Table A2 Code categories and examples of...

Table A2

Code categories and examples of analysed textual segments

Type of uncertainty	Second-order topics and first-order codes	Examples of analysed textual segments
Uncertainty in estimates	1. Demand
	1.1. Cargo volume	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “In order to assess the feasibility of planned activities, and considering the abovementioned possible risks, we would like to see how such a big difference in cargo forecasts is received in comparison to the feasibility analysis of the FinEst Link project.” (February 2019)
	1.2. Passenger traffic	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “To be able to connect the airports, the logistical and technical solution must be made so that it makes it possible to reach with 30 minutes from one airport to the other.” (November 2019)
	1.2. Passenger traffic	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “The passenger traffic is predicted five times bigger … is a big risk that the assumptions of cargo and passenger flows presented in the application are unrealistic (overly optimistic) and the project will not be profitable if only financed by the private sector.” (July 2020)
	1.3. Economic growth	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “Total cumulative economic effects during 2021–2050 (without any multipliers) will be 225 billion euro and 47 billion euro in Finland and Estonia, respectively.” (November 2019)
	1.4. Links to Rail Baltica	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “For the [realization of] financing and operation plans, Rail Baltica is not a necessary precondition, and the developer has also considered the possibility that Rail Baltica will not be constructed. For the developer's finance model and business plan calculations, Rail Baltica has no direct impact.” (November 2019)
	2. Timescale
	2.1 Opening date	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “According to the application, the rail tunnel will be open in December 2024./ … /From the beginning on, the project must be planned based on a realistic time-schedule, so that also the planned budget and business plan could be realistic too.” (July 2020)
	2.2. Process time	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “Actually, the applied NDSP process … can take five years, or more./ … /The unrealistic time-schedule … ignoring current norms and laws, can make the project significantly more expensive.” (July 2020)
	3. Costs
	3.1. Amount	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “To assess the feasibility of the project as well potential costs and risk for the state, it still does not come out from the amended application how is the operation of the tunnel planned, and what does it cost.” (July 2019)
	3.2. Breakdown	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “Before the planning proceedings get finished, the cross-border environmental assessment conducted, and the rail route chosen, it is impossible to assess … necessary activities and related costs at a reasonable level of detail. In many cases, to assess activities a preliminary project must be prepared.” (November 2019)
Uncertainty about project design and logistics	4. Main infrastructure
	4.1. Rail gauge	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “In case of [route] alternatives VE1a, VE1b and VE1c, the European (1435 mm) rail gauge, the Finnish (1524 mm) rail gauge or both rail gauges will be used.” (April 2019)
	4.2. Location	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “According to the descriptions, route alternatives VE1a, VE1b and VE1c run only to Ülemiste terminal/Tallinn airport, not compatible with Rail Baltica. We ask to liquidate the shortcomings in the application.” (February 2019)
	5. Order of proceedings
	5.1. Superficies licence	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “The aim of submitting the application of superficies licence is to harmonize the proceedings of NDSP and superficies licence in a way that would ensure that the time spent on necessary proceedings related to the planning of the rail tunnel is reasonable and expedient.” (December 2018)
	6. Groundwater
	6.1. Supply of drinking water	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “In the area where almost half of the Estonian population lives, the supply of drinking water can suffer due to planned [construction] activities … / … /Additionally the quality of drinking water can worsen./ … /We have already today problems with water supply in Viimsi [district].” (February 2019)
	6.2. Drilling of the tunnel	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “ … the tunnel passes all layers of groundwater and can influence the replenishment, the level and quality of groundwater.” (February 2019)
	7. Support infrastructure
	7.1. Deep-water port or mooring facility	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “According to the application, there will be a permanent deep-water port with a waterway and quay established on the artificial island. It is necessary to specify, what do you mean by that [port] (aim, size, volumes) … It also remains unclear, who would own and operate the deep-water port.” (February 2019)
	7.2. Functions of the artificial island	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “Considering the good location of the island, the state might be interested in setting up a logistical base, or other kind of base for maritime rescue, environmental protection, police, border guard, customs, state defence or some other nationally important tasks.” (November 2019)
Uncertainty about objectives and priorities	8. Climate and nature
	8.1. National climate goals	Reference to an opportunity/threat by the MoF: “The influence of the project on CO2 emissions, both during the construction and operation, as well as how the project can influence the achievement of Estonia's climate goals, must be assessed. It is important for Estonia to move towards the reduction of greenhouse gases in the transport sector.” (July 2019)
	8.2. Positive environmental impacts	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “In their [HELCOM, VASAB] documents, a rail tunnel is mentioned several times as an environmental friendlier alternative to the ferry connection.” (November 2019)
	9. Timescale
	9.1. Priority and changes in the time-schedule	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “A clearly communicated possible project deadline is important. Though the deadline is ambitious, it helps to focus and make different project-related work processes more efficient./ … /Such a timescale is also an important working tool to stay within budget.” (November 2019)
	10. Intergovernmental cooperation
	10.1. Memorandum of understanding	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “In joint interests of the countries [Finland and Estonia], in Estonia's foreign policy interests, in public interests and in the interests of planning feasibility, it is not right to start the NDSP of the rail tunnel without an agreement [memorandum of understanding signed] between the countries./ … / … it is not possible to predict, how long will the negotiations on the memorandum of understanding take between Estonia and Finland …” (July 2020)
	10.2. Significant (inter)national interests	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “The rail tunnel connecting Estonia and Finland is of great international interest as it is related to the development of the Finnish and more broadly the entire Baltic transportation network. It is also an important link, which influences the connectivity of both Finland and the Baltic states with the rest of Europe.” (December 2018)
Uncertainty about relationships between project parties	11. Safety and security of infrastructure
	11.1. Missing capabilities	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “Thereby it is important to know that at the moment the state does not have necessary resources to offer rescue, public order and security services in the rail tunnel and its related buildings. Neither has [the state] planned any resources for the development and maintenance of such services.” (July 2019)
	11.2. Extra costs and obligations of the project parties	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “The developer agrees to cover the costs of security and rescue and to plan the functioning of these services. Also, the developer agrees to ensure security of trains and end-stations during the operational phase … / … /Based on its initial assessments, the developer has arrived at conclusion that solving the rescue and security questions would have little impact on the total cost of the project.” (November 2019)
	11.3. Guarantees and risk mitigation	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “It comes out that previous studies have briefly recognized risks but have not addressed the impact and mitigation measures of those risks./ … /Risks related to security and rescue must be carefully mapped in the planning phase and it must be ensured that the risks are properly assessed, and mitigation measures put in place.” (November 2019)
	12. Public or non-public railways/service
	12.1. The nature of services	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “If the charges for the use of railway infrastructure by railway undertakings do not cover the costs related to the rail tunnel, the state must compensate the difference to the manager of public railways through a targeted [financial] support.” (July 2020)
	13. Acquisition and operation of trains
	13.1. Operation	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “It is possible that the developer establishes a separate daughter company for operating the tunnel, but it is also possible that for operations cooperation agreements will be signed with existing railway undertakings.” (April 2019)
	13.2. Purchase	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “Only based on more detailed analyses it would be possible to say which trains and at what speed could run in the tunnel./ … /Hence, more specific decisions can be made after the planning process …” (November 2019)
	13.3. Costs	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “We ask to add a description of infrastructure solutions, conditions and cargo/traffic volumes to the application to assess the annual operation and maintenance costs of the infrastructure and trains.” (February 2019)
	14. Financing agreement and business plan
	14.1. Transparency and business secrets	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “The developer has not … essentially responded to the questions … and presented appropriate evidence. According to the application, it is not possible for the developer to reveal or present the memorandum of understanding or other financing agreements or draft contracts because of usual business secrets in them. Therefore, it is not proved that the developer has [necessary] funds to implement the applied NDSP [project].” (July 2020)
	14.2. Business model and project payback	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “According to those calculations, the payback period of the project is 17 years and IRR 10.11%.” (November 2019)
	14.2. Business model and project payback	Reference to a threat by FBAD: “This [full disclosure of the business model] can put the developer at a disadvantage in negotiations and would give unfair advantage to possible competitors.” (November 2019)
	15. Ownership
	15.1. Interests and rights of the Chinese investors	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “Based on the public report by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, based on its analyses from 12.7.2019 and 3.9.2019 protected by the state secret, it is doubtful that there would be funds to implement the NDSP [project] and that the potential investor would be reliable.” (July 2020)
	15.2. Ownership structure	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “In the finance minister's opinion, considering the nature of the rail tunnel and the share of ownership acquired by the investor, the regulation [(EU) 2019/452 Establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union] would apply to the planned investment.” (July 2020)

Type of uncertainty	Second-order topics and first-order codes	Examples of analysed textual segments
Uncertainty in estimates	1. Demand
	1.1. Cargo volume	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “In order to assess the feasibility of planned activities, and considering the abovementioned possible risks, we would like to see how such a big difference in cargo forecasts is received in comparison to the feasibility analysis of the FinEst Link project.” (February 2019)
	1.2. Passenger traffic	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “To be able to connect the airports, the logistical and technical solution must be made so that it makes it possible to reach with 30 minutes from one airport to the other.” (November 2019)
	1.2. Passenger traffic	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “The passenger traffic is predicted five times bigger … is a big risk that the assumptions of cargo and passenger flows presented in the application are unrealistic (overly optimistic) and the project will not be profitable if only financed by the private sector.” (July 2020)
	1.3. Economic growth	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “Total cumulative economic effects during 2021–2050 (without any multipliers) will be 225 billion euro and 47 billion euro in Finland and Estonia, respectively.” (November 2019)
	1.4. Links to Rail Baltica	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “For the [realization of] financing and operation plans, Rail Baltica is not a necessary precondition, and the developer has also considered the possibility that Rail Baltica will not be constructed. For the developer's finance model and business plan calculations, Rail Baltica has no direct impact.” (November 2019)
	2. Timescale
	2.1 Opening date	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “According to the application, the rail tunnel will be open in December 2024./ … /From the beginning on, the project must be planned based on a realistic time-schedule, so that also the planned budget and business plan could be realistic too.” (July 2020)
	2.2. Process time	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “Actually, the applied NDSP process … can take five years, or more./ … /The unrealistic time-schedule … ignoring current norms and laws, can make the project significantly more expensive.” (July 2020)
	3. Costs
	3.1. Amount	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “To assess the feasibility of the project as well potential costs and risk for the state, it still does not come out from the amended application how is the operation of the tunnel planned, and what does it cost.” (July 2019)
	3.2. Breakdown	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “Before the planning proceedings get finished, the cross-border environmental assessment conducted, and the rail route chosen, it is impossible to assess … necessary activities and related costs at a reasonable level of detail. In many cases, to assess activities a preliminary project must be prepared.” (November 2019)
Uncertainty about project design and logistics	4. Main infrastructure
	4.1. Rail gauge	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “In case of [route] alternatives VE1a, VE1b and VE1c, the European (1435 mm) rail gauge, the Finnish (1524 mm) rail gauge or both rail gauges will be used.” (April 2019)
	4.2. Location	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “According to the descriptions, route alternatives VE1a, VE1b and VE1c run only to Ülemiste terminal/Tallinn airport, not compatible with Rail Baltica. We ask to liquidate the shortcomings in the application.” (February 2019)
	5. Order of proceedings
	5.1. Superficies licence	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “The aim of submitting the application of superficies licence is to harmonize the proceedings of NDSP and superficies licence in a way that would ensure that the time spent on necessary proceedings related to the planning of the rail tunnel is reasonable and expedient.” (December 2018)
	6. Groundwater
	6.1. Supply of drinking water	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “In the area where almost half of the Estonian population lives, the supply of drinking water can suffer due to planned [construction] activities … / … /Additionally the quality of drinking water can worsen./ … /We have already today problems with water supply in Viimsi [district].” (February 2019)
	6.2. Drilling of the tunnel	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “ … the tunnel passes all layers of groundwater and can influence the replenishment, the level and quality of groundwater.” (February 2019)
	7. Support infrastructure
	7.1. Deep-water port or mooring facility	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “According to the application, there will be a permanent deep-water port with a waterway and quay established on the artificial island. It is necessary to specify, what do you mean by that [port] (aim, size, volumes) … It also remains unclear, who would own and operate the deep-water port.” (February 2019)
	7.2. Functions of the artificial island	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “Considering the good location of the island, the state might be interested in setting up a logistical base, or other kind of base for maritime rescue, environmental protection, police, border guard, customs, state defence or some other nationally important tasks.” (November 2019)
Uncertainty about objectives and priorities	8. Climate and nature
	8.1. National climate goals	Reference to an opportunity/threat by the MoF: “The influence of the project on CO2 emissions, both during the construction and operation, as well as how the project can influence the achievement of Estonia's climate goals, must be assessed. It is important for Estonia to move towards the reduction of greenhouse gases in the transport sector.” (July 2019)
	8.2. Positive environmental impacts	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “In their [HELCOM, VASAB] documents, a rail tunnel is mentioned several times as an environmental friendlier alternative to the ferry connection.” (November 2019)
	9. Timescale
	9.1. Priority and changes in the time-schedule	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “A clearly communicated possible project deadline is important. Though the deadline is ambitious, it helps to focus and make different project-related work processes more efficient./ … /Such a timescale is also an important working tool to stay within budget.” (November 2019)
	10. Intergovernmental cooperation
	10.1. Memorandum of understanding	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “In joint interests of the countries [Finland and Estonia], in Estonia's foreign policy interests, in public interests and in the interests of planning feasibility, it is not right to start the NDSP of the rail tunnel without an agreement [memorandum of understanding signed] between the countries./ … / … it is not possible to predict, how long will the negotiations on the memorandum of understanding take between Estonia and Finland …” (July 2020)
	10.2. Significant (inter)national interests	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “The rail tunnel connecting Estonia and Finland is of great international interest as it is related to the development of the Finnish and more broadly the entire Baltic transportation network. It is also an important link, which influences the connectivity of both Finland and the Baltic states with the rest of Europe.” (December 2018)
Uncertainty about relationships between project parties	11. Safety and security of infrastructure
	11.1. Missing capabilities	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “Thereby it is important to know that at the moment the state does not have necessary resources to offer rescue, public order and security services in the rail tunnel and its related buildings. Neither has [the state] planned any resources for the development and maintenance of such services.” (July 2019)
	11.2. Extra costs and obligations of the project parties	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “The developer agrees to cover the costs of security and rescue and to plan the functioning of these services. Also, the developer agrees to ensure security of trains and end-stations during the operational phase … / … /Based on its initial assessments, the developer has arrived at conclusion that solving the rescue and security questions would have little impact on the total cost of the project.” (November 2019)
	11.3. Guarantees and risk mitigation	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “It comes out that previous studies have briefly recognized risks but have not addressed the impact and mitigation measures of those risks./ … /Risks related to security and rescue must be carefully mapped in the planning phase and it must be ensured that the risks are properly assessed, and mitigation measures put in place.” (November 2019)
	12. Public or non-public railways/service
	12.1. The nature of services	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “If the charges for the use of railway infrastructure by railway undertakings do not cover the costs related to the rail tunnel, the state must compensate the difference to the manager of public railways through a targeted [financial] support.” (July 2020)
	13. Acquisition and operation of trains
	13.1. Operation	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “It is possible that the developer establishes a separate daughter company for operating the tunnel, but it is also possible that for operations cooperation agreements will be signed with existing railway undertakings.” (April 2019)
	13.2. Purchase	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “Only based on more detailed analyses it would be possible to say which trains and at what speed could run in the tunnel./ … /Hence, more specific decisions can be made after the planning process …” (November 2019)
	13.3. Costs	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “We ask to add a description of infrastructure solutions, conditions and cargo/traffic volumes to the application to assess the annual operation and maintenance costs of the infrastructure and trains.” (February 2019)
	14. Financing agreement and business plan
	14.1. Transparency and business secrets	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “The developer has not … essentially responded to the questions … and presented appropriate evidence. According to the application, it is not possible for the developer to reveal or present the memorandum of understanding or other financing agreements or draft contracts because of usual business secrets in them. Therefore, it is not proved that the developer has [necessary] funds to implement the applied NDSP [project].” (July 2020)
	14.2. Business model and project payback	Reference to an opportunity by FBAD: “According to those calculations, the payback period of the project is 17 years and IRR 10.11%.” (November 2019)
	14.2. Business model and project payback	Reference to a threat by FBAD: “This [full disclosure of the business model] can put the developer at a disadvantage in negotiations and would give unfair advantage to possible competitors.” (November 2019)
	15. Ownership
	15.1. Interests and rights of the Chinese investors	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “Based on the public report by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, based on its analyses from 12.7.2019 and 3.9.2019 protected by the state secret, it is doubtful that there would be funds to implement the NDSP [project] and that the potential investor would be reliable.” (July 2020)
	15.2. Ownership structure	Reference to a threat by the MoF: “In the finance minister's opinion, considering the nature of the rail tunnel and the share of ownership acquired by the investor, the regulation [(EU) 2019/452 Establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union] would apply to the planned investment.” (July 2020)

[ViewLarge]

Sharing Unavailable