Determinants of the proportion of women on the board
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | Female directors (%) | Female directors (%) | Female directors (%) | Female directors (%) | Female directors (%) | Female directors (%) |
| Family Firm | 6.432*** (4.68) | 17.827*** (4.18) | 16.375*** (3.90) | 15.520*** (3.59) | 18.363*** (4.71) | 8.950** (2.35) |
| Board Size | −0.399 (−1.05) | −0.287 (−0.23) | −0.107 (−0.09) | −0.350 (−0.29) | 0.244 (0.21) | −0.601 (−0.49) |
| Indep. Dir | −0.301** (−2.43) | −0.323** (−2.55) | −0.300** (−2.42) | −0.374*** (−2.86) | ||
| Inst. Owner | −10.185* (−1.94) | −9.824 (−1.86) | −7.653 (−1.55) | −8.736* (−1.69) | ||
| Firm Size | −1.571** (−2.49) | −4.011*** (−2.61) | −4.080*** (−2.71) | −3.965*** (−2.60) | −4.116*** (−2.77) | −3.945*** (−2.59) |
| Firm Age | −0.063 (−1.14) | −0.159 (−1.21) | −0.101 (−0.77) | −0.108 (−0.82) | −0.093 (−0.72) | −0.067 (−0.51) |
| ROA | −0.101 (−1.48) | −0.229 (−1.42) | −0.214 (−1.35) | −0.219 (−1.37) | −0.231 (−1.47) | −0.207 (−1.33) |
| Market-to-book | 0.716** (2.13) | 2.191*** (2.86) | 2.222*** (3.09) | 2.241*** (3.11) | 2.211*** (3.08) | 1.506* (1.94) |
| Risk | −0.005 (−0.37) | 0.002 (0.07) | 0.002 (0.06) | 0.003 (0.10) | −0.001 (−0.05) | 0.002 (0.05) |
| Year effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 2,965 | 2,965 | 2,965 | 2,965 | 2,965 | 2,965 |
| R2/Pseudo R2 | 0.0891 | 0.0207 | 0.0251 | 0.0236 | 0.0294 | 0.0200 |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | ||||||
| 6.432 | 17.827 | 16.375 | 15.520 | 18.363 | 8.950 | |
| −0.399 (−1.05) | −0.287 (−0.23) | −0.107 (−0.09) | −0.350 (−0.29) | 0.244 (0.21) | −0.601 (−0.49) | |
| −0.301 | −0.323 | −0.300 | −0.374 | |||
| −10.185 | −9.824 (−1.86) | −7.653 (−1.55) | −8.736 | |||
| −1.571 | −4.011 | −4.080 | −3.965 | −4.116 | −3.945 | |
| −0.063 (−1.14) | −0.159 (−1.21) | −0.101 (−0.77) | −0.108 (−0.82) | −0.093 (−0.72) | −0.067 (−0.51) | |
| −0.101 (−1.48) | −0.229 (−1.42) | −0.214 (−1.35) | −0.219 (−1.37) | −0.231 (−1.47) | −0.207 (−1.33) | |
| 0.716 | 2.191 | 2.222 | 2.241 | 2.211 | 1.506 | |
| −0.005 (−0.37) | 0.002 (0.07) | 0.002 (0.06) | 0.003 (0.10) | −0.001 (−0.05) | 0.002 (0.05) | |
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| 2,965 | 2,965 | 2,965 | 2,965 | 2,965 | 2,965 | |
| 0.0891 | 0.0207 | 0.0251 | 0.0236 | 0.0294 | 0.0200 |
Notes:
This table presents results from OLS [Model (1)] and Tobit regressions [Models (2) to (6)]. Year dummies are included. The effect of the constant term is omitted. In all models, the dependent variable is the proportion of female directors on the board [female directors (%)]. In Columns 4 through 6, we use alternative family firm definitions (family ownership varies from 10% to 40%). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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