Table 12

Effect of contractual agreements: test of parallel trend assumption (PTA)

Time intervals−4 to 0−4 to 1−4 to 2−4 to 3−4 to 4
Panel A – Dependent variable: G_Trends
Post*Bank_Partner0.3360.4010.4860.4670.482
(0.281)(0.262)(0.371)(0.381)(0.374)
Pre*Bank_Partner0.3400.3270.3040.3020.293
(0.223)(0.223)(0.226)(0.227)(0.229)
Post*Age−0.037−0.054−0.065−0.065−0.068
(0.037)(0.038)(0.042)(0.042)(0.042)
Firm fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
Year fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
N° observations367447502534558
R20.0230.0320.0390.0300.027
F-stat1.9703.639**5.238***4.377***4.107***
Panel B – Dependent variable: G_Trends_Growth
Post*Bank_Partner0.0840.1000.1330.1010.102
(0.086)(0.086)(0.092)(0.106)(0.122)
Pre*Bank_Partner0.1060.1010.0840.0820.076
(0.088)(0.088)(0.090)(0.094)(0.100)
Post*Age−0.012−0.019−0.024−0.024−0.025*
(0.011)(0.013)(0.015)(0.015)(0.015)
Firm fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
Year fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
N° observations367447502534558
R20.0190.0230.0260.0060.004
F-stat1.6182.668**3.510**0.8130.613

Note(s): Test of PTA through the additional interaction term Pre*Bank_Partner. The coefficient of the interaction Pre*Bank_Partner3) measures the effect of contractual agreements with banks on the website traffic of treated FinTech firms compared to control units and can only be estimated when considering also post-treatment periods. All the specifications include firm fixed effects, time fixed effects and the interaction Post*Age. The columns show the results of separate panel regressions for each time interval, with the dummy Post equal to 1 in the years when we want to evaluate the effect of strategic alliances with banks and 0 in pre-treatment period (−4 to −1). Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Significance levels: *, **, *** for 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively

Source(s): Table was created by the authors

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