Additional test: the effects of politically-connected boards (PCBs) on over-investment in labor (OVER_LAB) and under-investment in labor (UNDER_LAB) using the alternative proxies for over-(under)-investment in labor
| Mean (average) industry | Median industry | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OVER_LAB | UNDER_LAB | OVER_LAB | UNDER_LAB | |||||
| Coefficient | t-values | Coefficient | t-values | Coefficient | t-values | Coefficient | t-values | |
| #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 | #5 | #6 | #7 | #8 | |
| PCBsit | −0.051** | (−2.46) | −0.001 | (−0.22) | −0.055** | (−2.52) | 0.001 | (0.21) |
| TOP5it | −0.039 | (−0.84) | 0.007 | (1.08) | −0.056 | (−1.13) | 0.015** | (1.92) |
| LEVit | −0.117** | (−2.12) | 0.007 | (1.21) | −0.090* | (−1.66) | 0.011 | (1.28) |
| ROAit | −0.38*** | (−3.51) | −0.017 | (−1.11) | −0.348*** | (−3.21) | 0.001 | (0.01) |
| DPRit | −0.033** | (−1.98) | 0.001 | (0.04) | −0.034** | (−2.03) | −0.004 | (−1.17) |
| TANGit | 0.069** | (2.22) | −0.008*** | (−2.61) | 0.067** | (2.11) | −0.002 | (−0.56) |
| OPER_CCit | 0.031*** | (2.73) | −0.002 | (−1.25) | 0.026** | (2.31) | −0.001 | (−0.40) |
| Qit | 0.014* | (1.80) | 0.001 | (0.86) | 0.012* | (1.64) | 0.001 | (0.94) |
| Constant | 0.274*** | (2.97) | 0.085*** | (7.84) | 0.245** | (2.65) | 0.122*** | (6.67) |
| Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||
| Observations | 1,273 | 1,183 | 1,191 | 1,191 | ||||
| F | 5.88*** | 15.48*** | 4.17*** | 12.51*** | ||||
| R2 | 0.302 | 0.402 | 0.254 | 0.418 | ||||
| Mean (average) industry | Median industry | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OVER_LAB | UNDER_LAB | OVER_LAB | UNDER_LAB | |||||
| Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient | |||||
| #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 | #5 | #6 | #7 | #8 | |
| −0.051** | (−2.46) | −0.001 | (−0.22) | −0.055** | (−2.52) | 0.001 | (0.21) | |
| −0.039 | (−0.84) | 0.007 | (1.08) | −0.056 | (−1.13) | 0.015** | (1.92) | |
| −0.117** | (−2.12) | 0.007 | (1.21) | −0.090* | (−1.66) | 0.011 | (1.28) | |
| −0.38*** | (−3.51) | −0.017 | (−1.11) | −0.348*** | (−3.21) | 0.001 | (0.01) | |
| −0.033** | (−1.98) | 0.001 | (0.04) | −0.034** | (−2.03) | −0.004 | (−1.17) | |
| 0.069** | (2.22) | −0.008*** | (−2.61) | 0.067** | (2.11) | −0.002 | (−0.56) | |
| 0.031*** | (2.73) | −0.002 | (−1.25) | 0.026** | (2.31) | −0.001 | (−0.40) | |
| 0.014* | (1.80) | 0.001 | (0.86) | 0.012* | (1.64) | 0.001 | (0.94) | |
| 0.274*** | (2.97) | 0.085*** | (7.84) | 0.245** | (2.65) | 0.122*** | (6.67) | |
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |||||
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |||||
| 1,273 | 1,183 | 1,191 | 1,191 | |||||
| 5.88*** | 15.48*** | 4.17*** | 12.51*** | |||||
| 0.302 | 0.402 | 0.254 | 0.418 | |||||
Note(s): Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model, t-statistics calculated based on the robust standard errors clustered at firm-level. Over-(under-)investment in labor in firm i occurs when the ratio of the number of employees at the end of financial year t to the annual sales of firm i during year t is greater (lower) than the mean (median) value of this ratio for all firms in the same industry sector in year t. In the sub-sample of over-investment in labor, a higher (lower) positive number indicates a higher (lower) over-investment in labor. For ease of interpretation, the negative signs of the sub-sample for under-investment in labor are multiplied by −1 to obtain a positive number. Hence, a higher (lower) positive number indicates a higher (lower) under-investment in labor. The presence of PCBsit is a dummy variable set to 1 if firm i in year t has politically-connected board member(s) and zero (0) otherwise. Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 report the OVER_LAB regression coefficients and t-values in parentheses, columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 report the UNDER_LAB regression coefficients and t-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). The definitions of variables are presented in Appendix
Source(s): Table 9 by authors