The effect of FDI and its modes of entry on domestic entrepreneurship – the role of institutional support
| Voice and accountability | Government effectiveness | Regulatory quality | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI | Greenfield | M&A | FDI | Greenfield | M&A | FDI | Greenfield | M&A | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | |
| FDI | 0.836*** | 0.816*** | 0.817*** | ||||||
| (0.037) | (0.044) | (0.041) | |||||||
| Greenfield | 0.891*** | 0.911*** | 0.830*** | ||||||
| (0.065) | (0.107) | (0.065) | |||||||
| M&A | 0.652*** | 0.585*** | 0.562*** | ||||||
| (0.055) | (0.061) | (0.062) | |||||||
| FDI*voice | 0.069 | ||||||||
| (0.044) | |||||||||
| Greenfield*voice | 0.196** | ||||||||
| (0.086) | |||||||||
| M&A*voice | −0.016 | ||||||||
| (0.058) | |||||||||
| FDI*effect | 0.399** | ||||||||
| (0.173) | |||||||||
| Greenfield*effect | 1.016** | ||||||||
| (0.446) | |||||||||
| M&As*effect | 0.301 | ||||||||
| (0.229) | |||||||||
| FDI*regulation | 0.336** | ||||||||
| (0.139) | |||||||||
| Greenfield*regulation | 0.738*** | ||||||||
| (0.268) | |||||||||
| M&A*regulation | 0.367* | ||||||||
| (0.202) | |||||||||
| Voice | −0.555 | −1.478** | −0.039 | ||||||
| (0.346) | (0.675) | (0.365) | |||||||
| Effect | −3.221** | −7.718** | −2.099 | ||||||
| (1.336) | (3.447) | (1.460) | |||||||
| Regulation | −2.632** | −5.547*** | −2.320* | ||||||
| (1.093) | (2.096) | (1.308) | |||||||
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Durbin–Wu–Hausman test | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Overindentification test | 0.015 | 0.019 | 0.197 | 0.178 | 0.986 | 0.283 | 0.377 | 0.414 | 0.550 |
| Underidentification test | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.017 | 0.094 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.027 |
| Observations | 835 | 775 | 558 | 835 | 775 | 558 | 835 | 775 | 558 |
| R-squared | 0.542 | 0.450 | 0.147 | 0.395 | −0.363 | −0.127 | 0.444 | 0.098 | −0.213 |
| Voice and accountability | Government effectiveness | Regulatory quality | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI | Greenfield | M&A | FDI | Greenfield | M&A | FDI | Greenfield | M&A | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | |
| 0.836*** | 0.816*** | 0.817*** | |||||||
| (0.037) | (0.044) | (0.041) | |||||||
| 0.891*** | 0.911*** | 0.830*** | |||||||
| (0.065) | (0.107) | (0.065) | |||||||
| 0.652*** | 0.585*** | 0.562*** | |||||||
| (0.055) | (0.061) | (0.062) | |||||||
| 0.069 | |||||||||
| (0.044) | |||||||||
| 0.196** | |||||||||
| (0.086) | |||||||||
| −0.016 | |||||||||
| (0.058) | |||||||||
| 0.399** | |||||||||
| (0.173) | |||||||||
| 1.016** | |||||||||
| (0.446) | |||||||||
| 0.301 | |||||||||
| (0.229) | |||||||||
| 0.336** | |||||||||
| (0.139) | |||||||||
| 0.738*** | |||||||||
| (0.268) | |||||||||
| 0.367* | |||||||||
| (0.202) | |||||||||
| −0.555 | −1.478** | −0.039 | |||||||
| (0.346) | (0.675) | (0.365) | |||||||
| −3.221** | −7.718** | −2.099 | |||||||
| (1.336) | (3.447) | (1.460) | |||||||
| −2.632** | −5.547*** | −2.320* | |||||||
| (1.093) | (2.096) | (1.308) | |||||||
| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
| Durbin–Wu–Hausman test | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Overindentification test | 0.015 | 0.019 | 0.197 | 0.178 | 0.986 | 0.283 | 0.377 | 0.414 | 0.550 |
| Underidentification test | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.017 | 0.094 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.027 |
| Observations | 835 | 775 | 558 | 835 | 775 | 558 | 835 | 775 | 558 |
| 0.542 | 0.450 | 0.147 | 0.395 | −0.363 | −0.127 | 0.444 | 0.098 | −0.213 | |
| Rule of law | Political stability | Control of corruption | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI | Greenfield | M&A | FDI | Greenfield | M&A | FDI | Greenfield | M&A | |
| (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | |
| FDI | 0.809*** | 0.788*** | 0.827*** | ||||||
| (0.035) | (0.040) | (0.038) | |||||||
| Greenfield | 0.953*** | 0.933*** | 0.958*** | ||||||
| (0.113) | (0.113) | (0.124) | |||||||
| M&A | 0.645*** | 0.665*** | 0.616*** | ||||||
| (0.052) | (0.066) | (0.052) | |||||||
| FDI*rule | 0.185* | ||||||||
| (0.095) | |||||||||
| Greenfield*rule | 0.619** | ||||||||
| (0.295) | |||||||||
| M&A*rule | 0.105 | ||||||||
| (0.098) | |||||||||
| FDI*stability | 0.249*** | ||||||||
| (0.087) | |||||||||
| Greenfield*stability | 0.534** | ||||||||
| (0.218) | |||||||||
| M&As*stability | 0.085 | ||||||||
| (0.116) | |||||||||
| FDI*corruption | 0.134* | ||||||||
| (0.072) | |||||||||
| Greenfield*corruption | 0.715** | ||||||||
| (0.359) | |||||||||
| M&A*corruption | 0.156 | ||||||||
| (0.125) | |||||||||
| Rule | −1.639** | −4.868** | −0.832 | ||||||
| (0.754) | (2.350) | (0.670) | |||||||
| Stability | −2.050*** | −4.086** | −0.504 | ||||||
| (0.627) | (1.601) | (0.627) | |||||||
| Corruption | −1.283** | −5.869** | −1.295 | ||||||
| (0.588) | (2.928) | (0.879) | |||||||
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Durbin–Wu–Hausman test | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Overidentification test | 0.087 | 0.535 | 0.243 | 0.019 | 0.031 | 0.408 | 0.066 | 0.192 | 0.086 |
| Underidentification test | 0.000 | 0.015 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.000 | 0.106 | 0.017 |
| Observations | 835 | 775 | 558 | 835 | 775 | 558 | 835 | 775 | 558 |
| R-squared | 0.527 | 0.134 | 0.084 | 0.553 | 0.281 | 0.077 | 0.529 | −0.011 | 0.088 |
| Rule of law | Political stability | Control of corruption | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI | Greenfield | M&A | FDI | Greenfield | M&A | FDI | Greenfield | M&A | |
| (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | |
| 0.809*** | 0.788*** | 0.827*** | |||||||
| (0.035) | (0.040) | (0.038) | |||||||
| 0.953*** | 0.933*** | 0.958*** | |||||||
| (0.113) | (0.113) | (0.124) | |||||||
| 0.645*** | 0.665*** | 0.616*** | |||||||
| (0.052) | (0.066) | (0.052) | |||||||
| 0.185* | |||||||||
| (0.095) | |||||||||
| 0.619** | |||||||||
| (0.295) | |||||||||
| 0.105 | |||||||||
| (0.098) | |||||||||
| 0.249*** | |||||||||
| (0.087) | |||||||||
| 0.534** | |||||||||
| (0.218) | |||||||||
| 0.085 | |||||||||
| (0.116) | |||||||||
| 0.134* | |||||||||
| (0.072) | |||||||||
| 0.715** | |||||||||
| (0.359) | |||||||||
| 0.156 | |||||||||
| (0.125) | |||||||||
| −1.639** | −4.868** | −0.832 | |||||||
| (0.754) | (2.350) | (0.670) | |||||||
| −2.050*** | −4.086** | −0.504 | |||||||
| (0.627) | (1.601) | (0.627) | |||||||
| −1.283** | −5.869** | −1.295 | |||||||
| (0.588) | (2.928) | (0.879) | |||||||
| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
| Durbin–Wu–Hausman test | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Overidentification test | 0.087 | 0.535 | 0.243 | 0.019 | 0.031 | 0.408 | 0.066 | 0.192 | 0.086 |
| Underidentification test | 0.000 | 0.015 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.000 | 0.106 | 0.017 |
| Observations | 835 | 775 | 558 | 835 | 775 | 558 | 835 | 775 | 558 |
| 0.527 | 0.134 | 0.084 | 0.553 | 0.281 | 0.077 | 0.529 | −0.011 | 0.088 | |
Note(s): Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively