Ruling out alternative explanation related to CEO risk-taking
| Dependent variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock return volatility, t+1 | Idiosyncratic volatility, t+1 | Numb. announced M&A deals, t+1 | Numb. completed M&A deals, t+1 | R&D exp., t+1 | |
| TFE | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.058 | 0.037 | 0.032 |
| (0.34) | (0.35) | (1.22) | (0.96) | (0.98) | |
| Observations | 9,980 | 9,980 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,091 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.599 | 0.595 | 0.444 | 0.430 | 0.185 |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Dependent variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock return volatility, | Idiosyncratic volatility, | Numb. announced M&A deals, | Numb. completed M&A deals, | R&D exp., | |
| TFE | |||||
| Observations | 9,980 | 9,980 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,091 |
| Adjusted | 0.599 | 0.595 | 0.444 | 0.430 | 0.185 |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Note(s): The table examines the relation between CEO individualism and several measures of CEO risk-taking. The dependent variables are stock return volatility in Column (1), idiosyncratic volatility in Column (2), the number of announced M&A deals in Column (3), the number of completed M&A deals in Column (4) and R&D expenditures in Column (5). Control variables (not shown) include the logarithm of CEO age, the logarithm of CEO tenure, firm size, the logarithm of firm age, capital expenditures, R&D expenditures and the logarithm of the number of employees. Standard errors are clustered at the CEO level. The t-statistics are in parentheses.*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively