Table 7

The election cycle and public spending: the role of control of corruption

(1)(2)(3)
Pre-election2.131***  
(0.765)  
Pre-election × Corruption control−0.420***  
(0.133)  
Election 1.460*** 
 (0.446) 
Election × Corruption control −0.223*** 
 (0.0598) 
Post-election  −1.225**
  (0.597)
Post-election × Corruption control  −1.559
  (1.220)
Corruption control−0.528**−0.612**−0.592**
(0.249)(0.300)(0.281)
Population growth (t – 1)2.638***2.632***2.618***
(0.841)(0.845)(0.846)
Median age (t – 1)0.840***0.839***0.838***
(0.197)(0.199)(0.199)
Unemployment rate (t – 1)0.523***0.520***0.523***
(0.186)(0.187)(0.187)
Inflation (t – 1)−0.158***−0.161***−0.149***
(0.0455)(0.0424)(0.0510)
Government debt (t – 1)−0.0222−0.0226−0.0223
(0.0268)(0.0272)(0.0271)
GDP growth (t – 1)0.1890.1930.191
(0.161)(0.164)(0.162)
Tax revenue (t – 1)0.583***0.576***0.575***
(0.189)(0.192)(0.192)
Constant4.75***5.16***4.93***
(1.803)(1.915)(1.846)
Observations1,2401,2401,240
Time effectsYesYesYes
Number of countries909090
R-squared0.3410.3360.337

Note(s): The table reports the conditioning effects of control of corruption (Corruption control) on the relationship between the election cycle and government spending. The dependent variable is the ratio of total government expenditure to GDP (Expenditure). Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively

Source(s): Authors' own work

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