CEO individualism and firm innovation
| Panel A: CEO individualism and firm innovation (base set of controls) | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | Log(1+patents), t+2 | Log(1+citations adj.), t+2 | ||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| TFE | 0.056* | 0.078*** | 0.057* | 0.048* | 0.071*** | 0.079** |
| (1.94) | (3.17) | (1.93) | (1.65) | (2.87) | (1.99) | |
| Log CEO age | −0.296 | 0.426** | 0.172 | −0.305 | 0.516** | 0.307 |
| (−1.06) | (2.19) | (0.59) | (−1.06) | (2.49) | (1.48) | |
| Log CEO tenure | 0.009 | −0.070*** | −0.028 | 0.018 | −0.072*** | −0.066*** |
| (0.25) | (−3.07) | (−0.92) | (0.49) | (−2.98) | (−2.81) | |
| Firm size | 0.447*** | 0.125** | 0.244*** | 0.461*** | 0.107** | 0.129** |
| (7.79) | (2.50) | (3.12) | (7.69) | (2.05) | (2.51) | |
| R&D expenditures | 4.464*** | 0.172 | 0.192 | 4.382*** | −0.583 | 0.157 |
| (5.53) | (0.22) | (0.19) | (4.85) | (−0.70) | (0.23) | |
| Capital expenditures | 3.689*** | 0.539 | 0.481 | 3.657*** | 0.488 | 0.466 |
| (5.67) | (1.57) | (1.09) | (5.54) | (1.39) | (1.27) | |
| Log firm age | 0.089 | −0.200* | −0.406** | 0.056 | −0.154 | −0.124 |
| (1.27) | (−1.77) | (−2.06) | (0.78) | (−1.20) | (−1.17) | |
| Log employees | 0.296*** | 0.356*** | 0.327*** | 0.270*** | 0.331*** | 0.317*** |
| (3.82) | (4.60) | (2.60) | (3.33) | (4.13) | (4.18) | |
| Observations | 10,336 | 10,336 | 7,649 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,030 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.681 | 0.903 | 0.923 | 0.654 | 0.884 | 0.907 |
| Industry FE | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No |
| Firm FE | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| State-Year FE | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Industry-Year FE | No | No | Yes | No | No | No |
| Panel A: CEO individualism and firm innovation (base set of controls) | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | Log(1+patents), | Log(1+citations adj.), | ||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| TFE | ||||||
| Log CEO age | −0.296 | 0.426** | 0.172 | −0.305 | 0.516** | 0.307 |
| (−1.06) | (2.19) | (0.59) | (−1.06) | (2.49) | (1.48) | |
| Log CEO tenure | 0.009 | −0.070*** | −0.028 | 0.018 | −0.072*** | −0.066*** |
| (0.25) | (−3.07) | (−0.92) | (0.49) | (−2.98) | (−2.81) | |
| Firm size | 0.447*** | 0.125** | 0.244*** | 0.461*** | 0.107** | 0.129** |
| (7.79) | (2.50) | (3.12) | (7.69) | (2.05) | (2.51) | |
| R&D expenditures | 4.464*** | 0.172 | 0.192 | 4.382*** | −0.583 | 0.157 |
| (5.53) | (0.22) | (0.19) | (4.85) | (−0.70) | (0.23) | |
| Capital expenditures | 3.689*** | 0.539 | 0.481 | 3.657*** | 0.488 | 0.466 |
| (5.67) | (1.57) | (1.09) | (5.54) | (1.39) | (1.27) | |
| Log firm age | 0.089 | −0.200* | −0.406** | 0.056 | −0.154 | −0.124 |
| (1.27) | (−1.77) | (−2.06) | (0.78) | (−1.20) | (−1.17) | |
| Log employees | 0.296*** | 0.356*** | 0.327*** | 0.270*** | 0.331*** | 0.317*** |
| (3.82) | (4.60) | (2.60) | (3.33) | (4.13) | (4.18) | |
| Observations | 10,336 | 10,336 | 7,649 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,030 |
| Adjusted | 0.681 | 0.903 | 0.923 | 0.654 | 0.884 | 0.907 |
| Industry FE | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No |
| Firm FE | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| State-Year FE | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Industry-Year FE | No | No | Yes | No | No | No |
| Panel B: individualism and firm innovation (expanded set of controls) | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Log(1+patents), t+2 | ||||||||
| TFE | 0.079*** | 0.078*** | 0.068*** | 0.103*** | 0.051* | 0.053* | 0.078*** | 0.098*** |
| (3.23) | (3.17) | (2.75) | (3.07) | (1.66) | (1.78) | (3.19) | (2.86) | |
| CEO education | −0.030 | |||||||
| (−1.06) | ||||||||
| Ivy League degree | 0.095 | |||||||
| (1.40) | ||||||||
| CEO overconfidence | 0.003 | |||||||
| (0.11) | ||||||||
| Log CEO compensation | 0.014 | |||||||
| (0.91) | ||||||||
| Log Delta | 0.009 | |||||||
| (0.73) | ||||||||
| Log Vega | 0.003 | |||||||
| (0.26) | ||||||||
| Founder CEO | −0.097 | |||||||
| (−0.83) | ||||||||
| General ability index (GAI) | 0.021 | |||||||
| (0.62) | ||||||||
| Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) | 0.003** | |||||||
| (1.98) | ||||||||
| Inventor CEO | 0.024 | −0.446** | ||||||
| (0.157) | (−2.35) | |||||||
| Log team size | −0.144 | |||||||
| (−1.55) | ||||||||
| Team MBA | 0.225 | |||||||
| (1.41) | ||||||||
| Team PhD | −0.187 | |||||||
| (−0.48) | ||||||||
| Log team network | 0.122** | |||||||
| (2.10) | ||||||||
| Team experience | −0.206 | |||||||
| (−1.59) | ||||||||
| Log team tenure | 0.047 | |||||||
| (0.58) | ||||||||
| Observations | 10,336 | 10,336 | 9,605 | 4,816 | 6,272 | 6,901 | 10,336 | 5,939 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.903 | 0.903 | 0.907 | 0.933 | 0.922 | 0.919 | 0.903 | 0.931 |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Panel B: individualism and firm innovation (expanded set of controls) | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Log(1+patents), | ||||||||
| TFE | ||||||||
| CEO education | −0.030 | |||||||
| (−1.06) | ||||||||
| Ivy League degree | 0.095 | |||||||
| (1.40) | ||||||||
| CEO overconfidence | 0.003 | |||||||
| (0.11) | ||||||||
| Log CEO compensation | 0.014 | |||||||
| (0.91) | ||||||||
| Log Delta | 0.009 | |||||||
| (0.73) | ||||||||
| Log Vega | 0.003 | |||||||
| (0.26) | ||||||||
| Founder CEO | −0.097 | |||||||
| (−0.83) | ||||||||
| General ability index (GAI) | 0.021 | |||||||
| (0.62) | ||||||||
| Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) | 0.003** | |||||||
| (1.98) | ||||||||
| Inventor CEO | 0.024 | −0.446** | ||||||
| (0.157) | (−2.35) | |||||||
| Log team size | −0.144 | |||||||
| (−1.55) | ||||||||
| Team MBA | 0.225 | |||||||
| (1.41) | ||||||||
| Team PhD | −0.187 | |||||||
| (−0.48) | ||||||||
| Log team network | 0.122** | |||||||
| (2.10) | ||||||||
| Team experience | −0.206 | |||||||
| (−1.59) | ||||||||
| Log team tenure | 0.047 | |||||||
| (0.58) | ||||||||
| Observations | 10,336 | 10,336 | 9,605 | 4,816 | 6,272 | 6,901 | 10,336 | 5,939 |
| Adjusted | 0.903 | 0.903 | 0.907 | 0.933 | 0.922 | 0.919 | 0.903 | 0.931 |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Note(s): The dependent variable in Columns (1), (3) and (5) of Panel A and in all columns of Panel B is the log of one plus the total number of patents filed by firm in year t+2; the dependent variable in Columns (2), (4) and (6) is the log of one plus the total number of citations adjusted by the year-patent class average in year t+2. Specifications in Panel A include the base set of controls and specifications in Panel B include a base set of controls and additional control variables (as shown) that address alternative explanations. Industries are classified using the four-digit SIC codes. The t-statistics based on the standard errors clustered at the CEO level are reported in parentheses.*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively