Table 2 Results from Equation (1) ,...

Table 2

Results from Equation (1), ordered probit estimates

	(1)		(2)		(3)
	Restricted		Extended		With interaction
	Estimated coefficient	Average ME ^†	Estimated coefficient	Average ME ^†	Estimated coefficient	Average ME ^†
Climate change concern (⁠ ${C C C}_{i}$ )	0.426^***	0.125^***	0.422^***	0.124^***	0.471^***	0.136^***
Climate change concern (⁠ ${C C C}_{i}$ )	(0.061)		(0.061)		(0.138)
Tax morale (⁠ ${T M}_{i}$ )			0.055^**	0.016^**
Tax morale (⁠ ${T M}_{i}$ )			(0.027)
Tax morale dummy (⁠ $T M D$ ⁠)					0.733^**	0.212^**
${C C C}_{i} x T M D$					(0.314)
					0.238^**	0.069^**
					(0.101)
Trust in government	0.115^***	0.034^***	0.111^***	0.033^***	0.123^***	0.036^***
Trust in government	(0.029)		(0.030)		(0.0295)
Political orientation	−0.052^**	−0.015^**	−0.047^**	−0.014^**	−0.056^***	−0.016^***
Political orientation	(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)
Political trust	−0.034	−0.010	−0.034	−0.010	−0.043	−0.013
Political trust	(0.034)		(0.034)		(0.034)
Political participation	−0.077	−0.023	−0.062	−0.018	−0.069	−0.020
Political participation	(0.111)		(0.111)		(0.111)
Climate responsibility	−0.007	−0.002	−0.006	−0.002	0.009	0.003
Climate responsibility	(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.017)
Social network activity	−0.043	−0.013	−0.034	−0.010	−0.049	−0.014
Social network activity	(0.101)		(0.101)		(0.101)
Religiosity	0.044	0.013	0.042	0.012	0.046	0.013
Religiosity	(0.101)		(0.101)		(0.101)
Gender	0.134	0.039	0.167^*	0.049^*	0.162	0.047
Gender	(0.099)		(0.101)		(0.101)
Age	0.010	0.003	0.008	0.002	0.010	0.003
Age	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)
Observations	514	514	514	514	514	514
Pseudo R²	0.062		0.065		0.061

	(1)		(2)		(3)
	Restricted		Extended		With interaction
	Estimated coefficient	Average ME ^†	Estimated coefficient	Average ME ^†	Estimated coefficient	Average ME ^†
Climate change concern ( ${C C C}_{i}$ )	0.426^***	0.125^***	0.422^***	0.124^***	0.471^***	0.136^***
Climate change concern ( ${C C C}_{i}$ )	(0.061)		(0.061)		(0.138)
Tax morale ( ${T M}_{i}$ )			0.055^**	0.016^**
Tax morale ( ${T M}_{i}$ )			(0.027)
Tax morale dummy ( $T M D$ )					0.733^**	0.212^**
${C C C}_{i} x T M D$					(0.314)
					0.238^**	0.069^**
					(0.101)
Trust in government	0.115^***	0.034^***	0.111^***	0.033^***	0.123^***	0.036^***
Trust in government	(0.029)		(0.030)		(0.0295)
Political orientation	−0.052^**	−0.015^**	−0.047^**	−0.014^**	−0.056^***	−0.016^***
Political orientation	(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)
Political trust	−0.034	−0.010	−0.034	−0.010	−0.043	−0.013
Political trust	(0.034)		(0.034)		(0.034)
Political participation	−0.077	−0.023	−0.062	−0.018	−0.069	−0.020
Political participation	(0.111)		(0.111)		(0.111)
Climate responsibility	−0.007	−0.002	−0.006	−0.002	0.009	0.003
Climate responsibility	(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.017)
Social network activity	−0.043	−0.013	−0.034	−0.010	−0.049	−0.014
Social network activity	(0.101)		(0.101)		(0.101)
Religiosity	0.044	0.013	0.042	0.012	0.046	0.013
Religiosity	(0.101)		(0.101)		(0.101)
Gender	0.134	0.039	0.167^*	0.049^*	0.162	0.047
Gender	(0.099)		(0.101)		(0.101)
Age	0.010	0.003	0.008	0.002	0.010	0.003
Age	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)
Observations	514	514	514	514	514	514
Pseudo R²	0.062		0.065		0.061

Note(s): The standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent. We employ ^*, ^** and ^*** to denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. ^† We report the average marginal effects for the highest score of tax morality

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