Impostor phenomenon and performance: regression results three-way interactions of impostor phenomenon
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Direct effect of | Moderation effect of … | Three-way interactions of impostor phenomenon with | |||
| Impostor phenomenon | Impostor phenomenon and controls | Gender (female) | Gender and CEO | Gender and workload | |
| Impostor phenomenon | 0.044** | 0.026 | 0.033 | −0.009 | 0.040 |
| (2.457) | (0.728) | (0.982) | (−0.293) | (0.138) | |
| Female | −0.001 | 0.278** | 0.194 | 0.295 | |
| (−0.026) | (2.250) | (1.149) | (0.305) | ||
| Impostor phenomenon * Female | −0.256** | −0.200 | −0.181 | ||
| (−2.495) | (−1.549) | (−0.207) | |||
| CEO | −0.160** | ||||
| (−2.474) | |||||
| Impostor phenomenon * CEO | 0.074* | ||||
| (1.808) | |||||
| Female* CEO | 0.160 | ||||
| (0.440) | |||||
| Impostor phenomenon * Female * CEO | −0.122 | ||||
| (−0.390) | |||||
| Workload | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | |
| (0.109) | (0.041) | (0.805) | (0.087) | ||
| Impostor phenomenon * Workload | −0.000 | ||||
| (−0.014) | |||||
| Female*Workload | 0.000 | ||||
| (0.003) | |||||
| Impostor phenomenon * Female * Workload | −0.002 | ||||
| (−0.096) | |||||
| (Ln) employees | −0.001 | −0.003 | −0.001 | −0.002 | |
| (−0.046) | (−0.239) | (−0.105) | (−0.192) | ||
| (Ln) assets | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | |
| (0.980) | (0.915) | (0.902) | (0.888) | ||
| (Ln) current ratio | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.009 | 0.004 | |
| (0.402) | (0.254) | (0.658) | (0.277) | ||
| Top management size | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.001 | |
| (0.094) | (0.149) | (0.240) | (0.079) | ||
| Tenure | −0.004* | −0.005* | −0.005* | −0.005* | |
| (−1.780) | (−1.844) | (−1.908) | (−1.820) | ||
| Age | −0.001 | −0.001 | 0.000 | −0.001 | |
| (−0.336) | (−0.274) | (0.159) | (−0.223) | ||
| Undergraduate | 0.062 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.061 | |
| (1.360) | (1.236) | (1.172) | (1.223) | ||
| Master | 0.022 | 0.016 | 0.021 | 0.019 | |
| (0.471) | (0.326) | (0.419) | (0.386) | ||
| Executive course | −0.037 | −0.037 | −0.041 | −0.032 | |
| (−0.547) | (−0.516) | (−0.547) | (−0.429) | ||
| PhD | 0.159*** | 0.156*** | 0.177*** | 0.157*** | |
| (2.926) | (2.862) | (2.717) | (2.853) | ||
| Married or equiv | −0.072 | −0.072 | −0.073 | −0.076 | |
| (−0.654) | (−0.684) | (−0.680) | (−0.659) | ||
| Divorced | −0.118 | −0.121 | −0.114 | −0.126 | |
| (−1.074) | (−1.130) | (−1.082) | (−1.062) | ||
| Widower | −0.121 | −0.137 | −0.120 | −0.134 | |
| (−0.905) | (−1.066) | (−0.859) | (−0.940) | ||
| Constant | −0.032 | −0.030 | −0.026 | −0.047 | −0.061 |
| (−0.997) | (−0.138) | (−0.124) | (−0.226) | (−0.155) | |
| Observations | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 |
| R-squared | 0.012 | 0.194 | 0.207 | 0.248 | 0.210 |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Direct effect of | Moderation effect of … | Three-way interactions of impostor phenomenon with | |||
| Impostor phenomenon | Impostor phenomenon and controls | Gender (female) | Gender and CEO | Gender and workload | |
| Impostor phenomenon | 0.044** | 0.026 | 0.033 | −0.009 | 0.040 |
| (2.457) | (0.728) | (0.982) | (−0.293) | (0.138) | |
| Female | −0.001 | 0.278** | 0.194 | 0.295 | |
| (−0.026) | (2.250) | (1.149) | (0.305) | ||
| Impostor phenomenon * Female | −0.256** | −0.200 | −0.181 | ||
| (−2.495) | (−1.549) | (−0.207) | |||
| CEO | −0.160** | ||||
| (−2.474) | |||||
| Impostor phenomenon * CEO | 0.074* | ||||
| (1.808) | |||||
| Female* CEO | 0.160 | ||||
| (0.440) | |||||
| Impostor phenomenon * Female * CEO | −0.122 | ||||
| (−0.390) | |||||
| Workload | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | |
| (0.109) | (0.041) | (0.805) | (0.087) | ||
| Impostor phenomenon * Workload | −0.000 | ||||
| (−0.014) | |||||
| Female*Workload | 0.000 | ||||
| (0.003) | |||||
| Impostor phenomenon * Female * Workload | −0.002 | ||||
| (−0.096) | |||||
| (Ln) employees | −0.001 | −0.003 | −0.001 | −0.002 | |
| (−0.046) | (−0.239) | (−0.105) | (−0.192) | ||
| (Ln) assets | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | |
| (0.980) | (0.915) | (0.902) | (0.888) | ||
| (Ln) current ratio | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.009 | 0.004 | |
| (0.402) | (0.254) | (0.658) | (0.277) | ||
| Top management size | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.001 | |
| (0.094) | (0.149) | (0.240) | (0.079) | ||
| Tenure | −0.004* | −0.005* | −0.005* | −0.005* | |
| (−1.780) | (−1.844) | (−1.908) | (−1.820) | ||
| Age | −0.001 | −0.001 | 0.000 | −0.001 | |
| (−0.336) | (−0.274) | (0.159) | (−0.223) | ||
| Undergraduate | 0.062 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.061 | |
| (1.360) | (1.236) | (1.172) | (1.223) | ||
| Master | 0.022 | 0.016 | 0.021 | 0.019 | |
| (0.471) | (0.326) | (0.419) | (0.386) | ||
| Executive course | −0.037 | −0.037 | −0.041 | −0.032 | |
| (−0.547) | (−0.516) | (−0.547) | (−0.429) | ||
| PhD | 0.159*** | 0.156*** | 0.177*** | 0.157*** | |
| (2.926) | (2.862) | (2.717) | (2.853) | ||
| Married or equiv | −0.072 | −0.072 | −0.073 | −0.076 | |
| (−0.654) | (−0.684) | (−0.680) | (−0.659) | ||
| Divorced | −0.118 | −0.121 | −0.114 | −0.126 | |
| (−1.074) | (−1.130) | (−1.082) | (−1.062) | ||
| Widower | −0.121 | −0.137 | −0.120 | −0.134 | |
| (−0.905) | (−1.066) | (−0.859) | (−0.940) | ||
| Constant | −0.032 | −0.030 | −0.026 | −0.047 | −0.061 |
| (−0.997) | (−0.138) | (−0.124) | (−0.226) | (−0.155) | |
| Observations | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 |
| R-squared | 0.012 | 0.194 | 0.207 | 0.248 | 0.210 |
Note(s): Robust standard errors clustered by industry in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Source(s): Created by author
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