Table 9

Co-opted board and market reactions to acquisition announcements: the role of internal and external monitoring

Panel A: entrenchment index
High eindexLow eindexHigh eindexLow eindexHigh eindexLow eindex
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
CARCARCARCARCARCAR
PCO_OPT−0.0106*−0.0019
(−1.90)(−0.54)    
NCO_OPT−0.0010*−0.0003
  (−1.91)(−0.83)  
RCO_OPT−0.0102*−0.0016
    (−1.83)(−0.47)
CONSTANT0.02340.01690.01300.01460.01650.0159
(0.92)(1.13)(0.49)(0.96)(0.63)(1.06)
ControlsYesYesYesYesYesYes
Year fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYesYes
Industry fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYesYes
R20.11380.06120.11350.06130.11360.0612
N9542,7639542,7639542,763
Panel B: Institutional ownership
High instoLow instoHigh instoLow instoHigh instoLow insto
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
CARCARCARCARCARCAR
PCO_OPT−0.0028−0.0107***
(−0.97)(−3.52)    
NCO_OPT−0.0003−0.0010***
  (−1.11)(−3.54)  
RCO_OPT−0.0023−0.0099***
    (−0.80)(−3.27)
CONSTANT0.02950.01490.02680.00630.02810.0084
(0.78)(1.18)(0.71)(0.49)(0.74)(0.66)
ControlsYesYesYesYesYesYes
Year fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYesYes
Industry fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYesYes
R20.05250.04260.05250.04220.05240.0423
N4,2844,6554,2844,6554,2844,655

Note(s): This table presents the regression results of the effect of co-opted board on acquisition performance with other control variables for high versus low entrenchment index in Panel A and high versus low institutional shareholdings in Panel B. Robust two-tailed t-statistics clustered by the firm are presented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. We present the variable definitions in the  Appendix

Source(s): Authors’ own work

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