Descriptive statistics for the selected variables
| Private firms | Public firms | Overall | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mean (Std. Dev.) | Obs | Mean (Std. Dev.) | Obs | Mean (Std. Dev.) | Obs | |
| Number of CEO replacements | 1.1157 (0.9886) | 1,390 | 1.2451 (0.9058) | 103 | 1.1246 (0.9833) | 1,493 |
| CEO turnover | 0.1590 (0.3657) | 9,766 | 0.1842 (0.3879)† | 685 | 0.1607 (0.3627) | 10,451 |
| Size (millions of euro) | 180.29 (966.83) | 9,762 | 1,854.54 (5776.34)*** | 675 | 288.47 (1787.92) | 10,437 |
| Leverage (debt to assets ratio) | 0.6149 (0.2214) | 9,771 | 0.4706 (0.2154)*** | 675 | 0.6054 (0.2238) | 10,446 |
| Return on assets (ROA) | 0.0613 (0.1166) | 9,771 | 0.0397 (0.0858)*** | 675 | 0.0599 (0.1150) | 10,446 |
| Market-to-book ratio | 2.6312 (5.6949) | 643 | ||||
| Chairperson turnover | 0.0802 (0.2716) | 9,766 | 0.0833 (0.2766) | 685 | 0.0804 (0.2720) | 10,451 |
| CEO duality | 0.1845 (0.3879) | 9,771 | 0.1023 (0.3033)*** | 685 | 0.1791 (0.3835) | 10,456 |
| Stake held by the CEO | 0.3966 (0.3455) | 1,812 | 0.0159 (0.0010)*** | 685 | 0.2922 (0.3255) | 2,497 |
| Stake held by the largest shareholder | 0.7801 (0.3000) | 9,357 | 0.3210 (0.2415)*** | 685 | 0.7488 (0.3181) | 10,042 |
| Stake held by the second largest shareholder | 0.2280 (0.2154) | 3,497 | 0.1205 (0.0756)*** | 632 | 0.2116 (0.2042) | 4,129 |
| Stake held by the third largest shareholder | 0.1108 (0.0913) | 1,356 | 0.0748 (0.0469)*** | 611 | 0.0996 (0.0819) | 1,967 |
| Private firms | Public firms | Overall | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mean (Std. Dev.) | Obs | Mean (Std. Dev.) | Obs | Mean (Std. Dev.) | Obs | |
| Number of CEO replacements | 1.1157 (0.9886) | 1,390 | 1.2451 (0.9058) | 103 | 1.1246 (0.9833) | 1,493 |
| CEO turnover | 0.1590 (0.3657) | 9,766 | 0.1842 (0.3879)† | 685 | 0.1607 (0.3627) | 10,451 |
| Size (millions of euro) | 180.29 (966.83) | 9,762 | 1,854.54 (5776.34)*** | 675 | 288.47 (1787.92) | 10,437 |
| Leverage (debt to assets ratio) | 0.6149 (0.2214) | 9,771 | 0.4706 (0.2154)*** | 675 | 0.6054 (0.2238) | 10,446 |
| Return on assets (ROA) | 0.0613 (0.1166) | 9,771 | 0.0397 (0.0858)*** | 675 | 0.0599 (0.1150) | 10,446 |
| Market-to-book ratio | 2.6312 (5.6949) | 643 | ||||
| Chairperson turnover | 0.0802 (0.2716) | 9,766 | 0.0833 (0.2766) | 685 | 0.0804 (0.2720) | 10,451 |
| CEO duality | 0.1845 (0.3879) | 9,771 | 0.1023 (0.3033)*** | 685 | 0.1791 (0.3835) | 10,456 |
| Stake held by the CEO | 0.3966 (0.3455) | 1,812 | 0.0159 (0.0010)*** | 685 | 0.2922 (0.3255) | 2,497 |
| Stake held by the largest shareholder | 0.7801 (0.3000) | 9,357 | 0.3210 (0.2415)*** | 685 | 0.7488 (0.3181) | 10,042 |
| Stake held by the second largest shareholder | 0.2280 (0.2154) | 3,497 | 0.1205 (0.0756)*** | 632 | 0.2116 (0.2042) | 4,129 |
| Stake held by the third largest shareholder | 0.1108 (0.0913) | 1,356 | 0.0748 (0.0469)*** | 611 | 0.0996 (0.0819) | 1,967 |
Note(s): The sample includes information for 103 public and 1,390 large private Spanish firms for the period 1998 and 2004. Size is expressed in millions of euros. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Return on assets is the ratio of operating profit to total assets, whereas the market-to-book value is measured as the current share price divided by the book value per share (end of year values). Chairman turnover is a dummy equal to one if a chairman change took place. CEO duality is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the CEO also serves as chairman. The variable “stake held by the CEO” captures the CEO's ownership only for those observations where the CEO is an owner. The variables related to ownership concentration show the average stake held by the three largest shareholders. The number of observations changes due to the presence of some missing values. The univariate test compares, for each variable, the difference in the mean values between public and private firms. Standard deviation is presented in brackets. †, *, **, *** indicate that the difference in the mean values between public and private firms is significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively
Source(s): Authors' elaboration