Gender diversity and board remuneration’s effects on earnings quality
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | EQ1 | EQ1 | EQ1 | EQ1 |
| GD1 | 0.567** (0.234) | 0.523** (0.228) | 0.485** (0.229) | 0.470** (0.222) |
| BRem1 | 0.839*** (0.315) | |||
| BRem12 | −0.032** (0.013) | |||
| BRem2 | 0.551** (0.242) | |||
| BRem22 | −0.021** (0.010) | |||
| BRem3 | 0.069 (0.096) | |||
| BRem32 | −0.246* (0.129) | |||
| BRem4 | 0.512 (0.396) | |||
| BRem42 | −5.726** (2.536) | |||
| Extrema point | 13.037 | 12.851 | 0.140 | 0.045 |
| Lind−Mehlum | 1.860 | 1.707 | 1.520 | 2.020 |
| p-value | (0.032) | (0.042) | (0.064) | (0.022) |
| BOwn | −0.308** (−2.16) | −0.2960** (−2.081) | −0.268** (−2.018) | −0.281** (−2.148) |
| BIndep | −0.036 (−0.245) | −0.023 (−0.1550) | 0.011 (0.071) | 0.032 (0.212) |
| BSize | −0.016 (−0.942) | −0.022 (−1.299) | −0.015 (−0.841) | −0.014 (−0.789) |
| BExec | 0.075 (0.385) | 0.056 (0.2897) | 0.073 (0.368) | 0.089 (0.445) |
| Size | −0.097 (−1.425) | −0.083 (−1.512) | −0.057 (−0.858) | −0.045 (−0.710) |
| Risk | 0.009 (0.569) | 0.010 (0.637) | 0.001 (0.059) | −0.000 (−0.009) |
| ROA | 1.138*** (3.248) | 1.156*** (3.247) | 1.075*** (3.092) | 1.162*** (3.312) |
| Lev | −0.240 (−0.825) | −0.298 (−1.063) | −0.332 (−1.164) | −0.341 (−1.137) |
| GO | −0.060 (−1.445) | −0.052 (−1.295) | −0.048 (−1.444) | −0.051 (−1.487) |
| Governance1 | −0.010 (−0.742) | −0.009 (−0.715) | −0.013 (−0.978) | −0.014 (−1.140) |
| Governance2 | 0.004 (0.204) | 0.005 (0.253) | 0.008 (0.415) | 0.004 (0.274) |
| Governance3 | −0.035 (−0.849) | −0.027 (−0.659) | −0.035 (−0.866) | −0.032 (−0.833) |
| Observations | 486 | 482 | 485 | 491 |
| Mean VIF | 1.566 | 1.109 | 1.318 | 2.107 |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | EQ1 | EQ1 | EQ1 | EQ1 |
| 0.567** (0.234) | 0.523** (0.228) | 0.485** (0.229) | 0.470** (0.222) | |
| 0.839 | ||||
| −0.032** (0.013) | ||||
| 0.551** (0.242) | ||||
| −0.021** (0.010) | ||||
| 0.069 (0.096) | ||||
| −0.246* (0.129) | ||||
| 0.512 (0.396) | ||||
| −5.726** (2.536) | ||||
| Lind−Mehlum | 1.860 | 1.707 | 1.520 | 2.020 |
| (0.032) | (0.042) | (0.064) | (0.022) | |
| −0.308** (−2.16) | −0.2960** (−2.081) | −0.268** (−2.018) | −0.281** (−2.148) | |
| −0.036 (−0.245) | −0.023 (−0.1550) | 0.011 (0.071) | 0.032 (0.212) | |
| −0.016 (−0.942) | −0.022 (−1.299) | −0.015 (−0.841) | −0.014 (−0.789) | |
| 0.075 (0.385) | 0.056 (0.2897) | 0.073 (0.368) | 0.089 (0.445) | |
| −0.097 (−1.425) | −0.083 (−1.512) | −0.057 (−0.858) | −0.045 (−0.710) | |
| 0.009 (0.569) | 0.010 (0.637) | 0.001 (0.059) | −0.000 (−0.009) | |
| 1.138 | 1.156 | 1.075 | 1.162 | |
| −0.240 (−0.825) | −0.298 (−1.063) | −0.332 (−1.164) | −0.341 (−1.137) | |
| −0.060 (−1.445) | −0.052 (−1.295) | −0.048 (−1.444) | −0.051 (−1.487) | |
| −0.010 (−0.742) | −0.009 (−0.715) | −0.013 (−0.978) | −0.014 (−1.140) | |
| 0.004 (0.204) | 0.005 (0.253) | 0.008 (0.415) | 0.004 (0.274) | |
| −0.035 (−0.849) | −0.027 (−0.659) | −0.035 (−0.866) | −0.032 (−0.833) | |
| 486 | 482 | 485 | 491 | |
| 1.566 | 1.109 | 1.318 | 2.107 |
Notes:
Regressions with Tobit semiparametric estimator with fixed effects at the firm and industry levels following Honoré (1992). Where EQ1 is earnings quality. GD1 is a measure of gender diversity. BRem1, BRem2, BRem3 and BRem4 are the measures of boards of directors’ remuneration. Control variables are the percentage of equity capital owned by the board of directors (BOwn), the percentage of independent board members (BIndep), the number of directors on the board (BSize), the percentage of executive directors (BExec), firm size (Size), default risk based on Altman’s (1968) Z-score (Risk), return on assets (ROA), leverage ratio (Lev), growth opportunities (GO) and factor variables from the Cluster-Focused Principal Component Factoring technique (Governance1, Governance2 and Governance3) that capture key attributes of the Unified Good Governance Code. The table also shows the extrema point (or threshold) for each regression using the alternative remuneration measures tested with Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) contrast. Standard errors are in parentheses.
***, ** and * simply statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively
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