Endogeneity test results
| Variable | IV | Multiple fixed effects |
|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | |
| Fned | 36.699*** | 0.302* |
| (3.51) | (1.72) | |
| Size | 0.145 | −0.062** |
| (1.34) | (−2.46) | |
| Lev | 0.914 | −0.282* |
| (1.64) | (−1.70) | |
| Growth | −0.407* | 0.038 |
| (−1.78) | (1.12) | |
| Age | −0.376* | −0.020 |
| (−1.88) | (−0.19) | |
| ROA | 3.240** | −0.267 |
| (2.10) | (−0.97) | |
| Board | 1.355** | −0.056 |
| (2.07) | (−0.56) | |
| Indep | 2.009 | −0.106 |
| (1.07) | (−0.32) | |
| Dual | 2.656*** | 0.024 |
| (3.60) | (0.83) | |
| Mshare | 1.628*** | −0.070 |
| (3.64) | (−0.62) | |
| FM | −23.743*** | −0.132 |
| (−3.26) | (−0.67) | |
| Child | 0.365** | −0.034 |
| (2.27) | (−1.20) | |
| HT | −0.155 | −0.000 |
| (−0.94) | (−0.74) | |
| Law | −0.054* | −0.010 |
| (−1.70) | (−1.04) | |
| Year | Y | Y |
| Industry | Y | N |
| Firm | N | Y |
| Year-Industry | N | Y |
| Cons | −6.221 | 4.138*** |
| (−1.59) | (7.20) | |
| N | 1,129 | 1,129 |
| Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic | 16.947*** (0.000) | |
| Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic | 16.672 | |
| R2/Pseudo R2 | – | 0.774 |
| Variable | IV | Multiple fixed effects |
|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | |
| 36.699*** | 0.302* | |
| (3.51) | (1.72) | |
| 0.145 | −0.062** | |
| (1.34) | (−2.46) | |
| 0.914 | −0.282* | |
| (1.64) | (−1.70) | |
| −0.407* | 0.038 | |
| (−1.78) | (1.12) | |
| −0.376* | −0.020 | |
| (−1.88) | (−0.19) | |
| 3.240** | −0.267 | |
| (2.10) | (−0.97) | |
| 1.355** | −0.056 | |
| (2.07) | (−0.56) | |
| 2.009 | −0.106 | |
| (1.07) | (−0.32) | |
| 2.656*** | 0.024 | |
| (3.60) | (0.83) | |
| 1.628*** | −0.070 | |
| (3.64) | (−0.62) | |
| −23.743*** | −0.132 | |
| (−3.26) | (−0.67) | |
| 0.365** | −0.034 | |
| (2.27) | (−1.20) | |
| −0.155 | −0.000 | |
| (−0.94) | (−0.74) | |
| −0.054* | −0.010 | |
| (−1.70) | (−1.04) | |
| Y | Y | |
| Y | N | |
| N | Y | |
| N | Y | |
| −6.221 | 4.138*** | |
| (−1.59) | (7.20) | |
| 1,129 | 1,129 | |
| 16.947*** (0.000) | ||
| 16.672 | ||
| – | 0.774 |
Note(s): This table reports the results of the endogeneity test. Column (1) shows the second stage of the IV regression results of the effect of family non-executive directors on robot adoption. Meanwhile, I show the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic and Cragg–Donald Wald F statistic in this table. Column (2) shows the result of the multiple fixed effects. We report t-statistics in parentheses. All models include year and industry-fixed effects. *, ** and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix
Source(s): Table by authors