Insider ownership and default risk: the role of the main bank
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Firms with main bank | Firms without main bank | |||||
| DD | DD | DD | DD | DD | DD | |
| DIR | −0.007*** | −0.008*** | ||||
| (−4.276) | (−6.194) | |||||
| CEOIR | −0.011*** | −0.014*** | ||||
| (−6.129) | (−6.605) | |||||
| EMPIR | −0.011 | −0.008 | ||||
| (−0.090) | (−1.484) | |||||
| LNS | 0.100*** | 0.098*** | 0.106*** | 0.206*** | 0.171*** | 0.219*** |
| (9.558) | (9.414) | (10.320) | (18.965) | (13.388) | (20.642) | |
| K/S | 0.643*** | 0.646*** | 0.630*** | 0.816*** | 0.811*** | 0.837*** |
| (10.811) | (10.854) | (10.570) | (15.263) | (13.252) | (15.674) | |
| Y/S | 6.477*** | 6.472*** | 6.401*** | 4.467*** | 4.189*** | 4.409*** |
| (22.981) | (22.977) | (22.672) | (20.788) | (17.455) | (20.505) | |
| R&D/K | 0.097** | 0.092** | 0.099** | 0.011*** | 0.008* | 0.011*** |
| (2.368) | (2.252) | (2.421) | (2.810) | (1.886) | (2.816) | |
| RDUM | 1.186 | 1.355 | 1.233 | |||
| (1.513) | (1.198) | (1.570) | ||||
| I/K | −0.333*** | −0.319** | −0.382*** | −0.058** | −0.062** | −0.062** |
| (−2.664) | (−2.554) | (−3.057) | (−2.188) | (−2.240) | (−2.305) | |
| ROA | 0.036*** | 0.036*** | 0.035*** | 0.027*** | 0.027*** | 0.026*** |
| (10.858) | (10.920) | (10.569) | (11.875) | (10.542) | (11.248) | |
| LEVERAGE | −5.926*** | −5.913*** | −5.951*** | −5.469*** | −5.330*** | −5.531*** |
| (−69.070) | (−68.945) | (−69.539) | (−62.525) | (−51.576) | (−63.610) | |
| Age | −0.059*** | −0.063*** | −0.034* | 0.081*** | 0.141*** | 0.117*** |
| (−2.886) | (−3.174) | (−1.761) | (3.997) | (5.378) | (6.028) | |
| Constant | 3.784*** | 3.822*** | 3.664*** | 1.273 | 1.273 | 0.953 |
| (30.917) | (32.351) | (31.648) | (1.599) | (1.117) | (1.199) | |
| Observations | 19,358 | 19,358 | 19,362 | 16,754 | 12,249 | 16,785 |
| R-squared | 0.580 | 0.580 | 0.580 | 0.543 | 0.559 | 0.541 |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| χ2 | 29.34 | 19.28 | 26.85 | |||
| Prob > χ2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Firms with main bank | Firms without main bank | |||||
| DD | DD | DD | DD | DD | DD | |
| DIR | −0.007*** | −0.008*** | ||||
| (−4.276) | (−6.194) | |||||
| CEOIR | −0.011*** | −0.014*** | ||||
| (−6.129) | (−6.605) | |||||
| EMPIR | −0.011 | −0.008 | ||||
| (−0.090) | (−1.484) | |||||
| LNS | 0.100*** | 0.098*** | 0.106*** | 0.206*** | 0.171*** | 0.219*** |
| (9.558) | (9.414) | (10.320) | (18.965) | (13.388) | (20.642) | |
| K/S | 0.643*** | 0.646*** | 0.630*** | 0.816*** | 0.811*** | 0.837*** |
| (10.811) | (10.854) | (10.570) | (15.263) | (13.252) | (15.674) | |
| Y/S | 6.477*** | 6.472*** | 6.401*** | 4.467*** | 4.189*** | 4.409*** |
| (22.981) | (22.977) | (22.672) | (20.788) | (17.455) | (20.505) | |
| R&D/K | 0.097** | 0.092** | 0.099** | 0.011*** | 0.008* | 0.011*** |
| (2.368) | (2.252) | (2.421) | (2.810) | (1.886) | (2.816) | |
| RDUM | 1.186 | 1.355 | 1.233 | |||
| (1.513) | (1.198) | (1.570) | ||||
| I/K | −0.333*** | −0.319** | −0.382*** | −0.058** | −0.062** | −0.062** |
| (−2.664) | (−2.554) | (−3.057) | (−2.188) | (−2.240) | (−2.305) | |
| ROA | 0.036*** | 0.036*** | 0.035*** | 0.027*** | 0.027*** | 0.026*** |
| (10.858) | (10.920) | (10.569) | (11.875) | (10.542) | (11.248) | |
| LEVERAGE | −5.926*** | −5.913*** | −5.951*** | −5.469*** | −5.330*** | −5.531*** |
| (−69.070) | (−68.945) | (−69.539) | (−62.525) | (−51.576) | (−63.610) | |
| Age | −0.059*** | −0.063*** | −0.034* | 0.081*** | 0.141*** | 0.117*** |
| (−2.886) | (−3.174) | (−1.761) | (3.997) | (5.378) | (6.028) | |
| Constant | 3.784*** | 3.822*** | 3.664*** | 1.273 | 1.273 | 0.953 |
| (30.917) | (32.351) | (31.648) | (1.599) | (1.117) | (1.199) | |
| Observations | 19,358 | 19,358 | 19,362 | 16,754 | 12,249 | 16,785 |
| 0.580 | 0.580 | 0.580 | 0.543 | 0.559 | 0.541 | |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 29.34 | 19.28 | 26.85 | ||||
| Prob > | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |||
Note(s): Table 10 reports estimates from regression results to analyze if the presence of main bank system moderates the relationship between insider ownership and firm default risk. Firms with main bank portray strong external governance and firms without main bank portray weak external governance. Columns 1–3 show results for firms with main bank ties and columns 4–6 show results for firms with no main bank ties. T-statistics are in parentheses. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix. Superscripts ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively
Source(s): Table created by the authors