List of Tables ix List of Abbreviations...

List of Tables		ix
List of Abbreviations		xi
About the Authors		xiii
Preface		xv
1.	Conceptual Approach of Corporate Governance	1
	1.1. Introduction	1
	1.2. Corporate Governance and Its Various Dimensions	2
	1.3. Corporate Governance Mechanisms	3
	1.3.1. Ownership Structure	4
	1.3.2. Board of Directors	5
	1.3.3. CEO Characteristics	6
	1.4. Theories of Corporate Governance	6
	1.4.1. Agency Theory	6
	1.4.2. Stewardship Theory	7
	1.4.3. Resource Dependence Theory	8
	1.4.4. Stakeholder Theory	9
	1.4.5. Signalling Theory	9
	1.4.6. Managerial Hegemony Theory	9
	1.4.7. Political Theory	10
	1.5. Motivation of the Study	10
	1.6. Chapter Plan of the Book	11
2.	Corporate Governance in India	13
	2.1. Introduction	13
	2.2. Three Historical Models and their Development Impact in India	14
	2.2.1. The Managing Agency Model (1850–1956)	14
	2.2.2. The Business House Model (1956–1991)	15
	2.2.3. The Anglo-American Model (1992 to Date)	16
	2.3. Features of Corporate Governance in India	17
	2.4. Corporate Governance Codes in India	18
	2.4.1. CII Code on Corporate Governance (1998)	19
	2.4.2. Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate  Governance (1999)	20
	2.4.3. Naresh Chandra Committee on Corporate Audit and  Governance (2002)	21
	2.4.4. Narayana Murthy Committee Report on Corporate  Governance (2003)	22
	2.4.5. Dr J. J. Irani Committee Report on Company Law (2005)	24
	2.5. Corporate Governance and Legislations in India	25
	2.5.1. Amendments to the Companies Act 1956	25
	2.5.1.1. The Companies (Amendment) Act 2000	25
	2.5.1.2. The Companies (Amendment) Act 2001	26
	2.5.1.3. The Companies (Amendment) Bill (2003)	26
	2.5.1.4. The Companies (Amendment) Bill (2008)	27
	2.5.2. The Companies Act 2013	28
	2.5.3. SEBI: Regulation of Capital Market	29
	2.6. Good Governance Indicators	30
	2.7. Summary	32
3.	Literature Review	33
	3.1. Introduction	33
	3.2. An International Approach	34
	3.3. A National Approach	48
	3.4. Research Gap	51
	3.5. Objectives of the Study	52
	3.6. Research Hypotheses	53
4.	Data and Methodology	55
	4.1. Data	55
	4.1.1. Data Source	55
	4.1.2. Sample Selection Procedure	55
	4.1.3. Study Period	56
	4.1.4. Selection of Variables	56
	4.1.4.1. Dependent Variables	56
	4.1.4.1.1. Cash Earnings Per Share	56
	4.1.4.1.2. Return on Capital Employed	57
	4.1.4.1.3. Tobin’s Q	57
	4.1.4.1.4. Market Value Added	58
	4.1.4.2. Independent Variables	58
	4.1.4.2.1. Promoters’ Shareholding	58
	4.1.4.2.2. Institutional Investors’ Shareholding	59
	4.1.4.2.3. Board Size	59
	4.1.4.2.4. Proportion of Executive Directors	59
	4.1.4.2.5. Proportion of Independent Directors  in Board	59
	4.1.4.2.6. Multiplicity of Directorship	59
	4.1.4.2.7. CEO Duality	60
	4.1.4.2.8. CEO Tenure	60
	4.1.4.3. Control Variables	60
	4.1.4.3.1. Executive Remuneration	60
	4.1.4.3.2. Size of the Firm	60
	4.1.4.3.3. Growth in Profit After Tax	61
	4.1.4.3.4. Debt Equity Ratio	61
	4.1.4.3.5. Assets Turnover Ratio	61
	4.2. Research Methodology	61
	4.2.1. Statistical Methods Used	61
	4.2.1.1. Descriptive Statistics	62
	4.2.1.2. Bi-variate Data Analysis	62
	4.2.1.3. Test for Multicollinearity	62
	4.2.1.3.1. Detection of Multicollinearity Property	63
	4.2.1.4. Test for Heteroskedasticity	63
	4.2.1.5. Test for Autocorrelation	63
	4.2.1.6. Panel Data Model	64
	4.2.1.6.1. Advantages of Panel Data Model	64
	4.2.1.6.2. Techniques of Panel Data Model	64
	4.2.1.6.3. Constant Coefficient Method or  Pooled OLS Method	64
	4.2.1.6.4. FEM or Least Square Dummy  Variable Regression Model	65
	4.2.1.6.5. REM or Error Component Model	65
	4.2.2. Scheme of Investigation	67
5.	Analysis and Findings	69
	5.1. Descriptive Statistics	69
	5.2. Analysis of Bi-variate Correlation	71
	5.3. Detection of Multicollinearity Property	72
	5.4. Detection of Heteroskedasticity	72
	5.5. Analysis of Multiple Regressions: Panel Data Model	74
	5.6. Key Findings and Its Interpretations	82
	5.6.1. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance	82
	5.6.1.1. Promoters Shareholding and Firm Performance	82
	5.6.1.2. IINV and Firm Performance	84
	5.6.2. BS, Composition and Corporate Performance	84
	5.6.2.1. BS and Corporate Performance	84
	5.6.2.2. EDs and Firm Performance	85
	5.6.2.3. IDs and Firm Performance	85
	5.6.2.4. MD and Firm Performance	86
	5.6.2.5. CEO Characteristics and Performance	86
	5.6.3. Control Variables and Corporate Performance	86
6.	Summary and Conclusion	89
	6.1. Summary	89
	6.2. Conclusion	90
	6.3. Contribution of the Study	91
	6.4. Policy Recommendation	92
	6.5. Limitations and Scope for Further Research	92
Bibliography		95
Index		103

List of Tables		ix
List of Abbreviations		xi
About the Authors		xiii
Preface		xv
1.	Conceptual Approach of Corporate Governance	1
	1.1. Introduction	1
	1.2. Corporate Governance and Its Various Dimensions	2
	1.3. Corporate Governance Mechanisms	3
	1.3.1. Ownership Structure	4
	1.3.2. Board of Directors	5
	1.3.3. CEO Characteristics	6
	1.4. Theories of Corporate Governance	6
	1.4.1. Agency Theory	6
	1.4.2. Stewardship Theory	7
	1.4.3. Resource Dependence Theory	8
	1.4.4. Stakeholder Theory	9
	1.4.5. Signalling Theory	9
	1.4.6. Managerial Hegemony Theory	9
	1.4.7. Political Theory	10
	1.5. Motivation of the Study	10
	1.6. Chapter Plan of the Book	11
2.	Corporate Governance in India	13
	2.1. Introduction	13
	2.2. Three Historical Models and their Development Impact in India	14
	2.2.1. The Managing Agency Model (1850–1956)	14
	2.2.2. The Business House Model (1956–1991)	15
	2.2.3. The Anglo-American Model (1992 to Date)	16
	2.3. Features of Corporate Governance in India	17
	2.4. Corporate Governance Codes in India	18
	2.4.1. CII Code on Corporate Governance (1998)	19
	2.4.2. Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate  Governance (1999)	20
	2.4.3. Naresh Chandra Committee on Corporate Audit and  Governance (2002)	21
	2.4.4. Narayana Murthy Committee Report on Corporate  Governance (2003)	22
	2.4.5. Dr J. J. Irani Committee Report on Company Law (2005)	24
	2.5. Corporate Governance and Legislations in India	25
	2.5.1. Amendments to the Companies Act 1956	25
	2.5.1.1. The Companies (Amendment) Act 2000	25
	2.5.1.2. The Companies (Amendment) Act 2001	26
	2.5.1.3. The Companies (Amendment) Bill (2003)	26
	2.5.1.4. The Companies (Amendment) Bill (2008)	27
	2.5.2. The Companies Act 2013	28
	2.5.3. SEBI: Regulation of Capital Market	29
	2.6. Good Governance Indicators	30
	2.7. Summary	32
3.	Literature Review	33
	3.1. Introduction	33
	3.2. An International Approach	34
	3.3. A National Approach	48
	3.4. Research Gap	51
	3.5. Objectives of the Study	52
	3.6. Research Hypotheses	53
4.	Data and Methodology	55
	4.1. Data	55
	4.1.1. Data Source	55
	4.1.2. Sample Selection Procedure	55
	4.1.3. Study Period	56
	4.1.4. Selection of Variables	56
	4.1.4.1. Dependent Variables	56
	4.1.4.1.1. Cash Earnings Per Share	56
	4.1.4.1.2. Return on Capital Employed	57
	4.1.4.1.3. Tobin’s Q	57
	4.1.4.1.4. Market Value Added	58
	4.1.4.2. Independent Variables	58
	4.1.4.2.1. Promoters’ Shareholding	58
	4.1.4.2.2. Institutional Investors’ Shareholding	59
	4.1.4.2.3. Board Size	59
	4.1.4.2.4. Proportion of Executive Directors	59
	4.1.4.2.5. Proportion of Independent Directors  in Board	59
	4.1.4.2.6. Multiplicity of Directorship	59
	4.1.4.2.7. CEO Duality	60
	4.1.4.2.8. CEO Tenure	60
	4.1.4.3. Control Variables	60
	4.1.4.3.1. Executive Remuneration	60
	4.1.4.3.2. Size of the Firm	60
	4.1.4.3.3. Growth in Profit After Tax	61
	4.1.4.3.4. Debt Equity Ratio	61
	4.1.4.3.5. Assets Turnover Ratio	61
	4.2. Research Methodology	61
	4.2.1. Statistical Methods Used	61
	4.2.1.1. Descriptive Statistics	62
	4.2.1.2. Bi-variate Data Analysis	62
	4.2.1.3. Test for Multicollinearity	62
	4.2.1.3.1. Detection of Multicollinearity Property	63
	4.2.1.4. Test for Heteroskedasticity	63
	4.2.1.5. Test for Autocorrelation	63
	4.2.1.6. Panel Data Model	64
	4.2.1.6.1. Advantages of Panel Data Model	64
	4.2.1.6.2. Techniques of Panel Data Model	64
	4.2.1.6.3. Constant Coefficient Method or  Pooled OLS Method	64
	4.2.1.6.4. FEM or Least Square Dummy  Variable Regression Model	65
	4.2.1.6.5. REM or Error Component Model	65
	4.2.2. Scheme of Investigation	67
5.	Analysis and Findings	69
	5.1. Descriptive Statistics	69
	5.2. Analysis of Bi-variate Correlation	71
	5.3. Detection of Multicollinearity Property	72
	5.4. Detection of Heteroskedasticity	72
	5.5. Analysis of Multiple Regressions: Panel Data Model	74
	5.6. Key Findings and Its Interpretations	82
	5.6.1. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance	82
	5.6.1.1. Promoters Shareholding and Firm Performance	82
	5.6.1.2. IINV and Firm Performance	84
	5.6.2. BS, Composition and Corporate Performance	84
	5.6.2.1. BS and Corporate Performance	84
	5.6.2.2. EDs and Firm Performance	85
	5.6.2.3. IDs and Firm Performance	85
	5.6.2.4. MD and Firm Performance	86
	5.6.2.5. CEO Characteristics and Performance	86
	5.6.3. Control Variables and Corporate Performance	86
6.	Summary and Conclusion	89
	6.1. Summary	89
	6.2. Conclusion	90
	6.3. Contribution of the Study	91
	6.4. Policy Recommendation	92
	6.5. Limitations and Scope for Further Research	92
Bibliography		95
Index		103

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