CEO turnover and family firms: three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression
| Dependent variable = CEO_TURN | Dependent variable = TRANS | |
|---|---|---|
| Model (1) | Model (2) | |
| FF | −0.039*** | |
| (–5.233) | ||
| FF×TRANS | 0.010*** | |
| (2.972) | ||
| TRANS | −0.013*** | |
| (–4.468) | ||
| SIZE | −0.005 | −1.208*** |
| (–1.643) | (–27.801) | |
| LEV | 0.079** | |
| (2.217) | ||
| ROA | −0.430*** | 6.681*** |
| (–8.689) | (9.450) | |
| BM | 0.012 | −0.175 |
| (0.747) | (–0.759) | |
| RET | 0.034*** | |
| (4.901) | ||
| SGROWTH | 0.033*** | |
| (3.019) | ||
| CFO | −0.025* | |
| (–1.906) | ||
| STD_CFO | 0.425*** | |
| (5.862) | ||
| FAGE | 0.006 | 0.625*** |
| (0.717) | (4.682) | |
| EMPTURN | 0.003*** | |
| (11.657) | ||
| BLOCK | −0.000 | |
| (–0.097) | ||
| BSIZE | 0.041*** | |
| (2.784) | ||
| BIND | −0.017 | |
| (–0.670) | ||
| CEO_DUAL | −0.062*** | |
| (–8.428) | ||
| CEO_GENDER | −0.054*** | |
| (–3.525) | ||
| CEO_OWN | 0.032 | |
| (0.418) | ||
| CEO_TURN | −0.462*** | |
| (–3.627) | ||
| VOLAT | −0.354*** | |
| (–5.857) | ||
| RND | 2.197*** | |
| (3.440) | ||
| TURN | 0.066* | |
| (1.842) | ||
| SEGMENT | −0.131 | |
| (–0.765) | ||
| HHI | −0.807 | |
| (–1.007) | ||
| ANA_SHOCK | 5.243*** | |
| (7.046) | ||
| Constant | 0.267*** | 3.932*** |
| (3.174) | (3.146) | |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 14,441 | 14,441 |
| R2 | 0.047 | 0.112 |
| Dependent variable = | Dependent variable = | |
|---|---|---|
| Model (1) | Model (2) | |
| −0.039*** | ||
| (–5.233) | ||
| 0.010*** | ||
| (2.972) | ||
| −0.013*** | ||
| (–4.468) | ||
| −0.005 | −1.208*** | |
| (–1.643) | (–27.801) | |
| 0.079** | ||
| (2.217) | ||
| −0.430*** | 6.681*** | |
| (–8.689) | (9.450) | |
| 0.012 | −0.175 | |
| (0.747) | (–0.759) | |
| 0.034*** | ||
| (4.901) | ||
| 0.033*** | ||
| (3.019) | ||
| −0.025* | ||
| (–1.906) | ||
| 0.425*** | ||
| (5.862) | ||
| 0.006 | 0.625*** | |
| (0.717) | (4.682) | |
| 0.003*** | ||
| (11.657) | ||
| −0.000 | ||
| (–0.097) | ||
| 0.041*** | ||
| (2.784) | ||
| −0.017 | ||
| (–0.670) | ||
| −0.062*** | ||
| (–8.428) | ||
| −0.054*** | ||
| (–3.525) | ||
| 0.032 | ||
| (0.418) | ||
| −0.462*** | ||
| (–3.627) | ||
| −0.354*** | ||
| (–5.857) | ||
| 2.197*** | ||
| (3.440) | ||
| 0.066* | ||
| (1.842) | ||
| −0.131 | ||
| (–0.765) | ||
| −0.807 | ||
| (–1.007) | ||
| 5.243*** | ||
| (7.046) | ||
| Constant | 0.267*** | 3.932*** |
| (3.174) | (3.146) | |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 14,441 | 14,441 |
| 0.047 | 0.112 |
Note(s): This table presents the 3SLS regression results of the moderating role of corporate transparency in the association between family firms and CEO turnover. Model (1) indicates the results of the moderating role of corporate transparency in the association between family firm and CEO turnover. Model (2) indicates the regression results of the determinants of corporate transparency. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics clustered by firm and year. Superscript ***, ** and * represent significance levels at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix
Source(s): Authors' own work
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