Table 6 Further analyses by job-hopping,...

Table 6

Further analyses by job-hopping, executive and firm attributes

Variables	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)
	CSRFormer < CSRFormerIndAvg		CSRFormer > CSRFormerIndAvg		Direct job-hopping		Gap job-hopping		Pay increase		No pay increase		Same city		Different city
	CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter
Panel A: Job-hopping attributes
CSRFormer	−0.030	(0.030)	0.078*	(0.040)	0.014**	(0.01)	0.033	(0.05)	0.001	(0.011)	0.027**	(0.011)	0.036**	(0.02)	0.006	(0.01)
All controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Year FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Firm FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
N	6,534		4,489		10,181		198		3,597		3,393		2,364		6,599
R²	0.861		0.851		0.712		0.878		0.788		0.739		0.771		0.729

Variables	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)
	CSRFormer <CSRFormerIndAvg		CSRFormer >CSRFormerIndAvg		Direct job-hopping		Gap job-hopping		Pay increase		No pay increase		Same city		Different city
	CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter
Panel A: Job-hopping attributes
CSRFormer	−0.030	(0.030)	0.078*	(0.040)	0.014**	(0.01)	0.033	(0.05)	0.001	(0.011)	0.027**	(0.011)	0.036**	(0.02)	0.006	(0.01)
All controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Year FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Firm FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
N	6,534		4,489		10,181		198		3,597		3,393		2,364		6,599
R²	0.861		0.851		0.712		0.878		0.788		0.739		0.771		0.729

Variables	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)
	Age > median		Age < median		Overseas experience		No overseas experience		Female executives		Male executives		CEO		Non−CEO
	CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter
Panel B: Executive Attributes
CSRFormer	0.023**	(0.01)	0.008	(0.01)	0.040***	(0.01)	0.005	(0.01)	0.034**	(0.014)	0.012*	(0.007)	0.043*	(0.023)	0.038***	(0.011)
All controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Year FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Firm FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
N	4,405		5,309		933		9,261		1,201		8,639		611		10,406
R²	0.772		0.757		0.857		0.706		0.880		0.708		0.343		0.256

Variables	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)
	Age > median		Age < median		Overseas experience		No overseas experience		Female executives		Male executives		CEO		Non−CEO
	CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter
Panel B: Executive Attributes
CSRFormer	0.023**	(0.01)	0.008	(0.01)	0.040***	(0.01)	0.005	(0.01)	0.034**	(0.014)	0.012*	(0.007)	0.043*	(0.023)	0.038***	(0.011)
All controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Year FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Firm FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
N	4,405		5,309		933		9,261		1,201		8,639		611		10,406
R²	0.772		0.757		0.857		0.706		0.880		0.708		0.343		0.256

Variables	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)
	Size > median		Size < median		OwnershipCon > Median		OwnershipCon < Median		SOE		Non-SOE		Leverage > median
	CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter
Panel C: Firm Attributes
CSRFormer	0.017*	(0.01)	0.001	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)	0.017***	(0.01)	−0.001	(0.01)	0.016*	(0.01)	0.024**	(0.01)
All controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Year FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Firm FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
N	5,471		5,202		5,293		5,343		2,337		8,335		5,404
R²	0.737		0.761		0.734		0.753		0.812		0.740		0.734

Variables	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)
	Size > median		Size < median		OwnershipCon> Median		OwnershipCon< Median		SOE		Non-SOE		Leverage > median
	CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter
Panel C: Firm Attributes
CSRFormer	0.017*	(0.01)	0.001	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)	0.017***	(0.01)	−0.001	(0.01)	0.016*	(0.01)	0.024**	(0.01)
All controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Year FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Firm FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
N	5,471		5,202		5,293		5,343		2,337		8,335		5,404
R²	0.737		0.761		0.734		0.753		0.812		0.740		0.734

Variables	(8)		(9)		(10)		(11)		(12)		(13)		(14)
	Leverage < median		TobinQ > median		TobinQ < median		MgmtHolding = 1		MgmtHolding = 0		CEODuality = 1		CEODuality = 0
	CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter
CSRFormer	0.005	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)	0.018**	(0.01)	0.014*	(0.01)	0.013	(0.01)	0.014*	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)
All controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Year FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Firm FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
N	5,253		5,135		5,300		6,093		4,660		8,076		2,644
R²	0.746		0.813		0.734		0.749		0.720		0.727		0.787

Variables	(8)		(9)		(10)		(11)		(12)		(13)		(14)
	Leverage < median		TobinQ > median		TobinQ < median		MgmtHolding = 1		MgmtHolding = 0		CEODuality = 1		CEODuality = 0
	CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter		CSRLatter
CSRFormer	0.005	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)	0.018**	(0.01)	0.014*	(0.01)	0.013	(0.01)	0.014*	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)
All controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Year FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Firm FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
N	5,253		5,135		5,300		6,093		4,660		8,076		2,644
R²	0.746		0.813		0.734		0.749		0.720		0.727		0.787

Note(s): This table reports subsample analyses for the job-hopping, executive and subsequent firm characteristics. We regress the CSR of the subsequent firm (CSRLatter) in year t + 1 on the lagged CSR of the former firm in year t−1 (CSRFormer) and the control variables in year t + 1. Robust standard errors clustered by firm and year are in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Source(s): Table 6 by authors

[ViewLarge]

Sharing Unavailable