Identification strategy and variable coding
| Test variables | Introduction of gender quota at the first renewal of the board of directors | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | |
| FIRM 1 – First mandatory adopter, Industry X | |||||||
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| First adopters | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| FIRM 2 – First voluntary adopter, Industry Y | |||||||
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| First adopters | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| FIRM 3 – Second mandatory adopter, Industry Z | |||||||
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| First adopters | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| FIRM 4 – Second voluntary adopter, Industry V | |||||||
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| First adopters | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| FIRM 5 – Third mandatory adopter, Industry W | |||||||
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| First adopters | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| FIRM 5 – Third voluntary adopter, Industry R | |||||||
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| First adopters | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Year fixed effects: control for average level of corporate governance quality in each year | |||||||
| Industry fixed effects: control for average level of corporate governance quality in Industries X, Y, Z, V, W and R | |||||||
| Test variables | Introduction of gender quota at the first renewal of the board of directors | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | |
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| First adopters | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| First adopters | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| First adopters | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| First adopters | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| First adopters | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mandatory gender quota | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Post | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mandatory adopters | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| First adopters | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Year fixed effects: control for average level of corporate governance quality in each year | |||||||
| Industry fixed effects: control for average level of corporate governance quality in Industries X, Y, Z, V, W and R | |||||||
Note:
Following Christensen et al. (2013)
Sharing content requires targeting cookies to be enabled. Please update your cookie preferences to use this feature.