Firm fixed effect regression results between family firms and CEO turnover
| Dependent Variable = CEO_TURN | ||
|---|---|---|
| Model (1) | Model (2) | |
| FF | −0.281*** | −0.276*** |
| (–4.200) | (–4.120) | |
| FF×TRANS | 0.012* | |
| (1.690) | ||
| TRANS | −0.017*** | |
| (–2.600) | ||
| SIZE | −0.031 | −0.041 |
| (–1.140) | (–1.500) | |
| LEV | 0.599*** | 0.582*** |
| (2.960) | (2.890) | |
| ROA | −1.160** | −1.119* |
| (–1.960) | (–1.900) | |
| BM | 0.063 | 0.061 |
| (0.530) | (0.520) | |
| RET | 0.067** | 0.068** |
| (2.350) | (2.420) | |
| SGROWTH | −0.001 | −0.002 |
| (–0.720) | (–0.540) | |
| CFO | 0.001*** | 0.000 |
| (0.930) | (0.910) | |
| STD_CFO | 0.014*** | 0.014*** |
| (6.170) | (6.180) | |
| FAGE | −0.044 | −0.042 |
| (–0.610) | (–0.580) | |
| EMPTURN | 0.015*** | 0.015*** |
| (9.920) | (9.930) | |
| BLOCK | −0.004 | −0.004 |
| (–0.500) | (–0.510) | |
| BSIZE | 0.041 | 0.042 |
| (0.330) | (0.340) | |
| BIND | 0.096 | 0.091 |
| (0.520) | (0.500) | |
| CEO_DUAL | −0.362*** | −0.363*** |
| (–5.360) | (–5.380) | |
| CEO_GENDER | −0.286** | −0.291** |
| (–2.290) | (–2.330) | |
| CEO_OWN | 0.055 | 0.056 |
| (0.580) | (0.580) | |
| Constant | −0.070 | −0.598 |
| (–0.070) | (–1.160) | |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 15,726 | 15,726 |
| Test: TRANS + FF×TRANS | 26.03*** | |
| Dependent Variable = | ||
|---|---|---|
| Model (1) | Model (2) | |
| −0.281*** | −0.276*** | |
| (–4.200) | (–4.120) | |
| 0.012* | ||
| (1.690) | ||
| −0.017*** | ||
| (–2.600) | ||
| −0.031 | −0.041 | |
| (–1.140) | (–1.500) | |
| 0.599*** | 0.582*** | |
| (2.960) | (2.890) | |
| −1.160** | −1.119* | |
| (–1.960) | (–1.900) | |
| 0.063 | 0.061 | |
| (0.530) | (0.520) | |
| 0.067** | 0.068** | |
| (2.350) | (2.420) | |
| −0.001 | −0.002 | |
| (–0.720) | (–0.540) | |
| 0.001*** | 0.000 | |
| (0.930) | (0.910) | |
| 0.014*** | 0.014*** | |
| (6.170) | (6.180) | |
| −0.044 | −0.042 | |
| (–0.610) | (–0.580) | |
| 0.015*** | 0.015*** | |
| (9.920) | (9.930) | |
| −0.004 | −0.004 | |
| (–0.500) | (–0.510) | |
| 0.041 | 0.042 | |
| (0.330) | (0.340) | |
| 0.096 | 0.091 | |
| (0.520) | (0.500) | |
| −0.362*** | −0.363*** | |
| (–5.360) | (–5.380) | |
| −0.286** | −0.291** | |
| (–2.290) | (–2.330) | |
| 0.055 | 0.056 | |
| (0.580) | (0.580) | |
| Constant | −0.070 | −0.598 |
| (–0.070) | (–1.160) | |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 15,726 | 15,726 |
| Test: | 26.03*** | |
Note(s): This table presents the regression results of the relationship between family firms and CEO turnover, and the moderating role of corporate transparency in this relationship with firm fixed effects. Model (1) indicates the results of the impact of family firms on CEO turnover. Model (2) indicates the moderating role of corporate transparency in the impact of family firms on CEO turnover. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics clustered by firm and year. Superscript ***, ** and * represent significance levels at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix
Source(s): Authors' own work
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