Table 7

Characteristics of family non-executive director test results

VariableBloodMarriageBloodMarriageFOFO1FO2FO3Nfoc
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)
Fned−1.543***2.944***−1.560***4.616***1.191***0.840**0.6880.972**−1.339***
(−3.01)(4.54)(−2.70)(2.88)(3.23)(2.49)(1.63)(2.39)(−3.71)
RiskT  −0.633***−0.369**     
  (−2.91)(−2.42)     
Fned×FO  −4.851*−11.871     
  (−1.84)(−1.38)     
FO    0.000    
    (0.04)    
Fned×FO    −0.104***    
    (−6.33)    
FO1     0.019   
     (0.32)   
Fned×FO1     0.974   
     (1.46)   
FO2      0.011  
      (0.29)  
Fned×FO2      2.005**  
      (2.27)  
FO3       −0.003 
       (−0.07) 
Fned×FO3       −3.234*** 
       (−4.97) 
Size0.0680.083**0.0620.075*0.0530.0590.080*0.0750.054
(1.56)(2.00)(1.61)(1.79)(1.05)(1.39)(1.79)(1.54)(1.51)
Lev0.3460.3530.3430.3670.3930.3450.2720.2740.372
(0.85)(0.89)(0.90)(0.91)(0.90)(0.84)(0.70)(0.69)(0.97)
Growth−0.169−0.168*−0.130−0.146−0.157−0.160−0.167*−0.179*−0.136
(−1.44)(−1.75)(−1.24)(−1.43)(−1.56)(−1.59)(−1.65)(−1.65)(−1.37)
Age−0.307**−0.325***−0.326**−0.342***−0.235**−0.300**−0.338***−0.309**−0.280**
(−2.34)(−2.99)(−2.59)(−3.09)(−2.40)(−2.39)(−2.91)(−2.39)(−2.56)
ROA1.2661.302*1.1341.242*1.228*1.2641.219*1.0011.441*
(1.48)(1.87)(1.63)(1.68)(1.71)(1.63)(1.71)(1.49)(1.84)
Board0.1570.1120.0920.0910.277*0.2050.2430.2410.221
(0.72)(0.54)(0.48)(0.43)(1.77)(1.11)(1.09)(1.17)(1.14)
Indep−0.418−0.484−0.536−0.442−0.549−0.289−0.321−0.482−0.381
(−0.65)(−0.86)(−0.95)(−0.81)(−0.99)(−0.49)(−0.57)(−0.83)(−0.63)
Dual0.123*0.168***0.0400.170***0.123**0.167***0.172***0.157***0.079
(2.25)(2.90)(1.06)(3.14)(2.00)(2.96)(2.75)(2.66)(1.30)
Mshare0.678***0.698***0.621***0.705***0.657***0.657***0.667***0.694***0.535***
(6.93)(8.04)(6.32)(8.10)(6.28)(6.33)(7.72)(7.94)(6.35)
FM1.250***0.950***2.329***0.877***0.3241.039**1.060***0.693**1.792***
(3.73)(3.34)(6.42)(3.31)(1.04)(2.59)(3.33)(2.12)(6.98)
Child0.206***0.199***0.193***0.209***0.169***0.198***0.212***0.207***0.184***
(5.14)(5.97)(4.54)(6.46)(3.43)(4.71)(4.66)(5.11)(3.95)
HT−0.339***−0.351***−0.384***−0.353***−0.388***−0.378***−0.368***−0.370***−0.398***
(−6.67)(−7.30)(−7.64)(−7.01)(−8.40)(−8.84)(−9.06)(−8.10)(−8.13)
Law−0.031*−0.027**−0.025*−0.027**−0.031**−0.028**−0.027**−0.029**−0.030*
(−2.26)(−2.14)(−1.85)(−2.31)(−2.58)(−2.20)(−2.07)(−2.41)(−1.93)
YearYYYYYYYYY
IndustryYYYYYYYYY
Cons−1.205−1.387−0.818−1.144−1.123−1.142−1.633−1.334−1.126
(−0.70)(−0.86)(−0.54)(−0.70)(−0.70)(−0.68)(−0.94)(−0.75)(−0.79)
N1,1291,1291,1291,1291,1291,1291,1291,1291,129
R20.4630.4660.4620.4680.4730.4590.4610.4650.468

Note(s): This table shows the regression results for the characteristics of family non-executive directors. Columns (1)–(4) are used to test the effect of kinship; Columns (5)–(8) are used to test the heterogeneity of family shareholding mode; Column (9) reports the result of the effect of excessive family directors. We report t-statistics in parentheses. All models include year and industry-fixed effects. *, ** and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in  Appendix

Source(s): Table by authors

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