Table 8

The election cycle and public spending: the role of political ideology

(1)(2)(3)
Pre-election0.612***  
(0.220)  
Pre-election × Left-wing0.356**  
(0.172)  
Election 1.375** 
 (0.588) 
Election × Left-wing 0.205 
 (0.239) 
Post-election  −0.601***
  (0.231)
Post-election × Left-wing  0.704
  (0.818)
Left-wing2.654**2.433**2.410**
(1.164)(1.116)(1.104)
Population growth (t – 1)1.372***1.376***1.379***
(0.441)(0.435)(0.431)
Median age (t – 1)0.766***0.765***0.765***
(0.222)(0.222)(0.222)
Unemployment rate (t – 1)0.349**0.348**0.348**
(0.132)(0.132)(0.132)
Inflation (t – 1)−0.0114−0.0116−0.0117
(0.0138)(0.0139)(0.0141)
Government debt (t – 1)−0.0200−0.0200−0.0201
(0.0258)(0.0257)(0.0257)
GDP growth (t – 1)0.07730.07700.0804
(0.106)(0.107)(0.107)
Tax revenue (t – 1)0.667***0.668***0.669***
(0.162)(0.162)(0.162)
Constant3.593.553.60
(2.610)(2.568)(2.558)
Observations1,1111,1111,111
Time effectsYesYesYes
Number of countries757575
R-squared0.4110.4110.411

Note(s): The table reports the conditioning effects of left-wing government (Left-wing) on the relationship between the election cycle and government spending. The dependent variable is the ratio of total government expenditure to GDP (Expenditure). Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively

Source(s): Authors' own work

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