CEO individualism and intensity of employee monitoring
Dependent variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Employee quality monitoring, t | Employee quality monitoring, t+1 | Employee quality monitoring, t | Employee quality monitoring, t+1 | |
| TFE | −0.017*** | −0.019*** | −0.017* | −0.020* |
| (−2.76) | (−2.93) | (−1.72) | (−1.74) | |
| Observations | 3,298 | 3,099 | 3,298 | 3,099 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.280 | 0.320 | 0.488 | 0.546 |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry FE | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Employee quality monitoring, | Employee quality monitoring, | Employee quality monitoring, | Employee quality monitoring, | |
| TFE | ||||
| Observations | 3,298 | 3,099 | 3,298 | 3,099 |
| Adjusted | 0.280 | 0.320 | 0.488 | 0.546 |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry FE | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Note(s): The table examines the relations between CEO individualism, measured by TFE, and the intensity of employee monitoring. The dependent variable is the score assessing the company’s performance monitoring regarding employment quality in year t and t+1. Industries are classified based on the four-digit SIC code. Control variables (data not shown) include the logarithm of CEO age, the logarithm of CEO tenure, firm size, the logarithm of firm age, capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, the logarithm of the number of firm employees, firm leverage, profitability and Tobin’s Q. The t-statistics based on the standard errors clustered at the CEO level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively