Mediating role of tax avoidance in the interaction role of family firms with corporate transparency and CEO turnover
| DV=CEO_TURN | DV = TAX_AVOID | DV=CEO_TURN | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | |
| FF×TRANS | 0.017*** | −0.002* | 0.017*** |
| (4.340) | (–1.890) | (4.418) | |
| TAX_AVOID | – | – | 0.210*** |
| (5.010) | |||
| FF | −0.048*** | 0.002 | −0.048*** |
| (–5.690) | (1.090) | (–5.738) | |
| TRANS | −0.017*** | −0.001 | −0.017*** |
| (–5.130) | (–1.540) | (–5.068) | |
| Intercept | 0.088 | −0.006 | 0.090 |
| (0.320) | (–0.120) | (0.329) | |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 14,626 | 14,626 | 14,626 |
| R2 | 0.056 | 0.233 | 0.057 |
| Mediating effects | |||
| Indirect effect: FF_TRANS ×TAX_AVOID | −0.0003* | ||
| z-statistic for indirect effect: FF_TRANS ×TAX_AVOID | (–1.765) | ||
| Direct effect | 0.0178 | ||
| Total effect | 0.0172 | ||
| % of total mediated effect | 1.744% | ||
| DV=CEO_TURN | DV = TAX_AVOID | DV=CEO_TURN | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | |
| 0.017*** | −0.002* | 0.017*** | |
| (4.340) | (–1.890) | (4.418) | |
| – | – | 0.210*** | |
| (5.010) | |||
| −0.048*** | 0.002 | −0.048*** | |
| (–5.690) | (1.090) | (–5.738) | |
| −0.017*** | −0.001 | −0.017*** | |
| (–5.130) | (–1.540) | (–5.068) | |
| Intercept | 0.088 | −0.006 | 0.090 |
| (0.320) | (–0.120) | (0.329) | |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 14,626 | 14,626 | 14,626 |
| 0.056 | 0.233 | 0.057 | |
| Indirect effect: | −0.0003* | ||
| (–1.765) | |||
| Direct effect | 0.0178 | ||
| Total effect | 0.0172 | ||
| % of total mediated effect | 1.744% | ||
Note(s): This table presents the regression results examining the mediating role of tax avoidance in the relationship between corporate transparency in family firms and CEO turnover. Model (1) shows the association between corporate transparency in family firms and CEO turnover. Model (2) reports the association between corporate transparency in family firms and tax avoidance. Model (3) shows the impact of corporate transparency in family firms on CEO turnover after controlling for the mediator variable, tax avoidance. Superscripts ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix
Source(s): Authors' own work
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