Post-DFA increase in tax avoidance and profitability, cost of capital and restatement and advisory fees
| Panel A: profitability | Tobin-Q | Profitability | Return on equity | Return on assets | Net interest margin | Net non-interest margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post-DFA Intensity in Tax Avoidance = 1 × StressTest = 1 | −0.027 | 0.001 | −0.017 | −0.001 | −0.006 | −0.000 |
| (0.018) | (0.002) | (0.031) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.009) | |
| Observations | 321 | 326 | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.947 | 0.966 | 0.584 | 0.871 | 0.898 | 0.938 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Tobin-Q | Profitability | Return on equity | Return on assets | Net interest margin | Net non-interest margin | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post-DFA Intensity in Tax Avoidance = 1 × StressTest = 1 | −0.027 | 0.001 | −0.017 | −0.001 | −0.006 | −0.000 |
| (0.018) | (0.002) | (0.031) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.009) | |
| Observations | 321 | 326 | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 |
| Adjusted | 0.947 | 0.966 | 0.584 | 0.871 | 0.898 | 0.938 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Panel B: cost of capital | Cost of capital | Cost of equity | Cost of debt | Dividend payout ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post-DFA Intensity in Tax Avoidance = 1 × StressTest = 1 | 0.002 | 0.019** | −0.002 | 0.023 |
| (0.004) | (0.008) | (0.004) | (0.051) | |
| Observations | 337 | 337 | 436 | 310 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.868 | 0.897 | 0.780 | 0.699 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Cost of capital | Cost of equity | Cost of debt | Dividend payout ratio | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post-DFA Intensity in Tax Avoidance = 1 × StressTest = 1 | 0.002 | 0.019** | −0.002 | 0.023 |
| (0.004) | (0.008) | (0.004) | (0.051) | |
| Observations | 337 | 337 | 436 | 310 |
| Adjusted | 0.868 | 0.897 | 0.780 | 0.699 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Panel C: restatements and advisory-related fees | Restatement_dummy | Acct audit expenses | Legal expense | Consult advisory expenses |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post-DFA Intensity in Tax Avoidance = 1 × StressTest = 1 | −0.038 | 0.466 | 6.592*** | −0.111 |
| (0.043) | (0.402) | (0.835) | (1.228) | |
| Observations | 360 | 436 | 436 | 436 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.309 | 0.727 | 0.625 | 0.678 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Restatement_dummy | Acct audit expenses | Legal expense | Consult advisory expenses | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post-DFA Intensity in Tax Avoidance = 1 × StressTest = 1 | −0.038 | 0.466 | 6.592*** | −0.111 |
| (0.043) | (0.402) | (0.835) | (1.228) | |
| Observations | 360 | 436 | 436 | 436 |
| Adjusted | 0.309 | 0.727 | 0.625 | 0.678 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Note(s): The table below exhibits the marginal impact of the Dodd–Frank stress tests for banks with a Post-DFA increase in tax avoidance post-Dodd–Frank compared to the pre-Dodd–Frank period on profitability, Cost of Capital and restatements and advisory-related fees. The profitability measures in Panel A include Tobin’s Q, gross profitability, Return on Equity, Return on Assets, Net Interest Margin and Net Non-Interest Margin. Panel B reports our findings for Cost of Capital-cost of debt and equity and the Dividend Payout Ratio. Finally, Panel C displays the marginal impact of stress tests over a large increase in tax avoidance in the Dodd–Frank era on bank reporting quality (restatements), Accounting and Auditing Expenses, Legal Expenses, Consulting and Advisory Expenses. Post-DFA Intensity in Tax Avoidance is a dummy variable equal to 1 for categories of large banks and regional banks in the top tercile increase in tax avoidance activities in the post-implementation of Dodd–Frank period (2011–2016) compared to the years 2005–2010. StressTest is a dummy variable equal to 1 for CCAR stress test banks and zero for Non-CCAR stress test banks. Control variables include the first 12 bank characteristics shown in Table 2. Bank and year-fixed effects are included in the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
Source(s): Authors’ own work
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