1.37 (0.93)	5.97***(6.01)
2010L.year	−0.21 (−0.19)	3.68*** (4.58)	1.08 (0.86)	3.85** (2.90)	2.15 (1.29)	5.63*** (4.94)
industry dummy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
_cons	23.24*** (4.73)	18.50*** (6.81)	24.56*** (4.35)	15.71* (2.54)	22.88*** (5.08)	15.73*** (4.32)
n	199	1,570	197	933	199	1,566
R²	0.324	0.125	0.301	0.163	0.182	0.133

Notes: t-values are in parentheses. The preference of the panel estimation method rather than a simple OLS method is confirmed by performing Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrangian multiplier test. The test results (p<0.05 in each of the model using ESG, E and S alternatively as the dependent variable) allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of variances across firms equal to zero (i.e. no panel effect hypothesis); while the R² between the studied firms and the overall R² are somewhat disappointing, this weakness has been minimised by the use of fixed-effect estimation where the unobserved year-invariant factors are fixed, leaving the year-variant factors to become more explanatory in the models. Thus, the reported magnitudes of R² within the studied firms are at the acceptable level in social science research. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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