Table 10 Co-opted board and market...

Table 10

Co-opted board and market reactions to acquisition announcements: the role of target board co-option

	Panel A: high co-opted target board			Panel B: low co-opted target board
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	CAR	CAR	CAR	CAR	CAR	CAR
PCO_OPT	−0.0079**	–	–	−0.0035	–	–
PCO_OPT	(−2.36)			(−1.10)
NCO_OPT	–	−0.0008**	–	–	−0.0004	–
NCO_OPT		(−2.53)			(−1.18)
RCO_OPT	–	–	−0.0075**	–	–	−0.0027
RCO_OPT			(−2.26)			(−0.85)
CONSTANT	−0.0227	−0.0296*	−0.0277	−0.0118	−0.0152	−0.0138
CONSTANT	(−1.32)	(−1.66)	(−1.57)	(−0.43)	(−0.55)	(−0.50)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R²	0.0424	0.0424	0.0423	0.0592	0.0592	0.0591
N	3,248	3,248	3,248	3,567	3,567	3,567

	Panel A: high co-opted target board			Panel B: low co-opted target board
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	CAR	CAR	CAR	CAR	CAR	CAR
PCO_OPT	−0.0079**	–	–	−0.0035	–	–
PCO_OPT	(−2.36)			(−1.10)
NCO_OPT	–	−0.0008**	–	–	−0.0004	–
NCO_OPT		(−2.53)			(−1.18)
RCO_OPT	–	–	−0.0075**	–	–	−0.0027
RCO_OPT			(−2.26)			(−0.85)
CONSTANT	−0.0227	−0.0296*	−0.0277	−0.0118	−0.0152	−0.0138
CONSTANT	(−1.32)	(−1.66)	(−1.57)	(−0.43)	(−0.55)	(−0.50)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R²	0.0424	0.0424	0.0423	0.0592	0.0592	0.0591
N	3,248	3,248	3,248	3,567	3,567	3,567

Note(s): This table presents the regression results of the effect of co-opted board on acquisition performance for high and low co-opted target board in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Robust two-tailed t-statistics clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. We present the variable definitions in the Appendix

Source(s): Authors’ own work

[ViewLarge]

Sharing Unavailable