The determinants of agrochemical traders’ voluntary and enforced tax compliance
| Variables | Probit regression | OLS regression | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntary tax | Enforced tax | Voluntary tax | Enforced tax | |
| Compliance | Compliance | Compliance | Compliance | |
| Demographic characteristics | ||||
| Age | −0.065*** | 0.128** | −0.016*** | 0.004* |
| (0.018) | (0.965) | (0.004) | (0.002) | |
| Gender (Female = 1) | −0.340 | 0.749 | −0.111 | −0.006 |
| (0.368) | (1.170) | (0.108) | (0.060) | |
| Educational level (years in school) | 0.257* | −0.385 | 0.062 | −0.022 |
| (0.175) | (0.383) | (0.051) | (0.028) | |
| Economic characteristics | ||||
| Tax rate | 0.066 | −0.467* | 0.0156 | −0.034*** |
| (0.073) | (0.246) | (0.022) | (0.012) | |
| Sales per year | 8.220* | −4.950* | 1.340*** | −3.250 |
| (2.910) | (3.390) | (4.190) | (2.330) | |
| Trust in authorities | ||||
| Respect | −0.149 | 0.431 | −0.024 | 0.038 |
| (0.172) | (0.383) | (0.051) | (0.028) | |
| Honesty | −0.542* | 1.504* | −0.151* | 0.134*** |
| (0.293) | (0.389) | (0.083) | (0.046) | |
| Trustworthiness | 0.458* | −1.286* | 0.098 | −0.101** |
| (0.262) | (0.714) | (0.075) | (0.042) | |
| Power of authorities | ||||
| Expertise | 0.095 | 0.166 | 0.035 | 0.045* |
| (0.159) | (0.274) | (0.048) | (0.027) | |
| Sanction | −0.133 | 1.390*** | −0.032 | 0.155*** |
| (0.114) | (0.460) | (0.344) | (0.019) | |
| Constant | 1.903* | −6.220** | 1.040*** | −0.137 |
| (0.074) | (3.150) | (0.310) | (0.172) | |
| Prob > F | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||
| R-Squared | 0.329 | 0.7069 | ||
| Prop > chi | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||
| Pseudo R2 | 0.314 | 0.817 | ||
| Wald X2 | (10) = 39.87 | (10) = 80.74 | ||
| Log pseudolikelihood | −43.639 | −9.049 | ||
| Variables | Probit regression | OLS regression | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntary tax | Enforced tax | Voluntary tax | Enforced tax | |
| Compliance | Compliance | Compliance | Compliance | |
| Age | −0.065*** | 0.128** | −0.016*** | 0.004* |
| (0.018) | (0.965) | (0.004) | (0.002) | |
| Gender (Female = 1) | −0.340 | 0.749 | −0.111 | −0.006 |
| (0.368) | (1.170) | (0.108) | (0.060) | |
| Educational level (years in school) | 0.257* | −0.385 | 0.062 | −0.022 |
| (0.175) | (0.383) | (0.051) | (0.028) | |
| Tax rate | 0.066 | −0.467* | 0.0156 | −0.034*** |
| (0.073) | (0.246) | (0.022) | (0.012) | |
| Sales per year | 8.220* | −4.950* | 1.340*** | −3.250 |
| (2.910) | (3.390) | (4.190) | (2.330) | |
| Respect | −0.149 | 0.431 | −0.024 | 0.038 |
| (0.172) | (0.383) | (0.051) | (0.028) | |
| Honesty | −0.542* | 1.504* | −0.151* | 0.134*** |
| (0.293) | (0.389) | (0.083) | (0.046) | |
| Trustworthiness | 0.458* | −1.286* | 0.098 | −0.101** |
| (0.262) | (0.714) | (0.075) | (0.042) | |
| Expertise | 0.095 | 0.166 | 0.035 | 0.045* |
| (0.159) | (0.274) | (0.048) | (0.027) | |
| Sanction | −0.133 | 1.390*** | −0.032 | 0.155*** |
| (0.114) | (0.460) | (0.344) | (0.019) | |
| Constant | 1.903* | −6.220** | 1.040*** | −0.137 |
| (0.074) | (3.150) | (0.310) | (0.172) | |
| Prob > F | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||
| 0.329 | 0.7069 | |||
| Prop > chi | 0.000 | 0.000 | ||
| Pseudo | 0.314 | 0.817 | ||
| Wald X2 | (10) = 39.87 | (10) = 80.74 | ||
| Log pseudolikelihood | −43.639 | −9.049 | ||
Note(s): NB: A dummy variable based on scores from 12 and above = 1 “voluntary compliance” and below 12 = 0 “otherwise”. A dummy variable based on scores from 12 and above = 1 “enforced compliance” and below 12 = 0 “otherwise”. The OLS model dependent variable is the addition of respondents’ scores from three questions relating to enforced compliance and voluntary compliance. Magnitude of agreement on sanction, expertise, respect, honesty and trustworthiness was measured on interval scale from 1 = total disagree to 5 = total agree
Source(s): Authors’ own from field data
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