Executive job-hopping effect on CSR performance
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Firm controls | Executive controls | All controls | All controls | |||||
| CSRLatter | CSRLatter | CSRLatter | CSRLatter | |||||
| CSRFormer | 0.012* | (0.01) | 0.014** | (0.01) | 0.013** | (0.01) | 0.033*** | (0.01) |
| Size | 6.547*** | (1.58) | 6.481*** | (1.57) | 7.274*** | (0.63) | ||
| ROA | 24.911* | (14.42) | 24.667* | (14.27) | 38.004* | (20.19) | ||
| Leverage | −5.255** | (2.35) | −5.275** | (2.33) | −5.694*** | (1.96) | ||
| Growth | 0.229 | (0.45) | 0.233 | (0.45) | 0.030 | (0.10) | ||
| TobinQ | −0.221 | (0.15) | −0.233 | (0.15) | 0.018 | (0.14) | ||
| OwnershipCon | −0.041 | (0.03) | −0.045 | (0.03) | 0.041*** | (0.02) | ||
| SOE | −0.519 | (0.81) | −0.517 | (0.81) | −0.055 | (0.58) | ||
| MgmtHolding | 1.089 | (0.84) | 0.982 | (0.83) | 1.042** | (0.48) | ||
| CEODuality | −1.485** | (0.73) | −1.479** | (0.73) | −0.778* | (0.45) | ||
| ExeAge | −0.011 | (0.02) | −0.010 | (0.01) | −0.026* | (0.02) | ||
| ExeGender | 0.343 | (0.29) | 0.354 | (0.28) | 0.062 | (0.33) | ||
| ExeEdu | 1.699*** | (0.49) | 1.501*** | (0.49) | −0.176 | (0.38) | ||
| ExeOveseas | −0.121 | (0.33) | −0.149 | (0.32) | 0.439 | (0.43) | ||
| ExeAcademic | −0.142 | (0.25) | −0.147 | (0.25) | 0.157 | (0.25) | ||
| ExeFinBack | −0.231 | (0.32) | −0.252 | (0.31) | 0.001 | (0.38) | ||
| Constant | −33.877** | (14.50) | 24.745*** | (0.89) | −33.621** | (14.54) | −46.630*** | (5.51) |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | ||||
| Industry FE | No | No | No | Yes | ||||
| N | 11,023 | 11,023 | 11,023 | 11,625 | ||||
| R2 | 0.706 | 0.699 | 0.706 | 0.320 | ||||
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Firm controls | Executive controls | All controls | All controls | |||||
| 0.012* | (0.01) | 0.014** | (0.01) | 0.013** | (0.01) | 0.033*** | (0.01) | |
| 6.547*** | (1.58) | 6.481*** | (1.57) | 7.274*** | (0.63) | |||
| 24.911* | (14.42) | 24.667* | (14.27) | 38.004* | (20.19) | |||
| −5.255** | (2.35) | −5.275** | (2.33) | −5.694*** | (1.96) | |||
| 0.229 | (0.45) | 0.233 | (0.45) | 0.030 | (0.10) | |||
| −0.221 | (0.15) | −0.233 | (0.15) | 0.018 | (0.14) | |||
| −0.041 | (0.03) | −0.045 | (0.03) | 0.041*** | (0.02) | |||
| −0.519 | (0.81) | −0.517 | (0.81) | −0.055 | (0.58) | |||
| 1.089 | (0.84) | 0.982 | (0.83) | 1.042** | (0.48) | |||
| −1.485** | (0.73) | −1.479** | (0.73) | −0.778* | (0.45) | |||
| −0.011 | (0.02) | −0.010 | (0.01) | −0.026* | (0.02) | |||
| 0.343 | (0.29) | 0.354 | (0.28) | 0.062 | (0.33) | |||
| 1.699*** | (0.49) | 1.501*** | (0.49) | −0.176 | (0.38) | |||
| −0.121 | (0.33) | −0.149 | (0.32) | 0.439 | (0.43) | |||
| −0.142 | (0.25) | −0.147 | (0.25) | 0.157 | (0.25) | |||
| −0.231 | (0.32) | −0.252 | (0.31) | 0.001 | (0.38) | |||
| Constant | −33.877** | (14.50) | 24.745*** | (0.89) | −33.621** | (14.54) | −46.630*** | (5.51) |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | ||||
| Industry FE | No | No | No | Yes | ||||
| N | 11,023 | 11,023 | 11,023 | 11,625 | ||||
| 0.706 | 0.699 | 0.706 | 0.320 | |||||
Note(s): This table reports the results of regressing the CSR of the subsequent firm (CSRLatter) in year t + 1 on the lagged CSR of the former firm in year t − 1 (CSRFormer) and the control variables in year t + 1. Robust standard errors clustered by firm and year are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are defined in Appendix 1
Source(s): Table 2 by authors
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