Post-DFA increase in regulatory uncertainty and tax planning
| Cash ETR | 3-year cash ETR | TA.I. | 3-yr TA.I. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Panel A: regulatory uncertainty (R.U.) | ||||
| Post-DFA Intensity in R.U. = 1 × StressTest = 1 | −0.132** | −0.241*** | 0.048 | 0.287*** |
| (0.065) | (0.059) | (0.075) | (0.100) | |
| Observations | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.123 | 0.268 | 0.267 | 0.190 |
| Panel B: regulatory uncertainty sentiment (R.U.S.) | ||||
| Post-DFA Intensity in R.U.S. = 1 × StressTest = 1 | 0.018 | −0.412** | 0.042 | 0.202 |
| (0.043) | (0.157) | (0.113) | (0.129) | |
| Observations | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.120 | 0.279 | 0.264 | 0.191 |
| Panel C: tax-related regulatory uncertainty | ||||
| Post-DFA Intensity in Tax-Related R.U. = 1 × StressTest = 1 | −0.132** | −0.241*** | 0.048 | 0.287*** |
| (0.065) | (0.059) | (0.075) | (0.100) | |
| Observations | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.123 | 0.268 | 0.267 | 0.190 |
| Panel D: portfolio uncertainty | ||||
| Post-DFA Intensity in Portfolio Uncertainty = 1 × StressTest = 1 | 0.110 | −0.066 | −0.074 | 0.035 |
| (0.079) | (0.051) | (0.067) | (0.093) | |
| Observations | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.123 | 0.268 | 0.267 | 0.190 |
| Cash ETR | 3-year cash ETR | TA.I. | 3-yr TA.I. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post-DFA Intensity in R.U. = 1 × StressTest = 1 | −0.132** | −0.241*** | 0.048 | 0.287*** |
| (0.065) | (0.059) | (0.075) | (0.100) | |
| Observations | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
| Adjusted | 0.123 | 0.268 | 0.267 | 0.190 |
| Post-DFA Intensity in R.U.S. = 1 × StressTest = 1 | 0.018 | −0.412** | 0.042 | 0.202 |
| (0.043) | (0.157) | (0.113) | (0.129) | |
| Observations | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
| Adjusted | 0.120 | 0.279 | 0.264 | 0.191 |
| Post-DFA Intensity in Tax-Related R.U. = 1 × StressTest = 1 | −0.132** | −0.241*** | 0.048 | 0.287*** |
| (0.065) | (0.059) | (0.075) | (0.100) | |
| Observations | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
| Adjusted | 0.123 | 0.268 | 0.267 | 0.190 |
| Post-DFA Intensity in Portfolio Uncertainty = 1 × StressTest = 1 | 0.110 | −0.066 | −0.074 | 0.035 |
| (0.079) | (0.051) | (0.067) | (0.093) | |
| Observations | 319 | 319 | 319 | 319 |
| Adjusted | 0.123 | 0.268 | 0.267 | 0.190 |
Note(s): The table exhibits the marginal impact of the Dodd–Frank stress tests for banks with a Post-DFA increase in regulatory uncertainty post-Dodd–Frank compared to the pre-Dodd–Frank period on tax avoidance (Cash ETR) and TAI, using our four different measures of bank uncertainty. Post-DFA Intensity in R.U., Post-DFA intensity in R.U.S., Post-DFA Intensity in tax-related R.U. and Post-DFA Intensity in portfolio uncertainty are dummy variables equal to 1 for categories of large banks and regional banks in the top tercile increase in the regulatory uncertainty, regulatory uncertainty sentiment, the tax-related regulatory uncertainty and the portfolio-related uncertainty sentiment, respectively, in the post-implementation of Dodd–Frank period (2011–2016) compared to the years 2005–2010. StressTest is a dummy variable equal to 1 for CCAR stress test banks and zero for Non-CCAR stress test banks. The dependent variables are the contemporaneous and the three-year rolling average cash effective tax rate and the TAI. Control variables include the bank characteristics as shown in Table 2. Bank and year-fixed effects are included in the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
Source(s): Authors’ own work
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