Results concerning the effect of Women on Board on firm performance moderated by sector growth opportunities. Analysis based on moderating effect
| (1) Model [2] | (2) Robustness | |
|---|---|---|
| Moderating effect between continuous variables | Moderating effect with dummy high growth sector (median) | |
| Women on board | 3.444 | 0.123 |
| (4.384) | (1.745) | |
| Sector growth opportunities | 3.512*** | |
| (0.806) | ||
| Women on board × sector growth opportunities | −7.467** | |
| (continuous variable of growth) | (3.778) | |
| Dummy high growth | −7.374** | |
| (3.314) | ||
| Women on board × dummy high growth | −7.044*** | |
| (dummy variable of growth) | (2.205) | |
| Age board (log) | 1.539 | 1.646 |
| (1.301) | (1.302) | |
| R&D expenses | −17.193*** | −17.184*** |
| (2.110) | (2.108) | |
| Patent expenses | −18.414*** | −18.254*** |
| (3.184) | (3.182) | |
| Licensing expenses | −9.680 | −9.503 |
| (6.030) | (6.008) | |
| Tangibility | 5.878*** | 5.674*** |
| (1.307) | (1.312) | |
| Cash Holding | 4.832*** | 4.844*** |
| (1.225) | (1.224) | |
| Size | 0.397** | 0.389** |
| (0.177) | (0.176) | |
| Long term debt | −9.449*** | −9.425*** |
| (0.799) | (0.799) | |
| Age (log) | 4.092*** | 4.067*** |
| (0.282) | (0.282) | |
| Dummy Listing | 1.820* | 1.834** |
| (0.931) | (0.931) | |
| Dummy Delisting | −27.120*** | −26.953*** |
| (7.208) | (7.327) | |
| Dummy South | 4.512*** | 4.498*** |
| (0.414) | (0.414) | |
| R2 | 0.079 | 0.079 |
| Observations | 12,173 | 12,173 |
| (1) | (2) | |
|---|---|---|
| Moderating effect between continuous variables | Moderating effect with dummy high growth sector (median) | |
| Women on board | 3.444 | 0.123 |
| (4.384) | (1.745) | |
| Sector growth opportunities | 3.512*** | |
| (0.806) | ||
| (continuous variable of growth) | (3.778) | |
| Dummy high growth | −7.374** | |
| (3.314) | ||
| (dummy variable of growth) | (2.205) | |
| Age board (log) | 1.539 | 1.646 |
| (1.301) | (1.302) | |
| R&D expenses | −17.193*** | −17.184*** |
| (2.110) | (2.108) | |
| Patent expenses | −18.414*** | −18.254*** |
| (3.184) | (3.182) | |
| Licensing expenses | −9.680 | −9.503 |
| (6.030) | (6.008) | |
| Tangibility | 5.878*** | 5.674*** |
| (1.307) | (1.312) | |
| Cash Holding | 4.832*** | 4.844*** |
| (1.225) | (1.224) | |
| Size | 0.397** | 0.389** |
| (0.177) | (0.176) | |
| Long term debt | −9.449*** | −9.425*** |
| (0.799) | (0.799) | |
| Age (log) | 4.092*** | 4.067*** |
| (0.282) | (0.282) | |
| Dummy Listing | 1.820* | 1.834** |
| (0.931) | (0.931) | |
| Dummy Delisting | −27.120*** | −26.953*** |
| (7.208) | (7.327) | |
| Dummy South | 4.512*** | 4.498*** |
| (0.414) | (0.414) | |
| 0.079 | 0.079 | |
| Observations | 12,173 | 12,173 |
Note(s): For a description of variables, see Table 1. Year and Industry dummies are included in the model although not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***: denotes significance at the 1% level; **: denotes significance at the 5% level; *: denotes significance at the 10% level. The interaction variable “Women on Board × Sector Growth Opportunities” is the multiplication of the “Women on Board” and the “Sector Growth Opportunities” variables. The interaction variable “Women on Board × Dummy High Growth” is the multiplication of the “Women on Board” and the “Dummy High Growth” variables
Source(s): Authors' own work
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