Table 9 Regression results between...

Table 9

Regression results between family firms and CEO turnover: individual and alternative proxies for corporate transparency

	Dependent Variable = CEO_TURN
	RFERROR	RFDISP	COVERAGE	RSPREAD	REM	RIDYORISK
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
FF	−0.231^**	−0.221^**	−0.066	−0.526^***	−0.267^***	0.563
FF	(–2.386)	(–2.428)	(–0.249)	(–2.853)	(–3.187)	(1.631)
FF×TRANS	4.550^*	7.994^***	−0.072	9.663^**	0.564^***	0.211^**
FF×TRANS	(1.757)	(3.082)	(–1.494)	(2.227)	(7.135)	(2.050)
TRANS	−5.595^*	−8.990^***	−0.048	−0.529	−0.008^**	0.135^*
TRANS	(–1.759)	(–4.639)	(–0.658)	(–0.196)	(–2.173)	(1.710)
SIZE	−0.012	−0.020	0.127^*	0.002	−0.002	0.023
SIZE	(–0.491)	(–0.737)	(1.803)	(0.085)	(–0.088)	(1.289)
LEV	0.520^*	0.499	0.247	0.543^*	0.524	0.534^*
LEV	(1.767)	(1.632)	(0.520)	(1.904)	(1.514)	(1.773)
ROA	−2.673^***	−2.650^***	−2.721^***	−2.603^***	−2.515^***	−2.486^***
ROA	(–5.974)	(–5.859)	(–5.775)	(–6.462)	(–6.640)	(–5.499)
BM	0.046	0.045	0.657^**	0.080	0.081	0.128
BM	(0.290)	(0.286)	(2.303)	(0.502)	(0.429)	(0.746)
RET	0.179^***	0.183^***	0.138^*	0.153^***	0.175^***	0.104^*
RET	(3.000)	(2.995)	(1.811)	(2.584)	(2.879)	(1.785)
SGROWTH	0.143^*	0.142^*	0.022	0.135	0.145	0.126
SGROWTH	(1.723)	(1.757)	(0.175)	(1.638)	(1.386)	(1.511)
CFO	−0.058	−0.058	0.401	−0.053	−0.070	−0.049
CFO	(–0.605)	(–0.622)	(1.255)	(–0.572)	(–0.999)	(–0.516)
STD_CFO	2.453^***	2.422^***	2.817^***	2.470^***	2.267^***	2.365^***
STD_CFO	(9.439)	(9.614)	(3.418)	(9.216)	(7.412)	(8.718)
FAGE	0.012	0.015	−0.248^**	0.024	0.007	0.048
FAGE	(0.168)	(0.209)	(–2.427)	(0.329)	(0.118)	(0.640)
EMPTURN	0.017^***	0.017^***	0.015^***	0.017^***	0.018^***	0.016^***
EMPTURN	(7.483)	(7.481)	(4.925)	(7.436)	(8.249)	(7.374)
BLOCK	−0.002	−0.002	−0.013^*	−0.002	0.000	−0.002
BLOCK	(–0.301)	(–0.312)	(–1.670)	(–0.273)	(0.046)	(–0.200)
BSIZE	0.244^*	0.240^*	0.202^*	0.250^*	0.249^*	0.249^*
BSIZE	(1.816)	(1.810)	(1.891)	(1.860)	(1.957)	(1.844)
BIND	−0.079	−0.094	0.103	−0.065	−0.030	−0.064
BIND	(–0.902)	(–1.078)	(0.796)	(–0.705)	(–0.239)	(–0.665)
CEO_DUAL	−0.411^***	−0.412^***	−0.545^***	−0.413^***	−0.415^***	−0.403^***
CEO_DUAL	(–7.088)	(–7.143)	(–9.295)	(–7.289)	(–8.043)	(–6.221)
CEO_GENDER	−0.290^***	−0.294^***	0.109	−0.289^***	−0.302^**	−0.294^***
CEO_GENDER	(–3.649)	(–3.746)	(0.650)	(–3.617)	(–2.462)	(–3.453)
CEO_OWN	0.338	0.343	0.203	0.332	0.067	0.366
CEO_OWN	(1.063)	(1.055)	(0.262)	(0.947)	(0.136)	(1.112)
Constant	−1.541^***	−1.456^***	−2.146^***	−1.625^***	−1.402^***	−1.267^***
Constant	(–5.550)	(–6.196)	(–3.627)	(–5.066)	(–5.297)	(–4.552)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	15,726	15,726	15,726	15,726	13,787	15,438
Pseudo-R²	0.043	0.044	0.048	0.043	0.043	0.044

	Dependent Variable = CEO_TURN
	RFERROR	RFDISP	COVERAGE	RSPREAD	REM	RIDYORISK
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
FF	−0.231^**	−0.221^**	−0.066	−0.526^***	−0.267^***	0.563
FF	(–2.386)	(–2.428)	(–0.249)	(–2.853)	(–3.187)	(1.631)
FF×TRANS	4.550^*	7.994^***	−0.072	9.663^**	0.564^***	0.211^**
FF×TRANS	(1.757)	(3.082)	(–1.494)	(2.227)	(7.135)	(2.050)
TRANS	−5.595^*	−8.990^***	−0.048	−0.529	−0.008^**	0.135^*
TRANS	(–1.759)	(–4.639)	(–0.658)	(–0.196)	(–2.173)	(1.710)
SIZE	−0.012	−0.020	0.127^*	0.002	−0.002	0.023
SIZE	(–0.491)	(–0.737)	(1.803)	(0.085)	(–0.088)	(1.289)
LEV	0.520^*	0.499	0.247	0.543^*	0.524	0.534^*
LEV	(1.767)	(1.632)	(0.520)	(1.904)	(1.514)	(1.773)
ROA	−2.673^***	−2.650^***	−2.721^***	−2.603^***	−2.515^***	−2.486^***
ROA	(–5.974)	(–5.859)	(–5.775)	(–6.462)	(–6.640)	(–5.499)
BM	0.046	0.045	0.657^**	0.080	0.081	0.128
BM	(0.290)	(0.286)	(2.303)	(0.502)	(0.429)	(0.746)
RET	0.179^***	0.183^***	0.138^*	0.153^***	0.175^***	0.104^*
RET	(3.000)	(2.995)	(1.811)	(2.584)	(2.879)	(1.785)
SGROWTH	0.143^*	0.142^*	0.022	0.135	0.145	0.126
SGROWTH	(1.723)	(1.757)	(0.175)	(1.638)	(1.386)	(1.511)
CFO	−0.058	−0.058	0.401	−0.053	−0.070	−0.049
CFO	(–0.605)	(–0.622)	(1.255)	(–0.572)	(–0.999)	(–0.516)
STD_CFO	2.453^***	2.422^***	2.817^***	2.470^***	2.267^***	2.365^***
STD_CFO	(9.439)	(9.614)	(3.418)	(9.216)	(7.412)	(8.718)
FAGE	0.012	0.015	−0.248^**	0.024	0.007	0.048
FAGE	(0.168)	(0.209)	(–2.427)	(0.329)	(0.118)	(0.640)
EMPTURN	0.017^***	0.017^***	0.015^***	0.017^***	0.018^***	0.016^***
EMPTURN	(7.483)	(7.481)	(4.925)	(7.436)	(8.249)	(7.374)
BLOCK	−0.002	−0.002	−0.013^*	−0.002	0.000	−0.002
BLOCK	(–0.301)	(–0.312)	(–1.670)	(–0.273)	(0.046)	(–0.200)
BSIZE	0.244^*	0.240^*	0.202^*	0.250^*	0.249^*	0.249^*
BSIZE	(1.816)	(1.810)	(1.891)	(1.860)	(1.957)	(1.844)
BIND	−0.079	−0.094	0.103	−0.065	−0.030	−0.064
BIND	(–0.902)	(–1.078)	(0.796)	(–0.705)	(–0.239)	(–0.665)
CEO_DUAL	−0.411^***	−0.412^***	−0.545^***	−0.413^***	−0.415^***	−0.403^***
CEO_DUAL	(–7.088)	(–7.143)	(–9.295)	(–7.289)	(–8.043)	(–6.221)
CEO_GENDER	−0.290^***	−0.294^***	0.109	−0.289^***	−0.302^**	−0.294^***
CEO_GENDER	(–3.649)	(–3.746)	(0.650)	(–3.617)	(–2.462)	(–3.453)
CEO_OWN	0.338	0.343	0.203	0.332	0.067	0.366
CEO_OWN	(1.063)	(1.055)	(0.262)	(0.947)	(0.136)	(1.112)
Constant	−1.541^***	−1.456^***	−2.146^***	−1.625^***	−1.402^***	−1.267^***
Constant	(–5.550)	(–6.196)	(–3.627)	(–5.066)	(–5.297)	(–4.552)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	15,726	15,726	15,726	15,726	13,787	15,438
Pseudo-R²	0.043	0.044	0.048	0.043	0.043	0.044

Note(s): This table presents the regression results of the relationship between family firms and CEO turnover, and the moderating role of corporate transparency in this relationship using individual and alternative proxies of corporate transparency. Models (1)–(4) indicate the results of the impacts of family firms and corporate transparency on CEO turnover using each of the individual proxies for corporate transparency. Models (5)–(6) indicate the results of the impacts of family firms and corporate transparency on CEO turnover using each of the alternative proxies for corporate transparency. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics clustered by firm and year. Superscript ^***, ^** and ^* represent significance levels at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix

Source(s): Authors' own work

[ViewLarge]

Sharing Unavailable