Gender quotas and glass ceiling: fixed effects panel regression models
| Total sample | Nonlisted nonparticipated group | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | (1) β (se) | (2) β (se) | (3) β (se) | (4) β (se) |
| Board size | −0.002 (0.004) | −0.001 (0.004) | −0.01** (0.005) | −0.01** (0.004) |
| Firm size | 0.02 (0.033) | 0.05 (0.033) | 0.02 (0.032) | 0.04* (0.035) |
| Law | 0.15*** (0.018) | 0.13*** (0.019) | 0.05*** (0.017) | 0.03* (0.018) |
| Women executives | 0.15*** (0.037) | 0.14*** (0.034) | 0.13** (0.052) | 0.13** (0.052) |
| Financiallaw | 0.091** (0.039) | 0.07* (0.043) | ||
| R-squared within | 0.551 | 0.570 | 0.407 | 0.433 |
| N | 232 | 232 | 116 | 116 |
| Variables | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| −0.002 (0.004) | −0.001 (0.004) | −0.01 | −0.01 | |
| 0.02 (0.033) | 0.05 (0.033) | 0.02 (0.032) | 0.04 | |
| 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.05 | 0.03 | |
| 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.13 | |
| 0.091 | 0.07 | |||
| 0.551 | 0.570 | 0.407 | 0.433 | |
| 232 | 232 | 116 | 116 | |
Notes:
robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.1