Table 12

Co-opted board and market reactions to acquisition announcements: acquisition efficiency

Panel A: bid premiumPanel B: partial deals
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
BIDPREMBIDPREMBIDPREMPARACQPARACQPARACQ
PCO_OPT0.6112***−0.1926**
(3.42)  (−2.09)  
NCO_OPT0.0586***−0.0158*
 (3.18)  (−1.77) 
RCO_OPT0.6051***−0.1994**
  (3.38)  (−2.18)
CONSTANT−1.7518−1.2361−1.3581−2.2066***−2.3476***−2.3359***
(−1.14)(−0.79)(−0.88)(−2.62)(−2.82)(−2.76)
ControlsYesYesYesYesYesYes
Year fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYesYes
Industry fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYesYes
R2/Wald-chi20.40410.40400.40411159.95061158.96191160.2459
N8,9398,9398,9398,9398,9398,939
Panel C: days to completionPanel D: completed deals
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
LOGDAYSLOGDAYSLOGDAYSCOMPLETEDCOMPLETEDCOMPLETED
PCO_OPT−0.2044***−0.3283***
(−2.69)  (−2.96)  
NCO_OPT−0.0226***−0.0238**
 (−3.09)  (−2.25) 
RCO_OPT−0.2024***−0.3186***
  (−2.68)  (−2.91)
CONSTANT−0.5520−0.7547−0.68371.6797*1.46041.4691
(−0.74)(−1.00)(−0.91)(1.83)(1.53)(1.59)
ControlsYesYesYesYesYesYes
Year fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYesYes
Industry fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYesYes
R2/Wald-chi20.27780.27810.27781544.15271542.24121545.0912
N7,0997,0997,0998,9398,9398,939

Note(s): This table presents the regression results of co-opted board on acquisition efficiency with other control variables. Robust two-tailed t-statistics clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. We present the variable definitions in the  Appendix

Source(s): Authors’ own work

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