Correlation matrix
| Environmental disclosure | Board size | Board independence | Role duality | Board meeting | Board gender diversity | Audit committee size | Audit committee independence | Firm profitability | Firm age | Firm size | Board specific skills | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Environmental disclosure | 0.386 | 0.322 | −0.066 | 0.049 | 0.314 | −0.126 | 0.123 | −0.177 | 0.197 | 0.491 | −0.156 | |
| Board size | 0.207 | 0.179 | −0.036 | −0.026 | 0.123 | 0.005 | 0.044 | −0.278 | −0.044 | 0.664 | −0.128 | |
| Board independence | 0.311 | 0.299 | −0.188 | 0.006 | 0.070 | −0.222 | −0.064 | −0.078 | 0.063 | 0.181 | −0.354 | |
| Role duality | −0.043 | 0.079 | 0.064 | −0.057 | −0.052 | 0.360 | 0.054 | 0.044 | −0.139 | −0.121 | 0.128 | |
| Board meeting | 0.126 | 0.144 | 0.061 | −0.043 | −0.099 | −0.135 | −0.044 | −0.048 | 0.144 | 0.057 | −0.009 | |
| Board gender diversity | 0.387 | 0.118 | 0.230 | 0.033 | 0.055 | −0.113 | 0.039 | 0.038 | 0.012 | 0.163 | −0.106 | |
| Audit committee size | −0.206 | −0.147 | −0.227 | 0.109 | −0.239 | −0.165 | −0.0134 | 0.089 | −0.135 | −0.103 | 0.017 | |
| Audit committee independence | 0.069 | 0.109 | 0.060 | −0.013 | −0.102 | −0.027 | 0.0648 | 0.065 | −0.042 | 0.153 | 0.109 | |
| Firm profitability | −0.012 | −0.137 | −0.146 | 0.006 | −0.211 | −0.049 | 0.128 | −0.015 | 0.016 | −0.405 | −0.048 | |
| Firm age | 0.009 | 0.004 | 0.013 | 0.049 | 0.029 | −0.036 | 0.006 | 0.019 | 0.036 | −0.039 | −0.122 | |
| Firm size | 0.205 | 0.235 | 0.193 | 0.103 | 0.039 | 0.091 | −0.150 | 0.143 | −0.387 | 0.005 | −0.065 | |
| Board specific skills | −0.075 | −0.278 | −0.253 | −0.033 | 0.004 | −0.093 | 0.083 | −0.087 | 0.013 | −0.059 | −0.143 |
| Environmental disclosure | 0.386 | 0.322 | −0.066 | 0.049 | 0.314 | −0.126 | 0.123 | −0.177 | 0.197 | 0.491 | −0.156 | |
| Board size | 0.207 | 0.179 | −0.036 | −0.026 | 0.123 | 0.005 | 0.044 | −0.278 | −0.044 | 0.664 | −0.128 | |
| Board independence | 0.311 | 0.299 | −0.188 | 0.006 | 0.070 | −0.222 | −0.064 | −0.078 | 0.063 | 0.181 | −0.354 | |
| Role duality | −0.043 | 0.079 | 0.064 | −0.057 | −0.052 | 0.360 | 0.054 | 0.044 | −0.139 | −0.121 | 0.128 | |
| Board meeting | 0.126 | 0.144 | 0.061 | −0.043 | −0.099 | −0.135 | −0.044 | −0.048 | 0.144 | 0.057 | −0.009 | |
| Board gender diversity | 0.387 | 0.118 | 0.230 | 0.033 | 0.055 | −0.113 | 0.039 | 0.038 | 0.012 | 0.163 | −0.106 | |
| Audit committee size | −0.206 | −0.147 | −0.227 | 0.109 | −0.239 | −0.165 | −0.0134 | 0.089 | −0.135 | −0.103 | 0.017 | |
| Audit committee independence | 0.069 | 0.109 | 0.060 | −0.013 | −0.102 | −0.027 | 0.0648 | 0.065 | −0.042 | 0.153 | 0.109 | |
| Firm profitability | −0.012 | −0.137 | −0.146 | 0.006 | −0.211 | −0.049 | 0.128 | −0.015 | 0.016 | −0.405 | −0.048 | |
| Firm age | 0.009 | 0.004 | 0.013 | 0.049 | 0.029 | −0.036 | 0.006 | 0.019 | 0.036 | −0.039 | −0.122 | |
| Firm size | 0.205 | 0.235 | 0.193 | 0.103 | 0.039 | 0.091 | −0.150 | 0.143 | −0.387 | 0.005 | −0.065 | |
| Board specific skills | −0.075 | −0.278 | −0.253 | −0.033 | 0.004 | −0.093 | 0.083 | −0.087 | 0.013 | −0.059 | −0.143 |
Notes:
Lower-triangular cells report correlation coefficients for S&P 500 firms, upper-triangular cells depict coefficients for FTSE 350 firms
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