Insider ownership and default risk: role of analyst coverage
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High analyst coverage | Low analyst coverage | |||||
| DD | DD | DD | DD | DD | DD | |
| DIR | −0.004*** | −0.009* | ||||
| (−8.743) | (−1.663) | |||||
| CEOIR | −0.007*** | −0.012** | ||||
| (−10.168) | (−2.476) | |||||
| EMPIR | −0.006** | −0.019** | ||||
| (−1.965) | (−2.290) | |||||
| LNS | 0.156*** | 0.135*** | 0.169*** | −0.048* | −0.061** | −0.041 |
| (19.747) | (15.982) | (21.802) | (−1.776) | (−2.163) | (−1.539) | |
| K/S | 0.724*** | 0.724*** | 0.736*** | 0.904*** | 0.819*** | 0.905*** |
| (17.369) | (16.239) | (17.651) | (7.894) | (6.882) | (7.930) | |
| Y/S | 5.006*** | 4.968*** | 4.946*** | 5.051*** | 4.994*** | 4.959*** |
| (27.357) | (25.386) | (26.990) | (11.591) | (11.003) | (11.357) | |
| R&D/K | 0.010** | 0.008* | 0.010** | −0.003 | −0.013 | −0.005 |
| (2.438) | (1.892) | (2.439) | (−0.333) | (−1.228) | (−0.439) | |
| RDUM | 0.544 | 0.313 | 0.615 | |||
| (0.885) | (0.492) | (1.000) | ||||
| I/K | −0.068** | −0.067** | −0.075*** | −0.367*** | −0.332*** | −0.385*** |
| (−2.576) | (−2.485) | (−2.831) | (−4.287) | (−3.836) | (−4.498) | |
| ROA | 0.035*** | 0.035*** | 0.033*** | 0.007 | 0.009* | 0.006 |
| (17.040) | (16.075) | (16.212) | (1.590) | (1.934) | (1.368) | |
| LEVERAGE | −5.571*** | −5.584*** | −5.631*** | −7.172*** | −7.131*** | −7.213*** |
| (−84.995) | (−79.226) | (−86.282) | (−41.881) | (−39.051) | (−42.501) | |
| Age | 0.009 | 0.002 | 0.051*** | 0.179*** | 0.155*** | 0.197*** |
| (0.573) | (0.134) | (3.517) | (4.811) | (3.799) | (5.630) | |
| Constant | 2.485*** | 2.944*** | 2.121*** | 5.298*** | 5.452*** | 5.208*** |
| (3.977) | (4.553) | (3.397) | (17.834) | (17.952) | (18.855) | |
| Observations | 30,415 | 26,631 | 30,445 | 5,684 | 4,962 | 5,690 |
| R-squared | 0.541 | 0.544 | 0.539 | 0.614 | 0.621 | 0.614 |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| χ2 | 20.88 | 23.87 | 19.88 | |||
| Prob > χ2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High analyst coverage | Low analyst coverage | |||||
| DD | DD | DD | DD | DD | DD | |
| DIR | −0.004*** | −0.009* | ||||
| (−8.743) | (−1.663) | |||||
| CEOIR | −0.007*** | −0.012** | ||||
| (−10.168) | (−2.476) | |||||
| EMPIR | −0.006** | −0.019** | ||||
| (−1.965) | (−2.290) | |||||
| LNS | 0.156*** | 0.135*** | 0.169*** | −0.048* | −0.061** | −0.041 |
| (19.747) | (15.982) | (21.802) | (−1.776) | (−2.163) | (−1.539) | |
| K/S | 0.724*** | 0.724*** | 0.736*** | 0.904*** | 0.819*** | 0.905*** |
| (17.369) | (16.239) | (17.651) | (7.894) | (6.882) | (7.930) | |
| Y/S | 5.006*** | 4.968*** | 4.946*** | 5.051*** | 4.994*** | 4.959*** |
| (27.357) | (25.386) | (26.990) | (11.591) | (11.003) | (11.357) | |
| R&D/K | 0.010** | 0.008* | 0.010** | −0.003 | −0.013 | −0.005 |
| (2.438) | (1.892) | (2.439) | (−0.333) | (−1.228) | (−0.439) | |
| RDUM | 0.544 | 0.313 | 0.615 | |||
| (0.885) | (0.492) | (1.000) | ||||
| I/K | −0.068** | −0.067** | −0.075*** | −0.367*** | −0.332*** | −0.385*** |
| (−2.576) | (−2.485) | (−2.831) | (−4.287) | (−3.836) | (−4.498) | |
| ROA | 0.035*** | 0.035*** | 0.033*** | 0.007 | 0.009* | 0.006 |
| (17.040) | (16.075) | (16.212) | (1.590) | (1.934) | (1.368) | |
| LEVERAGE | −5.571*** | −5.584*** | −5.631*** | −7.172*** | −7.131*** | −7.213*** |
| (−84.995) | (−79.226) | (−86.282) | (−41.881) | (−39.051) | (−42.501) | |
| Age | 0.009 | 0.002 | 0.051*** | 0.179*** | 0.155*** | 0.197*** |
| (0.573) | (0.134) | (3.517) | (4.811) | (3.799) | (5.630) | |
| Constant | 2.485*** | 2.944*** | 2.121*** | 5.298*** | 5.452*** | 5.208*** |
| (3.977) | (4.553) | (3.397) | (17.834) | (17.952) | (18.855) | |
| Observations | 30,415 | 26,631 | 30,445 | 5,684 | 4,962 | 5,690 |
| 0.541 | 0.544 | 0.539 | 0.614 | 0.621 | 0.614 | |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 20.88 | 23.87 | 19.88 | ||||
| Prob > | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||
Note(s): Table 9 represents regression results for analyzing the moderating impact of analyst coverage on the relationship between Insider ownership and firm default risk. High analyst coverage and Low analyst coverage indicate the below and above median value of analyst coverage level, adjacent to strong and weak external governance. Columns 1–3 show results for firms with higher analyst coverage and columns 4–6 show results for firms with less than median analyst coverage. T-statistics are in parentheses. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix. All regression control for industry and year fixed effects. Superscripts ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively
Source(s): Table created by the authors