Table VIII.

Influence of CEO power on negative coverage by founder-CEO and firm performance

Group
Variables
Non-founder-CEO and worse-performing firmsNon-founder-CEO and better-performing firmsFounder-CEO and worse-performing firmsFounder-CEO and better-performing firms
medianegmedianegmedianegmedianeg
3b3b3b3b
Duality–0.758 (–0.61)3.451 (1.45)–1.669** (–2.10)–0.516 (–0.41)
CEOtenHigh–0.705 (–0.61)–1.016 (–0.56)–1.313 (–1.41)–3.944*** (–2.91)
mediapos0.417*** (8.94)0.358*** (11.62)0.259*** (9.69)0.572*** (29.99)
SIZE–0.669 (–1.30)3.088*** (2.85)1.976** (2.59)1.932** (2.12)
LEV–1.381 (–0.58)–10.54* (–1.91)–7.659*** (–2.62)–6.471 (–1.52)
EPS–8.434*** (–4.40)0.381 (0.33)–9.543*** (–5.44)–2.220 (–1.52)
Ind–11.53 (–1.19)–12.50 (–0.73)6.052 (0.80)8.553 (0.82)
CurAsRa–0.289 (–0.12)–5.832 (–1.46)–1.860 (–0.72)–15.07*** (–4.10)
TAturnover–0.0291 (–0.05)0.281 (0.25)1.696 (1.41)0.589 (0.37)
Constant22.93** (1.97)–55.99** (–2.34)–30.93* (–1.84)–36.32* (–1.84)
N193200400405
R20.3540.5260.2790.793
Adjusted R20.3220.5040.2620.788

Notes:

t-statistics in parentheses;

*

p < 0.10;

**

p < 0.05;

***

p < 0.01

or Create an Account

Close Modal
Close Modal