Table 4 Top most cited articles... | Emerald Publishing

Table 4

Top most cited articles published, 1990–2007

Ref	Aim	Key words	Contribution	# Citations per year
Fan et al. (2007)	To examine the role of government intervention in China's newly partially privatized firms	political connections; corporate governance; IPO; performance; partial privatization; China; operating performance; share; market; state	The presence of politically connected CEO's in newly partially privatized in China in the period 1993–2001 reaches 27%. These companies vs. similar companies with non-politically connected CEO's: (a) underperform long-term post-IPO stock returns by −18% with poorer accounting performance; (b) IPO initial (first day) returns are negatively related to the CEO's political connections; (c) boards show fewer professionals than others with more presence of other bureaucrats, less gender and age diversity. In summary, government intervention through politically connected CEO's isn't a driver of shareholder value maximization	72,9
Johnson and Greening (1999)	To examine relationship among types of institutional investors, board composition, top management team equity, and specific Corporate Social Performance dimensions	organizational attractiveness; shareholder activism, firm innovation; investors; directors; incentives; boards; environment; intensity; strategy	Certain types of institutional ownership and government mechanisms are positively related to a pair of isolated aspects of corporate social performance such as product quality and people. Pension fund equity relates positively to both dimensions, while mutual and investment banks equity show no relation to those aspects. Outside directors show positive relation while cases where Top Management holds equity has a positive impact on product quality but no effect on people dimension	36,2
Hillman et al. (2000)	To present a taxonomy for classifying directors that reflects the resource dependence role as distinct from the agency role, and to explore the role of resource dependence by examining the changing nature of board composition in the US air line travel industry	performance; governance; top; firm; perspective; management; ownership; turnover; impact; model	A taxonomy of four types of directors (Insiders, Business Experts, Support Specialists and Community Influentials) that reflects the distinctive role that directors play under resource dependence theory as opposite to their role under agency theory perspective. Given an environmental change such as moving from regulation to a deregulation in US air lines sector, boards replacements were more likely to come from the business expert and community influential types, while during regulation board replacements were more likely from the insider and support specialist categories	28,9
Hoskisson et al. (2002)	To explain how different types of owners often have distinct and potentially conflicting preferences for corporate innovation strategies	R&D; agency costs; diversification strategy; firm; investors; board; management; directors; impact; incentives	Agency theory should be amended to consider that not all owners have the same preferences toward corporate governance and innovation strategies - Institutional pension (public) fund ownership has a stronger positive relationship with internal innovation as well as stronger inside director incentives and ownership, than does professional investment fund manager ownership - Professional investment fund manager ownership has a stronger positive relationship with external innovation through acquisition than does institutional pension (public) fund ownership - Inside board member ownership and incentives are more strongly positively related to internal innovation than is the degree of representation (director ratio and ownership) of independent outside board members - The degree of representation (director ratio and ownership) of independent outside board members is more strongly positively related to external innovation than are inside board member ownership and incentives	24,3
Westphal and Zajac (2001)	To explain the response of firms to answer external pressures to demonstrate corporate control over managerial behavior regarding the implementation of Stock repurchase programs in USA during 80´s and 90´s	corporate governance; CEO compensation; inter-organizational imitation; golden parachutes; management; adoption; performance; director; firm; embeddedness	The greater the CEO's power over the board, the greater the extent to which firms decouple financial investments from formally adopted repurchase programs, so that the programs remain more symbolic than substantive. Board network ties to firms that have decoupled their buyback programs can increase managers' awareness of the potential to engage in symbolic action (i.e. actual decoupling) vs substantive action (i.e. actual fulfilling formally adopted programs)	18,6

Ref	Aim	Key words	Contribution	# Citations per year
Fan et al. (2007)	To examine the role of government intervention in China's newly partially privatized firms	political connections; corporate governance; IPO; performance; partial privatization; China; operating performance; share; market; state	The presence of politically connected CEO's in newly partially privatized in China in the period 1993–2001 reaches 27%. These companies vs. similar companies with non-politically connected CEO's: (a) underperform long-term post-IPO stock returns by −18% with poorer accounting performance; (b) IPO initial (first day) returns are negatively related to the CEO's political connections; (c) boards show fewer professionals than others with more presence of other bureaucrats, less gender and age diversity. In summary, government intervention through politically connected CEO's isn't a driver of shareholder value maximization	72,9
Johnson and Greening (1999)	To examine relationship among types of institutional investors, board composition, top management team equity, and specific Corporate Social Performance dimensions	organizational attractiveness; shareholder activism, firm innovation; investors; directors; incentives; boards; environment; intensity; strategy	Certain types of institutional ownership and government mechanisms are positively related to a pair of isolated aspects of corporate social performance such as product quality and people. Pension fund equity relates positively to both dimensions, while mutual and investment banks equity show no relation to those aspects. Outside directors show positive relation while cases where Top Management holds equity has a positive impact on product quality but no effect on people dimension	36,2
Hillman et al. (2000)	To present a taxonomy for classifying directors that reflects the resource dependence role as distinct from the agency role, and to explore the role of resource dependence by examining the changing nature of board composition in the US air line travel industry	performance; governance; top; firm; perspective; management; ownership; turnover; impact; model	A taxonomy of four types of directors (Insiders, Business Experts, Support Specialists and Community Influentials) that reflects the distinctive role that directors play under resource dependence theory as opposite to their role under agency theory perspective. Given an environmental change such as moving from regulation to a deregulation in US air lines sector, boards replacements were more likely to come from the business expert and community influential types, while during regulation board replacements were more likely from the insider and support specialist categories	28,9
Hoskisson et al. (2002)	To explain how different types of owners often have distinct and potentially conflicting preferences for corporate innovation strategies	R&D; agency costs; diversification strategy; firm; investors; board; management; directors; impact; incentives	Agency theory should be amended to consider that not all owners have the same preferences toward corporate governance and innovation strategies- Institutional pension (public) fund ownership has a stronger positive relationship with internal innovation as well as stronger inside director incentives and ownership, than does professional investment fund manager ownership- Professional investment fund manager ownership has a stronger positive relationship with external innovation through acquisition than does institutional pension (public) fund ownership- Inside board member ownership and incentives are more strongly positively related to internal innovation than is the degree of representation (director ratio and ownership) of independent outside board members- The degree of representation (director ratio and ownership) of independent outside board members is more strongly positively related to external innovation than are inside board member ownership and incentives	24,3
Westphal and Zajac (2001)	To explain the response of firms to answer external pressures to demonstrate corporate control over managerial behavior regarding the implementation of Stock repurchase programs in USA during 80´s and 90´s	corporate governance; CEO compensation; inter-organizational imitation; golden parachutes; management; adoption; performance; director; firm; embeddedness	The greater the CEO's power over the board, the greater the extent to which firms decouple financial investments from formally adopted repurchase programs, so that the programs remain more symbolic than substantive. Board network ties to firms that have decoupled their buyback programs can increase managers' awareness of the potential to engage in symbolic action (i.e. actual decoupling) vs substantive action (i.e. actual fulfilling formally adopted programs)	18,6

Source(s): Table by authors