Evolution of nomination and remuneration committee research publications
| Author | Negara asal | Research question | Research method | Result | Theory |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conyon and Peck (1998) | USA | How is the oversight role of the board and remuneration committee in determining management compensation? | Quantitative method with a sample of the Financial Times top 100 companies by market value in the UK during 1991–1994 | Top management pay and company performance are more closely aligned in companies with outsider-dominated boards and remuneration committees | Agency theory and social comparison theory |
| Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) | USA | Does CEO involvement in the selection of new directors affect the nature of board appointments? | Quantitative methods with Fortune 500 non-financial companies during 1994–1995 | When the CEO serves on a nominating committee or there is no nominating committee, companies appoint fewer independent outside directors and more outsiders who have conflicts of interest | Agency theory |
| Ruigrok et al. (2006) | Switzerland | What impact does the existence of a nomination committee and its composition have on board independence and board demographic diversity? | Quantitative method, with a sample of 210 Swiss public companies from 2001 to 2003 | Companies that have nomination committees tend to have a higher number of independent and foreign directors. The composition of the nomination committee is important in the nomination of independent and foreign directors | Agency theory, resource dependence theory, and group effectiveness theory |
| Kaczmarek et al. (2012) | UK | Does the diversity of nomination committees (gender and nationality) affect the diversity (gender and nationality) of corporate boards? | Quantitative method with a sample of companies listed on the Financial Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 during 1999–2008 | The increased presence of women and non-British nationals on nominations committees will have a positive impact on the level of gender diversity and nationality on the board. The CEO on the nominating committee interacts with the independence of this committee, thereby exposing board demographic fault lines | Social identity theory |
| Hutchinson et al. (2015) | Australia | Does the presence of a designated nomination committee and the representation of women on the nomination committee affect gender diversity on the board? | A quantitative method with a sample of the top 500 companies listed in Australia in 2007 and 2011 | Gender diversity on the board is significantly and positively associated with the presence of an appointed nomination committee, and women's representation on the nomination committee is a significant explanatory factor in increasing gender diversity on the board | Agency Theory, stakeholder theory, Social identity theory, and resource dependence theory |
| Kanapathippillai et al. (2016) | Australia | What is the impact of the effectiveness of the remuneration committee on narrative voluntary disclosure of information on remuneration? | Quantitative method, with 673 observations of Australian companies during 2007–2011 | The existence and quality of a remuneration committee play an important role in the decision to provide voluntary disclosure regarding remuneration measures and the extent of this disclosure | Agency Theory |
| Appiah and Chizema (2016) | Ghana and UK | How board quality influences the relationship between corporate bankruptcy and nomination committee effectiveness? | Quantitative method, with 1,835 firm-year observations for 98 bankrupt and 269 non-bankrupt UK-listed non-financial firms between 1994 and 2011 | Nomination committee effectiveness has a negative impact on corporate bankruptcy, and the interaction of board quality and nomination committee effectiveness has a significant negative relationship with corporate bankruptcy | Agency theory and resource dependence theory |
| Eulaiwi et al. (2016) | Australia dan Oman | What is the relationship between outside board directorship and family ownership concentration? | Quantitative method, with 1,091 firm-year observations of non-financial publicly listed firms from Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) during the 2005–2013 period | There is a positive relationship between family ownership and the number of outside directorships held by board members. The existence of a nominating committee and the quality and characteristics of its membership suppress the positive relationship between outside directorship and family ownership | Agency theory type 2 and institution-based theories |
| Berezinets et al. (2017) | Russia | What is the relationship between board structure and company performance? | Quantitative method, with a sample of 207 Russian companies during the period 2007–2011 | Positive relationship between Tobin's q and gender diversity on boards. There is no empirical evidence regarding significant differences in Tobin's q values between companies that have nominations and remuneration for companies that do not have this committee | Agency theory and resource dependence theory |
| Yarram and Rice (2017) | Australia | How does the company determine the salaries of its executive employees? | Quantitative method with a sample of 129 mining companies and 332 non-mining companies for the research period 2005–2013 | Mining companies pay CEOs less overall than non-mining companies. The remuneration committee has a significant positive effect on the total salary of mining companies and an insignificant positive effect on non-mining companies. The remuneration committee moderates the influence of market capital on total salary in a significantly negative way in mining companies but not significantly in non-mining companies. When CEOs are on remuneration committees, they reduce the pay and performance sensitivity of long-term incentive pay at non-mining companies | Optimal contracting theory |
| Al-Absy et al. (2018) | Malaysia | How is the Chairman of the Board involved in the Nomination and Remuneration Committee on Profit Management? | Quantitative method, with a sample of 300 companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia with the lowest positive ROA for 2013 to 2015 | The chairmen of the nomination committee, ordinary members of the nomination committee, and board chairmen's involvement in the nomination committee have a significant positive relationship with AEM and REM, and the chairmen's involvement in the remuneration committee has a significant negative relationship with accrual earnings management (AEM) but not real earnings management (REM) | Agency Theory |
| Mans-Kemp and Viviers (2019) | South Africa | Does the nominating committee serve as an internal change mechanism to promote gender and racial diversity? | Quantitative method, with a sample of 40 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE Top 40) for the 2011–2016 period | A more diverse board has a nomination committee that is much more diverse in terms of both gender and race | Similarity attraction theory, human capital theory, resource dependence theory, and agency theory |
| Ntim et al. (2019) | UK | Can CEO power and corporate governance structure moderate pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS)? | Quantitative method, with 1,690 observations of non-financial companies in South Africa during 2003–2012 | Executive pay and performance are positively related to PPS. concentrated ownership and weak board structure; second-order agency conflicts (director supervisory power and opportunism) are stronger than first-order agency problems (CEO power and self-interest). CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on PPS. PPS is higher in companies that have more reputable CEOs, founders, and shareholders, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in companies with larger boards, more powerful CEOs, and a long term of office | Agency Theory, optimal contracting theory and managerial power hypothesis. |
| Puni and Anlesinya (2020) | Ghana | How do corporate governance mechanisms influence company performance? | Quantitative method, with 38 registered companies in Ghana from 2006 to 2018 | The presence of insiders and outsiders on a company's board improves financial performance. Board size, frequency of board meetings, and shareholder concentration/ownership structure generally have a positive impact on financial performance. However, the presence of board committees (audit, nomination, and remuneration) generally has a negative impact on financial performance, while CEO duality has no impact on financial performance | Agency and stewardship theory |
| Chaudhry et al. (2020) | Pakistan and Saudi Arabia | What is the influence of financial expertise, monitoring, and experience of the chairman of the audit committee and human resources (HR) expertise, monitoring expertise, and experience of the chairman of the nomination committee on financial performance? | Quantitative method, with 50 Pakistani non-financial companies listed on the KSE 100 during 2016 | The financial and monitoring expertise of the audit committee chairman and the experience expertise of the nomination committee chairman have a positive effect on company performance. However, no significant influence was found from the experience of the audit committee chairman and the monitoring and HR expertise of the nomination committee chairman on company performance | Agency theory and human capital theory |
| Harymawan et al. (2020) | Indonesia and USA | What is the relationship between the remuneration committee, executive remuneration, the board of directors, and company performance? | Quantitative method, with 847 observations on companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2014–2017 | The remuneration committee is positively related to executive remuneration and company performance. Higher remuneration is only associated with higher performance in companies that have established a remuneration committee. The interaction between the remuneration committee, the level of remuneration of senior company officials, and company performance is significantly positive | Agency Theory |
| Gai et al. (2021) | USA | How directors who structurally link multiple board committees (referred to as multi-committee directors (MCDs)) explain some board actions as merely symbolic while others are more substantive | Mix method, combining qualitative interviews and causal identification strategies of Russell 3,000 companies with 16,279 observations over the period 2001–2014 | Assigning directors to multiple board committees can improve governance performance under certain circumstances. The presence of an MCD linking the audit and nomination committees is associated with the appointment of more experienced directors and a reduced likelihood of future financial restatements and lawsuits | Agency Theory |
| Ashraf et al. (2022) | Portugal | What is the relationship between board committee independence and corporate financial distress in China and the UK? | Quantitative method, with samples of Chinese and British non-financial companies during 2007–2016 | In China, there is a positive and significant relationship between the percentage of independent audit committee members and a company's financial distress. The opposite relationship was found for the independence of the compensation and nomination committees. In the UK, the relationship is similar, but the results are only significant for the independence of nomination committees. The overall results show that independent audit committee members do not support the company's survival. On the other hand, independent compensation and nomination committee members are beneficial to a company's financial health | Agency theory, resource dependence theory, and stewardship theory |
| Saha and Kabra (2022) | India | How do several leading corporate governance (CG) practices influence voluntary disclosure (VD)? | Quantitative method with the top 100 non-financial and non-utility companies by market capitalization in India during 2013–2014 to 2017–2018 | significant negative influence of board independence on VD, while gender diversity and the risk management committee show a significant positive influence on VD. Board size, role duality, ownership concentration, audit committee independence, and nomination remuneration committee do not have a significant influence on VD. The relationship between CG mechanisms and various types of VD shows that board independence, in particular, has a strong negative influence on corporate strategy disclosure (CSD) and forward-looking disclosure (FWLD), while gender diversity and risk management committees show a significant positive influence on CSD, FWLD, CG disclosure, and financial and capital market disclosure. In particular, none of the CG mechanisms considered influences the influence of human and intellectual capital disclosure | Agency theory and resource dependence theory |
| Iannuzzi et al. (2023) | Italy | Whether the characteristics of the nomination committee can serve as key attributes to reduce ESG disputes and whether the composition of the nomination committee influences the appointment of ESG-friendly directors to the board | Quantitative method with a sample of 30 systemically important global banks from 2015 to 2021 | A bank's exposure to ESG controversies can be reduced when nominating committee members have at least one committee member who is a member of the sustainability committee and a foreign director. ESG disputes in banks are reduced when nomination committee members are younger, while the number of independent members has a negative impact. There is a positive influence on the composition of the nomination committee and the characteristics of its members, as well as the appointment of ESG-friendly directors on the board | Agency theory and resource dependence theory |
| Van Zyl and Mans-Kemp (2023) | South Africa | What are the perspectives of asset managers and listed financial services companies in South Africa on the impact of voting and engagement on director pay policies and practices? | Qualitative method with semi-structured interviews conducted with asset managers, CEOs, chief financial officers, and remuneration committee members from listed financial services companies in South Africa | Most asset managers and financial services representatives prefer proactive private involvement in pay issues, given its impact on voting outcomes and, ultimately, director remuneration practices and policies. The independent remuneration committee has an important role in facilitating relationships with investors to ensure fair remuneration | Agency Theory |
| Fulgence et al. (2023) | UK | What is the influence of board size and board independence, as well as the interaction effect between board independence and CEO/CFO, on corporate governance disclosure practices? | Quantitative method with 1,000 annual observations of companies from 2007 to 2017 in East Africa | Large boards and independent directors are associated with greater CG information disclosure. CEO/CFO power negatively moderates the relationship between board independence and corporate governance disclosure, but not in environments with stronger institutions and corporate governance systems. Companies whose CEOs and CFOs are involved in remuneration or nomination committees disclose less CG information. The combined effect of the CEO and CFO on the nomination and remuneration committee and the independent board in reducing corporate disclosure appears to be more pronounced in the post-financial crisis period compared to the crisis period | Agency theory |
| Lagasio et al. (2023) | Italy and France | What is the influence of the composition and function of board committees on a company's financial difficulties? | Quantitative method with a sample of 273 listed companies in Italy during 2004–2017 | Non-executive members on the remuneration and audit committees, as well as more remuneration committee meetings, can increase company stability. In contrast, a high frequency of nominating committee meetings appears to be positively associated with the likelihood of financial distress | Agency theory |
| Edacherian et al. (2024) | United Arab Emirates, Netherlands and India | What is the relationship between board interlocks and corporate performance, which is rooted in different perspectives on the role of the board of directors? | Quantitative method with 5,133 annual observations of non-financial companies in India during 2014–2018 | Interlocks between audit committees are negatively related to firm performance. In contrast, interlocks between the nomination and remuneration committees of Indian firms are positively related to performance | Agency theory and resource dependence theory |
| Author | Negara asal | Research question | Research method | Result | Theory |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USA | How is the oversight role of the board and remuneration committee in determining management compensation? | Quantitative method with a sample of the Financial Times top 100 companies by market value in the UK during 1991–1994 | Top management pay and company performance are more closely aligned in companies with outsider-dominated boards and remuneration committees | Agency theory and social comparison theory | |
| USA | Does CEO involvement in the selection of new directors affect the nature of board appointments? | Quantitative methods with Fortune 500 non-financial companies during 1994–1995 | When the CEO serves on a nominating committee or there is no nominating committee, companies appoint fewer independent outside directors and more outsiders who have conflicts of interest | Agency theory | |
| Switzerland | What impact does the existence of a nomination committee and its composition have on board independence and board demographic diversity? | Quantitative method, with a sample of 210 Swiss public companies from 2001 to 2003 | Companies that have nomination committees tend to have a higher number of independent and foreign directors. The composition of the nomination committee is important in the nomination of independent and foreign directors | Agency theory, resource dependence theory, and group effectiveness theory | |
| UK | Does the diversity of nomination committees (gender and nationality) affect the diversity (gender and nationality) of corporate boards? | Quantitative method with a sample of companies listed on the Financial Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 during 1999–2008 | The increased presence of women and non-British nationals on nominations committees will have a positive impact on the level of gender diversity and nationality on the board. The CEO on the nominating committee interacts with the independence of this committee, thereby exposing board demographic fault lines | Social identity theory | |
| Australia | Does the presence of a designated nomination committee and the representation of women on the nomination committee affect gender diversity on the board? | A quantitative method with a sample of the top 500 companies listed in Australia in 2007 and 2011 | Gender diversity on the board is significantly and positively associated with the presence of an appointed nomination committee, and women's representation on the nomination committee is a significant explanatory factor in increasing gender diversity on the board | Agency Theory, stakeholder theory, Social identity theory, and resource dependence theory | |
| Australia | What is the impact of the effectiveness of the remuneration committee on narrative voluntary disclosure of information on remuneration? | Quantitative method, with 673 observations of Australian companies during 2007–2011 | The existence and quality of a remuneration committee play an important role in the decision to provide voluntary disclosure regarding remuneration measures and the extent of this disclosure | Agency Theory | |
| Ghana and UK | How board quality influences the relationship between corporate bankruptcy and nomination committee effectiveness? | Quantitative method, with 1,835 firm-year observations for 98 bankrupt and 269 non-bankrupt UK-listed non-financial firms between 1994 and 2011 | Nomination committee effectiveness has a negative impact on corporate bankruptcy, and the interaction of board quality and nomination committee effectiveness has a significant negative relationship with corporate bankruptcy | Agency theory and resource dependence theory | |
| Australia dan Oman | What is the relationship between outside board directorship and family ownership concentration? | Quantitative method, with 1,091 firm-year observations of non-financial publicly listed firms from Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) during the 2005–2013 period | There is a positive relationship between family ownership and the number of outside directorships held by board members. The existence of a nominating committee and the quality and characteristics of its membership suppress the positive relationship between outside directorship and family ownership | Agency theory type 2 and institution-based theories | |
| Russia | What is the relationship between board structure and company performance? | Quantitative method, with a sample of 207 Russian companies during the period 2007–2011 | Positive relationship between Tobin's q and gender diversity on boards. There is no empirical evidence regarding significant differences in Tobin's | Agency theory and resource dependence theory | |
| Australia | How does the company determine the salaries of its executive employees? | Quantitative method with a sample of 129 mining companies and 332 non-mining companies for the research period 2005–2013 | Mining companies pay CEOs less overall than non-mining companies. The remuneration committee has a significant positive effect on the total salary of mining companies and an insignificant positive effect on non-mining companies. The remuneration committee moderates the influence of market capital on total salary in a significantly negative way in mining companies but not significantly in non-mining companies. When CEOs are on remuneration committees, they reduce the pay and performance sensitivity of long-term incentive pay at non-mining companies | Optimal contracting theory | |
| Malaysia | How is the Chairman of the Board involved in the Nomination and Remuneration Committee on Profit Management? | Quantitative method, with a sample of 300 companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia with the lowest positive ROA for 2013 to 2015 | The chairmen of the nomination committee, ordinary members of the nomination committee, and board chairmen's involvement in the nomination committee have a significant positive relationship with AEM and REM, and the chairmen's involvement in the remuneration committee has a significant negative relationship with accrual earnings management (AEM) but not real earnings management (REM) | Agency Theory | |
| South Africa | Does the nominating committee serve as an internal change mechanism to promote gender and racial diversity? | Quantitative method, with a sample of 40 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE Top 40) for the 2011–2016 period | A more diverse board has a nomination committee that is much more diverse in terms of both gender and race | Similarity attraction theory, human capital theory, resource dependence theory, and agency theory | |
| UK | Can CEO power and corporate governance structure moderate pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS)? | Quantitative method, with 1,690 observations of non-financial companies in South Africa during 2003–2012 | Executive pay and performance are positively related to PPS. concentrated ownership and weak board structure; second-order agency conflicts (director supervisory power and opportunism) are stronger than first-order agency problems (CEO power and self-interest). CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on PPS. PPS is higher in companies that have more reputable CEOs, founders, and shareholders, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in companies with larger boards, more powerful CEOs, and a long term of office | Agency Theory, optimal contracting theory and managerial power hypothesis. | |
| Ghana | How do corporate governance mechanisms influence company performance? | Quantitative method, with 38 registered companies in Ghana from 2006 to 2018 | The presence of insiders and outsiders on a company's board improves financial performance. Board size, frequency of board meetings, and shareholder concentration/ownership structure generally have a positive impact on financial performance. However, the presence of board committees (audit, nomination, and remuneration) generally has a negative impact on financial performance, while CEO duality has no impact on financial performance | Agency and stewardship theory | |
| Pakistan and Saudi Arabia | What is the influence of financial expertise, monitoring, and experience of the chairman of the audit committee and human resources (HR) expertise, monitoring expertise, and experience of the chairman of the nomination committee on financial performance? | Quantitative method, with 50 Pakistani non-financial companies listed on the KSE 100 during 2016 | The financial and monitoring expertise of the audit committee chairman and the experience expertise of the nomination committee chairman have a positive effect on company performance. However, no significant influence was found from the experience of the audit committee chairman and the monitoring and HR expertise of the nomination committee chairman on company performance | Agency theory and human capital theory | |
| Indonesia and USA | What is the relationship between the remuneration committee, executive remuneration, the board of directors, and company performance? | Quantitative method, with 847 observations on companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2014–2017 | The remuneration committee is positively related to executive remuneration and company performance. Higher remuneration is only associated with higher performance in companies that have established a remuneration committee. The interaction between the remuneration committee, the level of remuneration of senior company officials, and company performance is significantly positive | Agency Theory | |
| USA | How directors who structurally link multiple board committees (referred to as multi-committee directors (MCDs)) explain some board actions as merely symbolic while others are more substantive | Mix method, combining qualitative interviews and causal identification strategies of Russell 3,000 companies with 16,279 observations over the period 2001–2014 | Assigning directors to multiple board committees can improve governance performance under certain circumstances. The presence of an MCD linking the audit and nomination committees is associated with the appointment of more experienced directors and a reduced likelihood of future financial restatements and lawsuits | Agency Theory | |
| Portugal | What is the relationship between board committee independence and corporate financial distress in China and the UK? | Quantitative method, with samples of Chinese and British non-financial companies during 2007–2016 | In China, there is a positive and significant relationship between the percentage of independent audit committee members and a company's financial distress. The opposite relationship was found for the independence of the compensation and nomination committees. In the UK, the relationship is similar, but the results are only significant for the independence of nomination committees. The overall results show that independent audit committee members do not support the company's survival. On the other hand, independent compensation and nomination committee members are beneficial to a company's financial health | Agency theory, resource dependence theory, and stewardship theory | |
| India | How do several leading corporate governance (CG) practices influence voluntary disclosure (VD)? | Quantitative method with the top 100 non-financial and non-utility companies by market capitalization in India during 2013–2014 to 2017–2018 | significant negative influence of board independence on VD, while gender diversity and the risk management committee show a significant positive influence on VD. Board size, role duality, ownership concentration, audit committee independence, and nomination remuneration committee do not have a significant influence on VD. The relationship between CG mechanisms and various types of VD shows that board independence, in particular, has a strong negative influence on corporate strategy disclosure (CSD) and forward-looking disclosure (FWLD), while gender diversity and risk management committees show a significant positive influence on CSD, FWLD, CG disclosure, and financial and capital market disclosure. In particular, none of the CG mechanisms considered influences the influence of human and intellectual capital disclosure | Agency theory and resource dependence theory | |
| Italy | Whether the characteristics of the nomination committee can serve as key attributes to reduce ESG disputes and whether the composition of the nomination committee influences the appointment of ESG-friendly directors to the board | Quantitative method with a sample of 30 systemically important global banks from 2015 to 2021 | A bank's exposure to ESG controversies can be reduced when nominating committee members have at least one committee member who is a member of the sustainability committee and a foreign director. ESG disputes in banks are reduced when nomination committee members are younger, while the number of independent members has a negative impact. There is a positive influence on the composition of the nomination committee and the characteristics of its members, as well as the appointment of ESG-friendly directors on the board | Agency theory and resource dependence theory | |
| South Africa | What are the perspectives of asset managers and listed financial services companies in South Africa on the impact of voting and engagement on director pay policies and practices? | Qualitative method with semi-structured interviews conducted with asset managers, CEOs, chief financial officers, and remuneration committee members from listed financial services companies in South Africa | Most asset managers and financial services representatives prefer proactive private involvement in pay issues, given its impact on voting outcomes and, ultimately, director remuneration practices and policies. The independent remuneration committee has an important role in facilitating relationships with investors to ensure fair remuneration | Agency Theory | |
| UK | What is the influence of board size and board independence, as well as the interaction effect between board independence and CEO/CFO, on corporate governance disclosure practices? | Quantitative method with 1,000 annual observations of companies from 2007 to 2017 in East Africa | Large boards and independent directors are associated with greater CG information disclosure. CEO/CFO power negatively moderates the relationship between board independence and corporate governance disclosure, but not in environments with stronger institutions and corporate governance systems. Companies whose CEOs and CFOs are involved in remuneration or nomination committees disclose less CG information. The combined effect of the CEO and CFO on the nomination and remuneration committee and the independent board in reducing corporate disclosure appears to be more pronounced in the post-financial crisis period compared to the crisis period | Agency theory | |
| Italy and France | What is the influence of the composition and function of board committees on a company's financial difficulties? | Quantitative method with a sample of 273 listed companies in Italy during 2004–2017 | Non-executive members on the remuneration and audit committees, as well as more remuneration committee meetings, can increase company stability. In contrast, a high frequency of nominating committee meetings appears to be positively associated with the likelihood of financial distress | Agency theory | |
| United Arab Emirates, Netherlands and India | What is the relationship between board interlocks and corporate performance, which is rooted in different perspectives on the role of the board of directors? | Quantitative method with 5,133 annual observations of non-financial companies in India during 2014–2018 | Interlocks between audit committees are negatively related to firm performance. In contrast, interlocks between the nomination and remuneration committees of Indian firms are positively related to performance | Agency theory and resource dependence theory |
Source(s): Table created by authors
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