Female CEOs and ES performance of firms
| ES | Env | Soc | Gov | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Female_CEO | 0.018 | 0.021 | 0.015 | −0.036 |
| 2.694*** | 0.020 | 1.841* | −0.031 | |
| Tenure | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.009 | 0.723 |
| 3.992*** | 0.012 | 4.837*** | 2.720*** | |
| Board_Size | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.073 | 8.971 |
| 6.316*** | 0.061 | 6.144*** | 7.321*** | |
| Gender_diversity | −0.038 | −0.127 | 0.053 | 25.719 |
| −0.377 | −0.014 | 0.518 | 2.484** | |
| Firm_Size | 0.072 | 0.079 | 0.064 | 2.692 |
| 13.304*** | 0.113 | 10.356*** | 3.705*** | |
| Leverage | −9.182 | −6.693 | −11.464 | 80.075 |
| −2.459** | −0.013 | −2.505** | 1.266 | |
| M-to-B | 0.002 | 0.0004 | 0.003 | −0.196 |
| 2.924*** | 0.004 | 4.135*** | −2.013** | |
| Slack | −0.003 | −0.015 | 0.010 | −0.703 |
| −2.266** | −0.084 | 6.668*** | −3.572*** | |
| ROA | −0.022 | 0.011 | −0.054 | −6.697 |
| −1.138 | 0.002 | −2.328** | −2.078** | |
| Country control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year and firm fixed-effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2,129 | 2,129 | 2,130 | 2,122 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.554 | 0.375 | 0.565 | 0.319 |
| ES | Env | Soc | Gov | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Female_CEO | 0.018 | 0.021 | 0.015 | −0.036 |
| 2.694 | 0.020 | 1.841 | −0.031 | |
| Tenure | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.009 | 0.723 |
| 3.992 | 0.012 | 4.837 | 2.720 | |
| Board_Size | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.073 | 8.971 |
| 6.316 | 0.061 | 6.144 | 7.321 | |
| Gender_diversity | −0.038 | −0.127 | 0.053 | 25.719 |
| −0.377 | −0.014 | 0.518 | 2.484 | |
| Firm_Size | 0.072 | 0.079 | 0.064 | 2.692 |
| 13.304 | 0.113 | 10.356 | 3.705 | |
| Leverage | −9.182 | −6.693 | −11.464 | 80.075 |
| −2.459 | −0.013 | −2.505 | 1.266 | |
| M-to-B | 0.002 | 0.0004 | 0.003 | −0.196 |
| 2.924 | 0.004 | 4.135 | −2.013 | |
| Slack | −0.003 | −0.015 | 0.010 | −0.703 |
| −2.266 | −0.084 | 6.668 | −3.572 | |
| ROA | −0.022 | 0.011 | −0.054 | −6.697 |
| −1.138 | 0.002 | −2.328 | −2.078 | |
| Country control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year and firm fixed-effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2,129 | 2,129 | 2,130 | 2,122 |
| Adjusted | 0.554 | 0.375 | 0.565 | 0.319 |
Notes:
This table shows the results of the impact of female leaders on the average of the environmental and social combined (ES) scores and the individual environmental (Env), social (Soc) and governance (Gov) scores. Female_CEO is a dummy that equals one if a woman is the CEO of firm i at time t or zeros otherwise, Tenure is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the official’s appointment to the current year of observation, Board_Size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members in firm i at time t, Gender_Diversity is the percentage of women firm i board at time t. Firm_Size (Natural log of total firm sales), Leverage is the natural logarithm of total debt over total equity of firm i at time t, MB is the ratio of firm i market value of equity to its the book value of equity at time t, Slack i.e. current liabilities of firm i at time t divided by its current asset in the same period, ROA is firm i earnings before interest and taxes over its total assets at time t. The last rows include the country control, year and firm fixed-effects, the number of observations in the models estimated and adjusted R2. Firm-level standard error clustering is applied, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** (**, *) denotes significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level (two-sided test)
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