CEO individualism and firm innovation quality
| Panel A: top cited patents | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | Top 10% patents | Top 5% patents | Top 1% patents | |||
| t+2 | t+1 | t+2 | t+1 | t+2 | t+1 | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| TFE | 3.166** | 2.226** | 1.045** | 1.188** | 0.212* | 0.207* |
| (2.33) | (2.26) | (2.12) | (2.32) | (1.91) | (1.94) | |
| Observations | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.654 | 0.733 | 0.748 | 0.722 | 0.699 | 0.688 |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Panel A: top cited patents | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | Top 10% patents | Top 5% patents | Top 1% patents | |||
| t+2 | ||||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| TFE | ||||||
| Observations | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 |
| Adjusted | 0.654 | 0.733 | 0.748 | 0.722 | 0.699 | 0.688 |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Panel B: market value of patents | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | Real market value of patents | Log real market value of patents | Nominal market value of patents | Log nominal market value of patents |
| t+2 | t+2 | t+2 | t+2 | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| TFE | 173.188* | 0.120** | 403.852** | 0.128** |
| (1.74) | (2.36) | (2.21) | (2.28) | |
| Observations | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.814 | 0.873 | 0.828 | 0.865 |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Panel B: market value of patents | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | Real market value of patents | Log real market value of patents | Nominal market value of patents | Log nominal market value of patents |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| TFE | ||||
| Observations | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 | 10,336 |
| Adjusted | 0.814 | 0.873 | 0.828 | 0.865 |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Note(s): The dependent variables in Panel A are the number of top 10%, top 5% and top 1% cited patents. Control variables include the logarithm of CEO age, the logarithm of tenure, firm size, the logarithm of firm age, capital expenditure, R&D expenditure and the logarithm of employees. Firm- and year-fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the CEO level. The t-statistics are in parentheses.*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel B of Table 5 reports the regression of TFE on the market value of innovation. The dependent variables in Columns (1) and (2) are the real and the logarithm of the real value of patents. The dependent variables in Columns (3) and (4) are the nominal and the logarithm of the nominal value of patents. Control variables include the logarithm of CEO age, the logarithm of tenure, firm size, the logarithm of firm age, capital expenditure, R&D expenditure and the logarithm of employees. Firm and year-fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the CEO level. The t-statistics are in parentheses.*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively