Table 5

Effect of supervisory board’s optimal tenure (SB_TENR) on the relationship between politically-connected boards (PCBs) and over-investment in labor (OVER_LAB)

Optimal tenure = 5–10 yearsOptimal tenure = 8–11 years
OVER_LABOVER_LAB
Coefficientt-valuesCoefficientt-values
#1#2#3#4
PCBsit−0.050*(−1.75)−0.054**(−2.30)
SB_TENRit−0.041**(−2.11)−0.031*(−1.65)
PCBsitxSB_TENRit−0.085***(−3.53)−0.059**(−2.40)
TOP5it−0.045(−0.89)−0.037(−0.73)
LEVit−0.122**(−2.25)−0.120**(−2.20)
ROAit−0.403***(−3.81)−0.412***(−3.90)
DPRit−0.033**(−2.19)−0.032**(−2.15)
TANGit0.090***(3.02)0.088***(2.95)
OPER_CCit0.027**(2.43)0.028**(2.48)
Qit0.013(1.59)0.013*(1.70)
Constant0.284***(2.75)0.258**(2.55)
Industry FEYes Yes 
Year FEYes Yes 
Observations1,437 1,437 
F5.22*** 5.38*** 
R20.279 0.271 

Note(s): Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model, t-statistics calculated based on the robust standard errors clustered at firm-level. Over-investment in labor (OVER_LABit) in firm i occurs when the ratio of the number of employees at the end of financial year t to the annual sales of firm i during year t is greater than the ratio of the total number of employees of all firms in the same industry sector in year t to the total annual sales for all firms in the same industry sector in year t. In the sub-sample of over-investment in labor, a higher (lower) positive number indicates a higher (lower) over-investment in labor. The presence of PCBs is a dummy variable set to 1 if a firm has politically-connected board member(s) and zero (0) otherwise. Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 report the coefficients and t-statistic values of the interaction between PCBsit and SB_TENRit (SB’s optimal tenure). SB_TENRit is a dummy variable set to 1 if the average of SB tenure of firm i in year t is between 5–10 years (Columns 1 and 2) or 8–11 years (Columns 3 and 4) and zero (0) otherwise. t-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). The definitions of variables are presented in  Appendix

Source(s): Table 5 by authors

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