Effect of equity agreements: test of SUTVA assumption (spillover effects)
| Time intervals | −4 to 0 | −4 to 1 | −4 to 2 | −4 to 3 | −4 to 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Panel A – Dependent variable: G_Trends | |||||
| Post*Bank_Equity | 0.370*** | 0.548*** | 0.592*** | 0.565*** | 0.589*** |
| (0.130) | (0.153) | (0.176) | (0.171) | (0.171) | |
| Post*Age | −0.090** | −0.095* | −0.132** | −0.145** | −0.150*** |
| (0.043) | (0.054) | (0.060) | (0.060) | (0.058) | |
| Spillover_Equity_Agr | 0.086 | 0.100 | 0.026 | 0.009 | 0.035 |
| (0.059) | (0.069) | (0.057) | (0.061) | (0.057) | |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N° observations | 257 | 326 | 378 | 416 | 442 |
| R2 | 0.063 | 0.099 | 0.102 | 0.092 | 0.091 |
| F-stat | 3.815** | 8.742*** | 10.908*** | 10.959*** | 11.717*** |
| Panel B – Dependent variable: G_Trends_Growth | |||||
| Post*Bank_Equity | 0.113*** | 0.223** | 0.314** | 0.359** | 0.450** |
| (0.037) | (0.087) | (0.131) | (0.161) | (0.220) | |
| Post*Age | −0.018* | −0.025 | −0.043 | −0.057* | −0.073 |
| (0.011) | (0.019) | (0.026) | (0.034) | (0.045) | |
| Spillover_Equity_Agr | 0.014 | 0.032 | −0.058 | −0.075 | −0.007 |
| (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.052) | (0.063) | (0.029) | |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N° observations | 257 | 326 | 378 | 416 | 442 |
| R2 | 0.057 | 0.063 | 0.048 | 0.037 | 0.021 |
| F-stat | 3.438** | 5.327*** | 4.799*** | 4.183*** | 2.449* |
| Time intervals | −4 to 0 | −4 to 1 | −4 to 2 | −4 to 3 | −4 to 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post*Bank_Equity | 0.370*** | 0.548*** | 0.592*** | 0.565*** | 0.589*** |
| (0.130) | (0.153) | (0.176) | (0.171) | (0.171) | |
| Post*Age | −0.090** | −0.095* | −0.132** | −0.145** | −0.150*** |
| (0.043) | (0.054) | (0.060) | (0.060) | (0.058) | |
| Spillover_Equity_Agr | 0.086 | 0.100 | 0.026 | 0.009 | 0.035 |
| (0.059) | (0.069) | (0.057) | (0.061) | (0.057) | |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N° observations | 257 | 326 | 378 | 416 | 442 |
| R2 | 0.063 | 0.099 | 0.102 | 0.092 | 0.091 |
| F-stat | 3.815** | 8.742*** | 10.908*** | 10.959*** | 11.717*** |
| Post*Bank_Equity | 0.113*** | 0.223** | 0.314** | 0.359** | 0.450** |
| (0.037) | (0.087) | (0.131) | (0.161) | (0.220) | |
| Post*Age | −0.018* | −0.025 | −0.043 | −0.057* | −0.073 |
| (0.011) | (0.019) | (0.026) | (0.034) | (0.045) | |
| Spillover_Equity_Agr | 0.014 | 0.032 | −0.058 | −0.075 | −0.007 |
| (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.052) | (0.063) | (0.029) | |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N° observations | 257 | 326 | 378 | 416 | 442 |
| R2 | 0.057 | 0.063 | 0.048 | 0.037 | 0.021 |
| F-stat | 3.438** | 5.327*** | 4.799*** | 4.183*** | 2.449* |
Note(s): Test of spillover effects of equity agreement (SUTVA assumption) through the additional control variable Spillover_Equity_Agr, a binary variable which, for a specific FinTech observed in a specific year, is equal to 1 when other FinTechs operating in the same market segment are involved in an equity agreement in the same year. The coefficient of the interaction Post*Bank_Equity (β3) measures the effect of equity agreements with banks on the website traffic of treated FinTech firms compared to control units and can only be estimated when considering also post-treatment periods. All the specifications include firm fixed effects, time fixed effects and the interaction Post*Age. The columns show the results of separate panel regressions for each time interval, with the dummy Post equal to 1 in the years when we want to evaluate the effect of strategic alliances with banks and 0 in pre-treatment period (−4 to −1). Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Significance levels: *, **, *** for 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Source(s): Table was created by the authors
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