Table 4

Robustness tests (1)

(1)(2)(3)(4)
EM_proxy−0.037*  −0.214**
(−1.77)  (−2.36)
CSR 0.146*** 0.159***
 (3.84) (4.03)
STATE  0.082**0.135***
  (2.34)(3.43)
EM_proxy×CSR   0.071**
   (2.33)
EM_proxy×STATE   0.306
   (1.03)
CSR×STATE   0.016
   (0.96)
EM_proxy×CSR×STATE   0.059*
   (1.92)
SIZE−0.043−0.075*−0.013−0.077*
(−1.07)(−1.82)(−0.34)(−1.69)
AGE−0.030−0.029−0.024−0.051
(−0.83)(−0.86)(−0.23)(−1.41)
ROA0.0350.0210.0240.018
(0.93)(0.59)(0.67)(0.51)
LEV0.193***0.165***0.179***0.184***
(4.37)(3.99)(4.23)(4.17)
BOARD0.012−0.0550.016−0.011
(0.36)(−1.65)(0.49)(−0.29)
WOMEN−0.027−0.025−0.032−0.019
(−0.80)(−0.77)(−0.97)(−0.29)
INDEP−0.035−0.044−0.027−0.051*
(−1.16)(−1.38)(−0.92)(−1.71)
Industry effectsYesYesYesYes
Year effectsYesYesYesYes
Observations1,2241,2871,2901,222
Adj. R-sq0.0420.0450.0380.064

Note(s): The table reports the results of OLS models with fixed effects for year and industry for Hypotheses (1)-(4) with a new proxy for earnings management based on Laux and Leuz (2009) and Leuz et al. (2003), standard errors are clustered by industry. The results reflect the effect of the new earnings management proxy (EM_proxy) on Tobin’s Q variable as well as the moderating effect of CSR disclosure (CSR) and state ownership (STATE) in the above mentioned relationship. The variables are described in  Appendix B. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

Source(s): Author’s own creation

or Create an Account

Close subscription notice
Close access options