Table 4 The contribution of female...

Table 4

The contribution of female directors on monitoring tasks

	Monitoring tasks
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Spain	Italy		France
Skewed board (<20% women)	2.02 (0.39)
Tilted board (20–33% women)		−2.53 (–0.61)
Tilted board (>33% women)			7.50* (1.81)
Balanced board (>40% women)				0.03 (0.01)
Independent directors %	0.06 (0.52)	0.33** (2.48)	0.28** (2.30)	0.20*** (2.89)
CEO duality	−2.33 (−0.50)	2.94 (0.60)	4.64 (1.01)	0.58 (0.21)
Board size	1.49*** (2.29)	−0.59 (−1.10)	−0.39 (−0.75)	0.75 (1.31)
Log (total assets)	4.07 (1.15)	−1.87 (−0.42)	−4.09 (−0.98)	21.56*** (4.81)
R-squared within	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.11
R-squared between	0.26	0.20	0.08	0.05
R-overall	0.13	0.20	0.03	0.02
N. Obs	365	324	324	356
N. Firms	33	37	37	34

	Monitoring tasks
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Spain	Italy		France
Skewed board (<20% women)	2.02 (0.39)
Tilted board (20–33% women)		−2.53 (–0.61)
Tilted board (>33% women)			7.50* (1.81)
Balanced board (>40% women)				0.03 (0.01)
Independent directors %	0.06 (0.52)	0.33** (2.48)	0.28** (2.30)	0.20*** (2.89)
CEO duality	−2.33 (−0.50)	2.94 (0.60)	4.64 (1.01)	0.58 (0.21)
Board size	1.49*** (2.29)	−0.59 (−1.10)	−0.39 (−0.75)	0.75 (1.31)
Log (total assets)	4.07 (1.15)	−1.87 (−0.42)	−4.09 (−0.98)	21.56*** (4.81)
R-squared within	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.11
R-squared between	0.26	0.20	0.08	0.05
R-overall	0.13	0.20	0.03	0.02
N. Obs	365	324	324	356
N. Firms	33	37	37	34

Note(s): T-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-division level. All tests are two-tailed

[ViewLarge]

Sharing Unavailable